Trade of permits for greenhouse gas emissions; bilateral trade need not be the answer

The Kyoto Protocol sets national quotas on CO2 emissions and allows international trade of these quotas. We argue that this trade is characterized by asymmetric, identity-dependent externalities, and show that bilateral trade may not be sufficient for an efficient allocation of emissions. We derive conditions under which bilateral trade does improve the allocation of permits. The conditions are strong. In this sense, we argue that, for emissions permits, market design matters.

A class of stochastic games with infinitely many interacting agents related to Glauber dynamics on random graphs

We introduce and study a class of infinite-horizon nonzero-sum non-cooperative stochastic games with infinitely many interacting agents using ideas of statistical mechanics. First we show, in the general case of asymmetric interactions, the existence of a strategy that allows any player to eliminate losses after a finite random time. In the special case of symmetric interactions, we also prove that, as time goes to infinity, the game converges to a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, assuming that all agents adopt the same strategy, using arguments related to those leading to perfect simulation algorithms, spatial mixing and ergodicity are proved. In turn, ergodicity allows us to prove “fixation”, i.e. that players will adopt a constant strategy after a finite time. The resulting dynamics is related to zerotemperature Glauber dynamics on random graphs of possibly infinite volume.

Progress Towards to Equity Market Integration in Eastern Europe

The advent of the European Union has decreased the diversification benefits available from country based equity market indices in the region. This paper measures the increase in stock integration between the three largest new EU members (Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland who joined in May 2004) and the Euro-zone. A potentially gradual transition in correlations is accommodated in a single VAR model by embedding smooth transition conditional correlation models with fat tails, spillovers, volatility clustering, and asymmetric volatility effects. At the country market index level all three Eastern European markets show a considerable increase in correlations in 2006. At the industry level the dates and transition periods for the correlations differ, and the correlations are lower although also increasing. The results show that sectoral indices in Eastern European markets may provide larger diversification opportunities than the aggregate market. JEL classifications: C32; C51; F36; G15 Keywords: Multivariate GARCH; Smooth Transition Conditional Correlation; Stock Return Comovement; Sectoral correlations; New EU Members

Bargaining one-dimensional policies and the efficiency of super majority rules

We consider negotiations selecting one-dimensional policies. Individuals have single-peaked preferences, and they are impatient. Decisions arise from a bargaining game with random proposers and (super) majority approval, ranging from the simple majority up to unanimity. The existence and uniqueness of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium is established, and its explicit characterization provided. We supply an explicit formula to determine the unique alternative that prevails, as impatience vanishes, for each majority. As an application, we examine the efficiency of majority rules. For symmetric distributions of peaks unanimity is the unanimously preferred majority rule. For asymmetric populations rules maximizing social surplus are characterized.

Disseny i caracterització d'estructures RF amb printed electronics per a RFID

En els últims anys printed electronics està aixecant un gran interès entre la indústria electrònica. Aquest tipus de procés consisteix en imprimir circuits amb tècniques d'impressió convencionals utilitzant tintes conductores, resistives, dielèctriques o semiconductores sobre substrats flexibles de baix cost com paper o plàstic. Fer servir aquestes tècniques s'espera que suposi una reducció dels costos de producció degut a que és un procés totalment additiu el que fa que sigui més senzill i es redueixi la quantitat de material emprat. El disseny de dispositius bàsics com resistències, condensadors i bobines per posteriorment veure la relació entre simulacions i valors obtinguts ha ocupat la primera part del projecte. La segona s’ha centrat en fer prototips d’antenes per a RFID (Radio Frequency IDentification) amb la tecnologia que es disposa a CEPHIS (Centre de Prototips i Solucions Hardwre-Software). Tot això ha servit per caracteritzar la tecnologia de la que es disposa i saber en quins apartats s’ha de seguir treballant per aconseguir millors prestacions.

Memory in contracts: the experience of the EBRD (1991-2003)

The objective of this paper is to identify the role of memory as a screening device in repeated contracts with asymmetric information in financial intermediation. We use an original dataset from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. We propose a simple empirical method to capture the role of memory using the client's reputation. Our results unambiguously isolate the dominant effect of memory on the bank's lending decisions over market factors in the case of established clients.

Strategic mass killings

Since World War II there have been about fifty episodes of large-scale mass killings of civilians and massive forced displacements. They were usually meticulously planned and independent of military goals. We provide a model where conflict onset, conflict intensity and the decision to commit mass killings are all endogenous, with two main goals: (1) to identify the key variables and situations that make mass killings more likely to occur; and (2) to distinguish conditions under which mass killings and military conflict intensity reinforce each other from situations where they are substitute modes of strategic violence. We predict that mass killings are most likely in societies with large natural resources, significant proportionality constraints for rent sharing, low productivity and low state capacity. Further, massacres are more likely in a civil than in an interstate war, as in the latter group sizes matter less for future rents. In non polarized societies there are asymmetric equilibria with only the larger group wanting to engage in massacres. In such settings the smaller group compensates for this by fighting harder in the first place. In this case we can talk of mass killings and fighting efforts to be substitutes. In contrast, in polarized societies either both or none of the groups can be ready to do mass killings in case of victory. Under the "shadow of mass killings" groups fight harder. Hence, in this case massacres and fighting are complements. We also present novel empirical results on the role of natural resources in mass killings and on what kinds of ethnic groups are most likely to be victimized in massacres and forced resettlements, using group level panel data.

