Factor shares, the price markup, and the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor.

In a Walrasian labor market, the labor income share is constant under the assumptions of a Cobb-Douglas production function and perfect competition. Given the observed decline of the labor share in recent decades, this paper relaxes these assumptions, proposes a time-series calculation of the aggregate price mark-up reflecting the degree of imperfect competition in the product market, and provides estimates of the elasticity of substitution under such product market imperfections. We focus on Spain and the U.S. and show that the elasticity of substitution is above one in Spain and below one in the U.S. We also show that the price markup drives the elasticity of substitution away from one, upwards in Spain, downwards in the U.S. These results are used to explain the declining path of the labor income share, common to both economies, and their contrasted patterns in terms of capital deepening.

Sunk costs, extensive R&D subsidies and permanent inducement effects

We study whether there is scope for using subsidies to smooth out barriers to R&D performance and expand the share of R&D firms in Spain. We consider a dynamic model with sunk entry costs in which firms’ optimal participation strategy is defined in terms of two subsidy thresholds that characterise entry and continuation. We compute the subsidy thresholds from the estimates of a dynamic panel data type-2 tobit model for an unbalanced panel of about 2,000 Spanish manufacturing firms. The results suggest that “extensive” subsidies are a feasible and efficient tool for expanding the share of R&D firms.

Informality and overeducation in the labor market of a developing country

In this paper, we explore the connection between labor market segmentation in two sectors, a modern protected formal sector and a traditional- unprotected-informal sector, and overeducation in a developing country. Informality is thought to have negative consequences, primarily through poorer working conditions, lack of social security, as well as low levels of productivity throughout the economy. This paper considers an aspect that has not been previously addressed, namely the fact that informality might also affect the way workers match their actual education with that required performing their job. We use micro-data from Colombia to test the relationship between overeducation and informality. Empirical results suggest that, once the endogeneity of employment choice has been accounted for, formal male workers are less likely to be overeducated. Interestingly, the propensity of being overeducated among women does not seem to be closely related to the employment choice.

Bayesian nash equilibrium in ''linear'' cournot models with private information about costs

Calculating explicit closed form solutions of Cournot models where firms have private information about their costs is, in general, very cumbersome. Most authors consider therefore linear demands and constant marginal costs. However, within this framework, the nonnegativity constraint on prices (and quantities) has been ignored or not properly dealt with and the correct calculation of all Bayesian Nash equilibria is more complicated than expected. Moreover, multiple symmetric and interior Bayesianf equilibria may exist for an open set of parameters. The reason for this is that linear demand is not really linear, since there is a kink at zero price: the general ''linear'' inverse demand function is P (Q) = max{a - bQ, 0} rather than P (Q) = a - bQ.

The hidden costs of hidden debt

We report evidence that salience may have economically signi.cant e¤ects on homeowners.borrowing behavior, through a bias in favour of less salient but more costly loans. Survey evidence corroborates the existence of such a bias. We outline a simple model in which some consumers are biased and show that under plausible assumptions this affects prices in equilibrium. Market data support the predictions of the model.

Determinants sociodemogràfics, incentius i rendiments econòmics de l'aprenentage de l'idioma Català per part de la població immigrant a Catalunya

En aquest projecte s’han estudiat diferents aspectes relacionats amb l’aprenentatge del català per part de la població immigrant. Aquest es un tema rellevant donat que les habilitats idiomàtiques dels immigrants es una altra forma de capital humà, que no només facilita la seva integració social, sinó que també incrementa les seves oportunitats laborals. En aquest estudi s’ha enfocat l’aprenentatge de l’idioma català per part de la població immigrant com una inversió de la qual es deriven costos i beneficis. Una qüestió rellevant és quins son els incentius que els immigrants que ja parlen el castellà, bé per que és la seva llengua materna o per que l’han après amb posterioritat, tenen per aprendre la llengua catalana. Aquest estudi es encara més interessant si considerem aquells immigrants que no tenen un nivell fluït del castellà, i encara més els que arriben a Catalunya sense conèixer cap de les dues llegües oficials. Aquest estudi es centra en els determinants econòmics i demogràfics del nivell de coneixement del català entre els immigrants a Catalunya. En aquest sentit, és clau determinar el rol que juguen variables com el grau d’exposició, eficiència i els incentius econòmics, com per exemple les conseqüències laborals (salaris i oportunitat de treball). Tanmateix, també es important determinar si viure en entorns on hi ha una gran concentració d’immigrants d’un mateix país exerceix un efecte depressor en l’aprenentatge del català per part dels immigrants. La segona part del projecte ha consistit en estimar un model per contrastar la hipòtesi de si el coneixement del català per part dels immigrants implica un millor salari. Per altra banda, també analitzarem si aquest coneixement del català implícita tenir accés a millors oportunitats de treball. La confirmació d’aquestes hipòtesis implicaria que els immigrants realment tenen un incentiu econòmic per invertir en l’aprenentatge del català.     

A sequential model for older workers' labor transitions after a health shock

In this work we study older workers'(50-64) labor force transitions after a health/disability shock. We find that the probability of keeping working decreases with both age and severity of the shock. Moreover, we find strong interactions between age and severity in the 50-64 age range and none in the 30-49 age range. Regarding demographics we find that being female and married reduce the probability of keeping work. On the contrary, being main breadwinner, education and skill levels increase it. Interestingly, the effect of some demographics changes its sign when we look at transitions from inactivity to work. This is the case of being married or having a working spouse. Undoubtedly, leisure complementarities should play a role in the latter case. Since the data we use contains a very detailed information on disabilities, we are able to evaluate the marginal effect of each type of disability either in the probability of keeping working or in returning back to work. Some of these results may have strong policy implications.

