Biana: a software framework for compiling biological interactions and analyzing networks

Background: The analysis and usage of biological data is hindered by the spread of information across multiple repositories and the difficulties posed by different nomenclature systems and storage formats. In particular, there is an important need for data unification in the study and use of protein-protein interactions. Without good integration strategies, it is difficult to analyze the whole set of available data and its properties.Results: We introduce BIANA (Biologic Interactions and Network Analysis), a tool for biological information integration and network management. BIANA is a Python framework designed to achieve two major goals: i) the integration of multiple sources of biological information, including biological entities and their relationships, and ii) the management of biological information as a network where entities are nodes and relationships are edges. Moreover, BIANA uses properties of proteins and genes to infer latent biomolecular relationships by transferring edges to entities sharing similar properties. BIANA is also provided as a plugin for Cytoscape, which allows users to visualize and interactively manage the data. A web interface to BIANA providing basic functionalities is also available. The software can be downloaded under GNU GPL license from http://sbi.imim.es/web/BIANA.php.Conclusions: BIANA's approach to data unification solves many of the nomenclature issues common to systems dealing with biological data. BIANA can easily be extended to handle new specific data repositories and new specific data types. The unification protocol allows BIANA to be a flexible tool suitable for different user requirements: non-expert users can use a suggested unification protocol while expert users can define their own specific unification rules.

On the distribution of income and worker assignment under intra-firm spillovers, with an application to ideas and networks

We study the earnings structure and the equilibrium assignment of workers when workers exert intra-firm spillovers on each other.We allow for arbitrary spillovers provided output depends on some aggregate index of workers' skill. Despite the possibility of increasing returns to skills, equilibrium typically exists. We show that equilibrium will typically be segregated; that the skill space can be partitioned into a set of segments and any firm hires from only one segment. Next, we apply the model to analyze the effect of information technology on segmentation and the distribution of income. There are two types of human capital, productivity and creativity, i.e. the ability to produce ideas that may be duplicated over a network. Under plausible assumptions, inequality rises and then falls when network size increases, and the poorest workers cannot lose. We also analyze the impact of an improvement in worker quality and of an increased international mobility of ideas.

Selective hiring and welfare analysis in labor market models

Firms select not only how many, but also which workers to hire. Yet, in standardsearch models of the labor market, all workers have the same probability of being hired.We argue that selective hiring crucially affects welfare analysis. Our model is isomorphicto a search model under random hiring but allows for selective hiring. With selectivehiring, the positive predictions of the model change very little, but the welfare costsof unemployment are much larger because unemployment risk is distributed unequallyacross workers. As a result, optimal unemployment insurance may be higher and welfareis lower if hiring is selective.

Do Spanish informal caregivers come to the rescue of dependent people with formal care unmet needs?

This paper analyses the effect of unmet formal care needs on informal caregiving hours in Spain using the two wavesof the Informal Support Survey (1994, 2004). Testing for double sample selection from formal care receipt and theemergence of unmet needs provides evidence that the omission of either variable would causes underestimation of thenumber of informal caregiving hours. After controlling for these two factors the number of hours of care increaseswith both the degree of dependency and unmet needs. More importantly, in the presence of unmet needs, the numberof informal caregiving hours increases when some formal care is received. This result refutes the substitution modeland supports complementarity or task specificity between both types of care. For a given combination of formal careand unmet needs, informal caregiving hours increased between 1994 and 2004. Finally, in the model for 2004, theselection term associated with the unmet needs equation is larger than that of the formal care equation, suggestingthat using the number of formal care recipients as a quality indicator may be confounding, if we do not complete thisinformation with other quality indicators.

