A note on discrete claims problems

In this note, we consider claims problems with indivisible goods. Specifically, by applying recursively the P-rights lower bound (Jiménez-Gómez and Marco-Gil (2008)), we ensure the fulfillment of Weak Order Preservation, considered by many authors as a minimal requirement of fairness. Moreover, we retrieve the Discrete Constrained Equal Losses and the Discrete Constrained Equal Awards rules (Herrero and Martíınez (2008)). Finally, by the recursive double imposition of a lower and an upper bound, we obtain the average between them. Keywords: Claims problems, Indivisibilities, Order Preservation, Constrained Egalitarian rules, Midpoint. JEL classification: C71, D63, D71.

The Limits of Discrete Time Repeated Games:Some Notes and Comments

This paper studies the limits of discrete time repeated games with public monitoring. We solve and characterize the Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce (1991) problem. We found that for the "bad" ("good") news model the lower (higher) magnitude events suggest cooperation, i.e., zero punishment probability, while the highrt (lower) magnitude events suggest defection, i.e., punishment with probability one. Public correlation is used to connect these two sets of signals and to make the enforceability to bind. The dynamic and limit behavior of the punishment probabilities for variations in ... (the discount rate) and ... (the time interval) are characterized, as well as the limit payo¤s for all these scenarios (We also introduce uncertainty in the time domain). The obtained ... limits are to the best of my knowledge, new. The obtained ... limits coincide with Fudenberg and Levine (2007) and Fudenberg and Olszewski (2011), with the exception that we clearly state the precise informational conditions that cause the limit to converge from above, to converge from below or to degenerate. JEL: C73, D82, D86. KEYWORDS: Repeated Games, Frequent Monitoring, Random Pub- lic Monitoring, Moral Hazard, Stochastic Processes.

A distributed environment for virtual and/or real experiments for underwater robots

This paper presents the distributed environment for virtual and/or real experiments for underwater robots (DEVRE). This environment is composed of a set of processes running on a local area network composed of three sites: 1) the onboard AUV computer; 2) a surface computer used as human-machine interface (HMI); and 3) a computer used for simulating the vehicle dynamics and representing the virtual world. The HMI can be transparently linked to the real sensors and actuators dealing with a real mission. It can also be linked with virtual sensors and virtual actuators, dealing with a virtual mission. The aim of DEVRE is to assist engineers during the software development and testing in the lab prior to real experiments

Ab initio absorption spectrum of NiO combining molecular dynamics with the embedded cluster approach in a discrete reaction field

We developed a procedure that combines three complementary computational methodologies to improve the theoretical description of the electronic structure of nickel oxide. The starting point is a Car-Parrinello molecular dynamics simulation to incorporate vibrorotational degrees of freedom into the material model. By means ofcomplete active space self-consistent field second-order perturbation theory (CASPT2) calculations on embedded clusters extracted from the resulting trajectory, we describe localized spectroscopic phenomena on NiO with an efficient treatment of electron correlation. The inclusion of thermal motion into the theoretical description allowsus to study electronic transitions that, otherwise, would be dipole forbidden in the ideal structure and results in a natural reproduction of the band broadening. Moreover, we improved the embedded cluster model by incorporating self-consistently at the complete active space self-consistent field (CASSCF) level a discrete (or direct) reaction field (DRF) in the cluster surroundings. The DRF approach offers an efficient treatment ofelectric response effects of the crystalline embedding to the electronic transitions localized in the cluster. We offer accurate theoretical estimates of the absorption spectrum and the density of states around the Fermi level of NiO, and a comprehensive explanation of the source of the broadening and the relaxation of the charge transferstates due to the adaptation of the environment

Analytical expressions for the flame front speed in the downward combustion of thin solid fuels and comparison to experiments

We derive analytical expressions for the propagation speed of downward combustion fronts of thin solid fuels with a background flow initially at rest. The classical combustion model for thin solid fuels that consists of five coupled reaction-convection-diffusion equations is here reduced into a single equation with the gas temperature as the single variable. For doing so we apply a two-zone combustion model that divides the system into a preheating region and a pyrolyzing region. The speed of the combustion front is obtained after matching the temperature and its derivative at the location that separates both regions.We also derive a simplified version of this analytical expression expected to be valid for a wide range of cases. Flame front velocities predicted by our analyticalexpressions agree well with experimental data found in the literature for a large variety of cases and substantially improve the results obtained from a previous well-known analytical expression

Occupational choice and development

The rise in world trade since 1970 has been accompanied by a rise in the geographic span of control of management and, hence, also a rise in the e ective international mobility of labor services. We study the e ect of such a globalization of the world's labor markets. The world's welfare gains depend positively on the skill-heterogeneity of the world's labor force. We nd that when peoplecan choose between wage work and managerial work, the worldwide labor market raises output by more in the rich and the poor countries, and by less in the middle-income countries. This is because the middle-income countries experience the smallest change in the factor-price ratio, and where the option to choose between wage work and managerial work has the least value in the integratedeconomy. Our theory also establishes that after economic integration, the high skill countries see a disproportionate increase in managerial occupations. Using aggregate data on GDP, openness and occupations from 115 countries, we find evidence for these patterns of occupational choice.