Social Security in Theory and Practice (II): Efficiency Theories, Narrative Theories, and Implications for Reform

166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forces create and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999b) document several of the internationally and historically common features of social security programs, and explore "political" theories of Social Security. This paper discusses the "efficiency theories", which view creation of the SS program as a full of partial solution to some market failure. Efficiency explanations of social security include the "SS as welfare for the elderly" the "retirement increases productivity to optimally manage human capital externalities", "optimal retirement insurance", the "prodigal father problem", the "misguided Keynesian", the "optimal longevity insurance", the "government economizing transaction costs", and the "return on human capital investment". We also analyze four "narrative" theories of social security: the "chain letter theory", the "lump of labor theory", the "monopoly capitalism theory", and the "Sub-but-Nearly-Optimal policy response to private pensions theory". The political and efficiency explanations are compared with the international and historical facts and used to derive implications for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan. Most of the explanations suggest that forced savings does not increase welfare, and may decrease it.

The Labor Market Effects of Technology Shocks

We analyze the labor market effects of neutral and investment-specific technology shocks along the intensive margin (hours worked) and the extensive margin (unemployment). We characterize the dynamic response of unemployment in terms of the job separation and the job finding rate. Labor market adjustments occur along the extensive margin in response to neutral shocks, along the intensive margin in response to investment specific shocks. The job separation rate accounts for a major portion of the impact response of unemployment. Neutral shocks prompt a contemporaneous increase in unemployment because of a sharp rise in the separation rate. This is prolonged by a persistent fall in the job finding rate. Investment specific shocks rise employment and hours worked. Neutral shocks explain a substantial portion of the volatility of unemployment and output; investment specific shocks mainly explain hours worked volatility. This suggests that neutral progress is consistent with Schumpeterian creative destruction, while investment-specific progress operates as in a neoclassical growth model.

The Simple Economics of Conglomeration with Bankruptcy Costs: Separate or Joint Financing?

Which projects should be financed through separate non-recourse loans (or limited- liability companies) and which should be bundled into a single loan? In the pres- ence of bankruptcy costs, this conglomeration decision trades off the benefit of co- insurance with the cost of risk contamination. This paper characterize this tradeoff for projects with binary returns, depending on the mean, variability, and skewness of returns, the bankruptcy recovery rate, the correlation across projects, the number of projects, and their heterogeneous characteristics. In some cases, separate financing dominates joint financing, even though it increases the interest rate or the probability of bankruptcy.

Employment Protection, International Specialization, and Innovation

We develop a model to analyse the implications of firing costs on incentives for R&D and international specialization. The Key idea is paying the firing cost, the country with a rigid labor market will tend to produce relatively secure goods, at a late stage of their product life cycle. Under international trade, an international product cycle emerges where, roughly, new goods are first produced in the low firing cost country will specialize in 'secondary innovations', that is, improvements in existing goods, while the low firing cost country will more specialize in 'primary innovation', that is, invention of new goods.

Self-serving biases: Evidence from a simulated labor relationship

Previous studies have found evidence of a self-serving bias in bargaining and dispute resolution. We use experimental data to test for this effect in a simulated labor relatonship. We finda consistent discrepancy between employer beliefs and employee actions that can only be attributed to self-serving biases. This discrepancy is evident through stated beliefs, revealed satisfaction, and actual actions. We present evidenceand discuss implications.

Attribution and reciprocity in a simulated labor market: An experimental investigation

While papers such as Akerlof and Yellen (1990) and Rabin (1993) argue that psychological considerations such as fairness and reciprocity are important in individual decision-making, there is little explicit empirical evidence of reciprocal altruism in economic environments. This paper tests whether attribution of volition in choosing a wage has a significant effect on subsequent costly effort provision. An experiment was conducted in which subjects are first randomly divided into groups of employers and employees. Wages were selected and employees asked to choose an effort level, where increased effort is costly to the employee, but highly beneficial to the employer. The wage-determination process was common knowledge and wages were chosen either by the employer or by an external process. There is evidence for both distributional concerns and reciprocal altruism. The slope of the effort/wage profile is clearly positive in all cases, but is significantly higher when wages are chosen by the employer, offering support for the hypothesis of reciprocity. There are implications for models of utility and a critique of some current models is presented.

A sequential model for older workers’ labor transitions after a health shock

In this work we study older workers (50 64) labor force transitions after a health/disability shock. We find that the probability of keeping working decreases with both age and severity of the shock. Moreover, we find strong interactions between age and severity in the 50 64 age range and none in the 30 49 age range. Regarding demographics we find that being female and married reduce the probability of keeping work. On the contrary, being main breadwinner, education and skill levels increase it. Interestingly, the effect of some demographics changes its sign when we look at transitions from inactivity to work. This is the case of being married or having a working spouse. Undoubtedly, leisure complementarities should play a role in the latter case. Since the data we use contains a very detailed information on disabilities, we are able to evaluate the marginal effect of each type of disability either in the probability of keeping working or in returning back to work. Some of these results may have strong policy implications.

Toward a theory of labor market institutions

Standard economic analysis holds that labor market rigidities are harmfulfor job creation and typically increase unemployment. But many orthodoxreforms of the labor market have proved difficult to implement because ofpolitical opposition. For these reasons it is important to explain why weobserve such regulations. In this paper I outline a theory of how they may arise and why they fit together. This theory is fully developed in aforthcoming book (Saint-Paul (2000)), to which the reader is referred forfurther details.