The dynamics of research networks in Brite-Euram

Network formation within the BRITE--EURAM program is investigated.Wedescribe the role of the hub of the network, which is defined as the setofmain contractors that account for most of the participations. We studytheeffects that the conflict of objectives within European research fundingbetween pre-competitive research vs. European cohesion has on theformationof networks and on the relationship between different partnersof the network. \\A panel data set is constructed including the second and third frameworkof theBrite--Euram program. A model of joint production of research results isusedto test for changes in the behavior of partners within the twoframeworks. \\The main findings are that participations are very concentrated, that isasmall group of institutions account for most of the participations, butgoingfrom the second to the third framework the presence of subcontractorsand singleparticipants increases substantially. This result is reinforced by the factthat main contractors receive smaller spill-ins within networks, butspill-insincrease from the second to the third framework.

Competitive location and pricing on networks

In this paper we consider a location and pricing model for a retail firm that wants to enter a spatial market where a competitor firm is already operating as a monopoly with several outlets. The entering firms seeks to determine the optimal uniform mill price and its servers' locations that maximizes profits given the reaction in price of the competitor firm to its entrance. A tabu search procedure is presentedto solve the model together with computational experience.

Median problems in networks

The P-median problem is a classical location model par excellence . In this paper we, firstexamine the early origins of the problem, formulated independently by Louis Hakimi andCharles ReVelle, two of the fathers of the burgeoning multidisciplinary field of researchknown today as Facility Location Theory and Modelling. We then examine some of thetraditional heuristic and exact methods developed to solve the problem. In the third sectionwe analyze the impact of the model in the field. We end the paper by proposing new lines ofresearch related to such a classical problem.

Employee referrals and efficiency wages

Many workers believe that personal contacts are crucial for obtainingjobs in high-wage sectors. On the other hand, firms in high-wage sectorsreport using employee referrals because they help provide screening andmonitoring of new employees. This paper develops a matching model thatcan explain the link between inter-industry wage differentials and useof employee referrals. Referrals lower monitoring costs because high-effortreferees can exert peer pressure on co-workers, allowing firms to pay lowerefficiency wages. On the other hand, informal search provides fewer job andapplicant contacts than formal methods (e.g., newspaper ads). In equilibrium,the matching process generates segmentation in the labor market becauseof heterogeneity in the size of referral networks. Referrals match good high-paying jobs to well-connected workers, while formal methods matchless attractive jobs to less-connected workers. Industry-level data show apositive correlation between industry wage premia and use of employeereferrals. Moreover, evidence using the NLSY shows similar positive andsignificant OLS and fixed-effects estimates of the returns to employeereferrals, but insignificant effects once sector of employment is controlledfor. This evidence suggests referred workers earn higher wages not becauseof higher unobserved ability or better matches but rather because theyare hired in high-wage sectors.

Hiring and firing costs, adverse selection and long-term unemployment

In this paper, we present a matching model with adverse selection that explains why flows into and out of unemployment are much lower in Europe compared to North America, while employment-to-employment flows are similar in the two continents. In the model,firms use discretion in terms of whom to fire and, thus, low quality workers are more likely to be dismissed than high quality workers. Moreover, as hiring and firing costs increase, firms find it more costly to hire a bad worker and, thus, they prefer to hire out of the pool of employed job seekers rather than out of the pool of the unemployed, who are more likely to turn out to be 'lemons'. We use microdata for Spain and the U.S. and find that the ratio of the job finding probability of the unemployed to the job finding probability of employed job seekers was smaller in Spain than in the U.S. Furthermore, using U.S. data, we find that the discrimination of the unemployed increased over the 1980's in those states that raised firing costs by introducing exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine.

Trade-off between formal and informal care in Spain

The remarkable growth of older population has moved long term care to the front ranks of the social policy agenda. Understanding the factors that determine the type and amount of formal care is important for predicting use in the future and developing long-term policy. In this context we jointly analyze the choice of care (formal, informal, both together or none) as well as the number of hours of care received. Given that the number of hours of care is not independent of the type of care received, we estimate, for the first time in this area of research, a sample selection model with the particularity that the first step is a multinomial logit model. With regard to the debate about complementarity or substitutability between formal and informal care, our results indicate that formal care acts as a reinforcement of the family care in certain cases: for very old care receivers, in those cases in which the individual has multiple disabilities, when many care hours are provided, and in case of mental illness and/or dementia. There exist substantial differences in long term care addressed to younger and older dependent people and dependent women are in risk of becoming more vulnerable to the shortage of informal caregivers in the future. Finally, we have documented that there are great disparities in the availability of public social care across regions.