Organizational Choice and Environmental Change

We explain the choice between franchising and vertical integration by estimating a model of relative performance in a sample of 250 Spanish car distributors, controlling for self-selection and including environmental factors. The method allows us to estimate performance counterfactuals. Organizational choice seemingly aims to contain moral hazard for both distributors and manufacturers but it is subject to start-up constraints and switching costs. While the market for franchises remained underdeveloped, information asymmetries led to the opening of integrated outlets. Their subsequent conversion into franchised outlets probably involved prohibitive transaction costs. Consequently, they performed worse than would have been expected had they been independent, as confirmed by the systematic improvement observed when they were in fact converted. The timing of such conversions suggests that switching costs were prohibitive until firms developed a substantial cushion of temporary contracts, previously forbidden by regulation.

Salience theory of choice under risk

We present a theory of choice among lotteries in which the decision maker's attention is drawn to (precisely defined) salient payoffs. This leads the decision maker to a context-dependent representation of lotteries in which true probabilities are replaced by decision weights distorted in favor of salient payoffs. By endogenizing decision weights as a function of payoffs, our model provides a novel and unified account of many empirical phenomena, including frequent risk-seeking behavior, invariance failures such as the Allais paradox, and preference reversals. It also yields new predictions, including some that distinguish it from Prospect Theory, which we test.

Optimal Contracts, Adverse Selection, and Social Preferences: An Experiment

It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly refuted by numerous experiments, and we feel that it may be useful to consider nonpecuniary utility in mechanism design and contract theory. Accordingly, we devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in an adverse-selection context. A principal proposes one of three contract menus, each of which offers a choice of two incentive-compatible contracts, to two agents whose types are unknown to the principal. The agents know the set of possible menus, and choose to either accept one of the two contracts offered in the proposed menu or to reject the menu altogether; a rejection by either agent leads to lower (and equal) reservation payoffs for all parties. While all three possible menus favor the principal, they do so to varying degrees. We observe numerous rejections of the more lopsided menus, and approach an equilibrium where one of the more equitable contract menus (which one depends on the reservation payoffs) is proposed and agents accept a contract, selecting actions according to their types. Behavior is largely consistent with all recent models of social preferences, strongly suggesting there is value in considering nonpecuniary utility in agency theory.

Do the Wealthy Risk More Money? An Experimental Comparison

Are poor people more or less likely to take money risks than wealthy folks? We find that risk attraction is more prevalent among the wealthy when the amounts of money at risk are small (not surprising, since ten dollars is a smaller amount for a wealthy person than for a poor one), but, interestingly, for the larger amounts of money at risk the fraction of the nonwealthy displaying risk attraction exceeds that of the wealthy. We also replicate our previous finding that many people display risk attraction for small money amounts, but risk aversion for large ones. We argue that preferences yielding risk attraction for small money amounts, together with risk aversion for larger amounts, at all levels of wealth, while contradicting the expected utility hypothesis, may be well-defined, independently of reference points, on the choice space.

Experiments de Pávlov aplicats als peixos

Treball de recerca realitzat per un alumne d’ensenyament secundari i guardonat amb un Premi CIRIT per fomentar l'esperit científic del Jovent l’any 2010. El motiu del treball ha estat aplicar els experiments de Pávlov realitzats amb gossos a una espècie diferent, Carassius sp, i verificar la idoneitat d'aplicar aquesta tècnica en l'espècie i estudiar així la capacitat d'apendre dels peixos.

Portfolio choice and the effects of liquidity

This paper shows how to introduce liquidity into the well known mean-variance framework of portfolio selection. Either by estimating mean-variance liquidity constrained frontiers or directly estimating optimal portfolios for alternative levels of risk aversion and preference for liquidity, we obtain strong effects of liquidity on optimal portfolio selection. In particular, portfolio performance, measured by the Sharpe ratio relative to the tangency portfolio, varies significantly with liquidity. Moreover, although mean-variance performance becomes clearly worse, the levels of liquidity onoptimal portfolios obtained when there is a positive preference for liquidity are much lower than on those optimal portfolios where investors show no sign of preference for liquidity.

Macroprudential policy, countercyclical bank capital buffers and credit supply: Evidence from the Spanish dynamic provisioning experiments

We analyze the impact of countercyclical capital buffers held by banks on the supplyof credit to firms and their subsequent performance. Spain introduced dynamicprovisioning unrelated to specific bank loan losses in 2000 and modified its formulaparameters in 2005 and 2008. In each case, individual banks were impacteddifferently. The resultant bank-specific shocks to capital buffers, coupled withcomprehensive bank-, firm-, loan-, and loan application-level data, allow us toidentify its impact on the supply of credit and on real activity. Our estimates showthat countercyclical dynamic provisioning smooths cycles in the supply of credit andin bad times upholds firm financing and performance.

Welfare of naive and sophisticated players in school choice

Two main school choice mechanisms have attracted the attention in the literature: Boston and deferred acceptance (DA). The question arises on the ex-ante welfareimplications when the game is played by participants that vary in terms of their strategicsophistication. Abdulkadiroglu, Che and Yasuda (2011) have shown that the chances ofnaive participants getting into a good school are higher under the Boston mechanism thanunder DA, and some naive participants are actually better off. In this note we show thatthese results can be extended to show that, under the veil of ignorance, i.e. students not yetknowing their utility values, all naive students may prefer to adopt the Boston mechanism.