A note on discrete claims problems

In this note, we consider claims problems with indivisible goods. Specifically, by applying recursively the P-rights lower bound (Jiménez-Gómez and Marco-Gil (2008)), we ensure the fulfillment of Weak Order Preservation, considered by many authors as a minimal requirement of fairness. Moreover, we retrieve the Discrete Constrained Equal Losses and the Discrete Constrained Equal Awards rules (Herrero and Martíınez (2008)). Finally, by the recursive double imposition of a lower and an upper bound, we obtain the average between them. Keywords: Claims problems, Indivisibilities, Order Preservation, Constrained Egalitarian rules, Midpoint. JEL classification: C71, D63, D71.

Fair bounds based solidarity

How should scholarships be distributed among the (public) higher education students? We raise this situation as a redistribution problem. Following the approach developed in Fleurbaey (1994) and Bossert (1995), redistribution should be based on the notion of solidarity and it re-allocates resources taking into account only agents’ relevant characteristics. We also follow Luttens (2010a), who considers that compensation of relevant characteristics must be based on a lower bound on what every individual deserves. In doing so, we use the so-called fair bound (Moulin (2002)) to define an egalitarian redistribution mechanism and characterize it in terms of non-negativity, priority in lower bound and solidarity. Finally, we apply our approach to the scholarships redistribution problem. Keywords: Redistribution mechanism, Lower bounds, Scholarship, Solidarity. JEL classification: C71, D63, D71

Signalling and Productivity Effects of Overeducation: Is It Really a Waste of Resources?

Overeducation raises concerns that governments may be overinvesting in education. To inform the debate, this paper studies the impact of overeducation on productivity. We advance the literature by considering that returns to overeducation may be due both to productivity and signalling effects. To disentangle both effects, we apply Wolpin’s (1977) methodology and compare the rates of return of screened (employed) and unscreened (selfemployed) workers. To overcome well-known endogeneity problems due to unobserved heterogeneity, we estimate a panel with individual and employment-status fixed effects. Our results show that signalling effects are relevant and that overeducation does not carry a productivity penalty. Keywords: Overeducation, signalling model, human capital model, unobserved heterogeneity. JEL classification: I20, J24, J31.

A fractionally integrated approach to monetary policy and inflation dynamics

This paper relaxes the standard I(0) and I(1) assumptions typically stated in the monetary VAR literature by considering a richer framework that encompasses the previous two processes as well as other fractionally integrated possibilities. First, a timevarying multivariate spectrum is estimated for post WWII US data. Then, a structural fractionally integrated VAR (VARFIMA) is fitted to each of the resulting time dependent spectra. In this way, both the coefficients of the VAR and the innovation variances are allowed to evolve freely. The model is employed to analyze inflation persistence and to evaluate the stance of US monetary policy. Our findings indicate a strong decline in the innovation variances during the great disinflation, consistent with the view that the good performance of the economy during the 80’s and 90’s is in part a tale of good luck. However, we also find evidence of a decline in inflation persistence together with a stronger monetary response to inflation during the same period. This last result suggests that the Fed may still play a role in accounting for the observed differences in the US inflation history. Finally, we conclude that previous evidence against drifting coefficients could be an artifact of parameter restriction towards the stationary region. Keywords: monetary policy, inflation persistence, fractional integration, timevarying coefficients, VARFIMA. JEL Classification: E52, C32

Hours worked - Productivity puzzle: identification in fractional integration settings

A recent finding of the structural VAR literature is that the response of hours worked to a technology shock depends on the assumption on the order of integration of the hours. In this work we relax this assumption, allowing for fractional integration and long memory in the process for hours and productivity. We find that the sign and magnitude of the estimated impulse responses of hours to a positive technology shock depend crucially on the assumptions applied to identify them. Responses estimated with short-run identification are positive and statistically significant in all datasets analyzed. Long-run identification results in negative often not statistically significant responses. We check validity of these assumptions with the Sims (1989) procedure, concluding that both types of assumptions are appropriate to recover the impulse responses of hours in a fractionally integrated VAR. However, the application of longrun identification results in a substantial increase of the sampling uncertainty. JEL Classification numbers: C22, E32. Keywords: technology shock, fractional integration, hours worked, structural VAR, identification

The equity core and the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core

In this paper, we characterize the non-emptiness of the equity core (Selten, 1978) and provide a method, easy to implement, for computing the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core (Dutta-Ray, 1991). Both results are based on a geometrical decomposition of the equity core as a finite union of polyhedrons. Keywords: Cooperative game, equity core, equal division core, Lorenz domination. JEL classification: C71

Supply Multipliers in Two Regional Economies

This paper focuses on the analysis of the economic impact that sectorial total factor productivity – or valued added - gains have on two regional Spanish economies (Catalonia and Extremadura). In particular it is studied the quantitative effect that each sector’s valued added injections has on household welfare (real disposable income), on the consumption price indices and factor relative prices, on real production (GDP) and on the government and foreign net income. To do that, we introduce the concept of supply multiplier. The analytical approach consists of a computable general equilibrium model, in which it is assumed perfect competition and cleared markets of goods and factors. All the parameters and exogenous variables of the model are calibrated by means of two social accounting matrices, one for each region under study. The results allow identifying those sectors with the greatest multipliers impact on consumer welfare as the key sectors in the regional economies. Keywords: efficiency gains, supply multipliers, key sectors, computable general equilibrium. JEL Classification: C68, R13.

Do more educated leaders raise citizens’ education?