A simple access pricing rule to achieve the Ramsey outcome for interconnected networks

This paper considers a general and informationally efficient approach to determine the optimal access pricing rule for interconnected networks. It shows that there exists a simple rule that achieves the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium when networks compete in linear prices without network-based price discrimination. The approach is informationally efficient in the sense that the regulator is required to know only the marginal cost structure, i.e. the marginal cost of making and terminating a call. The approach is general in that access prices can depend not only on the marginal costs but also on the retail prices, which can be observed by consumers and therefore by the regulator as well. In particular, I consider the set of linear access pricing rules which includes any fixed access price, the Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR) and the Modified ECPR as special cases. I show that in this set, there is a unique rule that implements the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium independently of the underlying demand conditions.

Bargaining on networks: An experiment

While markets are often decentralized, in many other cases agents in one role can only negotiate with a proper subset of the agents in the complementary role. There may be proximity issues or restricted communication flows. For example, information may be transmitted only through word-of-mouth, as is often the case for job openings, business opportunities, and confidential transactions. Bargaining can be considered to occur over a network that summarizes the structure of linkages among people. We conduct an alternating-offer bargaining experiment using separate simple networks, which are then joined during the session by an additional link. The results diverge sharply depending on how this connection is made. Payoffs can be systematically affected even for agents who are not connected by the new link. We use a graph-theoretic analysis to show that any two-sided network can be decomposed into simple networks of three types, so that our result can be generalized to more complex bargaining environments. Participants appear to grasp the essential characteristics of the networks and we observe a rather consistently high level of bargaining efficiency.

Optimization of multiclass queueing networks with changeover times via the achievable region approach: Part I, the single-station case

We address the performance optimization problem in a single-stationmulticlass queueing network with changeover times by means of theachievable region approach. This approach seeks to obtainperformance bounds and scheduling policies from the solution of amathematical program over a relaxation of the system's performanceregion. Relaxed formulations (including linear, convex, nonconvexand positive semidefinite constraints) of this region are developedby formulating equilibrium relations satisfied by the system, withthe help of Palm calculus. Our contributions include: (1) newconstraints formulating equilibrium relations on server dynamics;(2) a flow conservation interpretation of the constraintspreviously derived by the potential function method; (3) newpositive semidefinite constraints; (4) new work decomposition lawsfor single-station multiclass queueing networks, which yield newconvex constraints; (5) a unified buffer occupancy method ofperformance analysis obtained from the constraints; (6) heuristicscheduling policies from the solution of the relaxations.

Optimization of multiclass queueing networks with changeover times via the achievable region method: Part II, the multi-station case

We address the problem of scheduling a multi-station multiclassqueueing network (MQNET) with server changeover times to minimizesteady-state mean job holding costs. We present new lower boundson the best achievable cost that emerge as the values ofmathematical programming problems (linear, semidefinite, andconvex) over relaxed formulations of the system's achievableperformance region. The constraints on achievable performancedefining these formulations are obtained by formulatingsystem's equilibrium relations. Our contributions include: (1) aflow conservation interpretation and closed formulae for theconstraints previously derived by the potential function method;(2) new work decomposition laws for MQNETs; (3) new constraints(linear, convex, and semidefinite) on the performance region offirst and second moments of queue lengths for MQNETs; (4) a fastbound for a MQNET with N customer classes computed in N steps; (5)two heuristic scheduling policies: a priority-index policy, anda policy extracted from the solution of a linear programmingrelaxation.