This paper looks at the contribution of political leaders to enhance citizens education and investigate how the educational attainment of the population is affected while a leader with higher education remains in office. For this purpose, we consider educational transitions of political leaders in office and find that the educational attainment of population increases when a more educated leader remains in office. Furthermore, we also observe that the educational attainment of the population is negatively impacted when a country transitions from an educated leader to a less educated one. This result may help to explain the previous finding that more educated political leaders favor economic growth. Key Words: Political leaders, Primary Education, School Achievement, Political institutions. JEL classification: I21,I25,I28.

Spatial Exploration of Age Distribution in Catalan Municipalities

This paper takes the shelf and digs into the complex population’s age structure of Catalan municipalities for the year 2009. Catalonia is a very heterogeneous territory, and age pyramids vary considerably across different areas of the territory, existing geographical factors shaping municipalities’ age distributions. By means of spatial statistics methodologies, this piece of research tries to assess which spatial factors determine the location, scale and shape of local distributions. The results show that there exist different distributional patterns across the geography according to specific local determinants. Keywords: Spatial Models. JEL Classification: C21.

On reduced games and the lexmax solution

For a family of reduced games satisfying a monotonicity property, we introduced the reduced equal split-off set, an extension of the equal split-off set (Branzei et. al, 2006), and study its relation with the core. Regardless of the reduction operation we consider, the intersection between both sets is either empty or a singleton containing the lexmax solution (Arin et al., 2008). We also provide a procedure for computing the lexmax solution for a class of games that includes games with large core (Sharkey, 1982). [JEL Classification: C71]

Moral Hazard in Repeated Procurement of Services

This paper analyzes repeated procurement of services as a four-stage game divided into two periods. In each period there is (1) a contest stage à la Tullock in which the principal selects an agent and (2) a service stage in which the selected agent provides a service. Since this service effort is non-verifiable, the principal faces a moral hazard problem at the service stages. This work considers how the principal should design the period-two contest to mitigate the moral hazard problem in the period-one service stage and to maximize total service and contest efforts. It is shown that the principal must take account of the agent's past service effort in the period-two contest success function. The results indicate that the optimal way to introduce this `bias' is to choose a certain degree of complementarity between past service and current contest efforts. This result shows that contests with `additive bias' (`multiplicative bias') are optimal in incentive problems when effort cost is low (high). Furthermore, it is shown that the severity of the moral hazard problem increases with the cost of service effort (compared to the cost of contest effort) and the number of agents. Finally, the results are extended to more general contest success functions. JEL classification: C72; D82 Key words: Biased contests; Moral Hazard; Repeated Game; Incentives.

A Theory of Representative Behavior in the Dictator Game

In this paper we present a model of representative behavior in the dictator game. Individuals have simultaneous and non-contradictory preferences over monetary payoffs, altruistic actions and equity concerns. We require that these behaviors must be aggregated and founded in principles of representativeness and empathy. The model results match closely the observed mean split and replicate other empirical regularities (for instance, higher stakes reduce the willingness to give). In addition, we connect representative behavior with an allocation rule built on psychological and behavioral arguments. An approach consistently neglected in this literature. Key words: Dictator Game, Behavioral Allocation Rules, Altruism, Equity Concerns, Empathy, Self-interest JEL classification: C91, D03, D63, D74.

A Sequential Allocation Problem: The Asymptotic Distribution of Resources

In this paper we consider a sequential allocation problem with n individuals. The first individual can consume any amount of some endowment leaving the remaining for the second individual, and so on. Motivated by the limitations associated with the cooperative or non-cooperative solutions we propose a new approach. We establish some axioms that should be satisfied, representativeness, impartiality, etc. The result is a unique asymptotic allocation rule. It is shown for n = 2; 3; 4; and a claim is made for general n. We show that it satisfies a set of desirable properties. Key words: Sequential allocation rule, River sharing problem, Cooperative and non-cooperative games, Dictator and ultimatum games. JEL classification: C79, D63, D74.

The global carbon budget:a conflicting claims problem

Despite global environmental governance has traditionally couched global warming in terms of annual CO2 emissions (a flow), global mean temperature is actually determined by cumulative CO2 emissions in the atmosphere (a stock). Thanks to advances of scientific community, nowadays it is possible to quantify the \global carbon budget", that is, the amount of available cumulative CO2 emissions before crossing the 2oC threshold (Meinshausen et al., 2009). The current approach proposes to analyze the allocation of such global carbon budget among countries as a classical conflicting claims problem (O'Neill, 1982). Based on some appealing principles, it is proposed an efficient and sustainable allocation of the available carbon budget from 2000 to 2050 taking into account different environmental risk scenarios. Keywords: Carbon budget, Conflicting claims problem, Distribution, Climate change. JEL classification: C79, D71, D74, H41, H87, Q50, Q54, Q58.

Regional determinants of firm entry in a developing country

We analyse the determinants of firm entry in developing countries using Argentina as an illustrative case. Our main finding is that although most of the regional determinants used in previous studies analysing developed countries are also relevant here, there is a need for additional explanatory variables that proxy for the specificities of developing economies (e.g., poverty, informal economy and idle capacity).We also find evidence of a core-periphery pattern in the spatial structure of entry that seems to be mostly driven by differences in agglomeration economies. Since regional policies aiming to attract new firms are largely based on evidence from developed countries, our results raise doubts about the usefulness of such policies when applied to developing economies. JEL classification: R12, R30, C33. Key words: Firm entry, Argentina, count data models.