Public and private learning from prices, strategic substitutability and complementarity, and equilibrium multiplicity

We study a general static noisy rational expectations model where investors have private information about asset payoffs, with common and private components, and about their own exposure to an aggregate risk factor, and derive conditions for existence and uniqueness (or multiplicity) of equilibria. We find that a main driver of the characterization of equilibria is whether the actions of investors are strategic substitutes or complements. This latter property in turn is driven by the strength of a private learning channel from prices, arising from the multidimensional sources of asymmetric information, in relation to the usual public learning channel. When the private learning channel is strong (weak) in relation to the public we have strong (weak) strategic complementarity in actions and potentially multiple (unique) equilibria. The results enable a precise characterization of whether information acquisition decisions are strategic substitutes or complements. We find that the strategic substitutability in information acquisition result obtained in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) is robust. JEL Classification: D82, D83, G14 Keywords: Rational expectations equilibrium, asymmetric information, risk exposure, hedging, supply information, information acquisition.

Political Competition in Hard Times

This paper analyzes a spatial model of political competition between two policy- motivated parties in hard times of crisis. Hard times are modeled in terms of policy- making costs carried by a newly elected party. The results predict policy divergence in equilibrium. If the ideological preferences of parties are quite diverse and extreme, there is a unique equilibrium in which the parties announce symmetric platforms and each party wins with probability one half. If one party is extreme while the other is more moderate, there is a unique equilibrium in which the parties announce asymmetric platforms. If the preferred policies of the parties are not very distinct, there are two equilibria with asymmetric platforms. An important property of equilibrium with asymmetric platforms is that a winning party necessarily announces its most preferred policy as a platform. JEL classification: D72. Keywords: Spatial model; Political competition; Two-party system; Policy-motivated parties; Hard times; Crisis.

Estudio de parámetros circuitales de resonadores

El objetivo de este proyecto consiste en el estudio de los parámetros circuitales (condensadores, bobinas…) de un resonador, realizado con estructuras microstrip, donde permita obtener unos resultados de esos parámetros circuitales cambiando los valores físicos del diseño, tales como la longitud y la anchura del resonador a partir de las medidas de los parámetros S. Para llevar a cabo dicho trabajo, se desarrolla en primer lugar toda la teoría necesaria de resonadores. Empezando por el funcionamiento y la estructura del resonador diseñado, y mostrando especial interés en el modelado de dicho resonador. Seguidamente, se estudia y analiza su comportamiento a través de las simulaciones de los parámetros S. Una vez se ha estudiado y analizado su comportamiento, se procede con las modificaciones de los parámetros físicos y se analiza a través de las simulaciones de los parámetros S cómo afectan estas modificaciones en los parámetros circuitales. Donde se utilizan una serie de herramientas que agilizan la extracción de los valores de los parámetros circuitales del resonador.

Applications of stochastic analysis in finance and statistical inference

First: A continuous-time version of Kyle's model (Kyle 1985), known as the Back's model (Back 1992), of asset pricing with asymmetric information, is studied. A larger class of price processes and of noise traders' processes are studied. The price process, as in Kyle's model, is allowed to depend on the path of the market order. The process of the noise traders' is an inhomogeneous Lévy process. Solutions are found by the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations. With the insider being risk-neutral, the price pressure is constant, and there is no equilibirium in the presence of jumps. If the insider is risk-averse, there is no equilibirium in the presence of either jumps or drifts. Also, it is analised when the release time is unknown. A general relation is established between the problem of finding an equilibrium and of enlargement of filtrations. Random announcement time is random is also considered. In such a case the market is not fully efficient and there exists equilibrium if the sensitivity of prices with respect to the global demand is time decreasing according with the distribution of the random time. Second: Power variations. it is considered, the asymptotic behavior of the power variation of processes of the form _integral_0^t u(s-)dS(s), where S_ is an alpha-stable process with index of stability 0&alpha&2 and the integral is an Itô integral. Stable convergence of corresponding fluctuations is established. These results provide statistical tools to infer the process u from discrete observations. Third: A bond market is studied where short rates r(t) evolve as an integral of g(t-s)sigma(s) with respect to W(ds), where g and sigma are deterministic and W is the stochastic Wiener measure. Processes of this type are particular cases of ambit processes. These processes are in general not of the semimartingale kind.

Two-sided learning in new keynesian models: dynamics, (lack of) convergence and the value of information

This paper investigates the role of learning by private agents and the central bank (two-sided learning) in a New Keynesian framework in which both sides of the economy have asymmetric and imperfect knowledge about the true data generating process. We assume that all agents employ the data that they observe (which may be distinct for different sets of agents) to form beliefs about unknown aspects of the true model of the economy, use their beliefs to decide on actions, and revise these beliefs through a statistical learning algorithm as new information becomes available. We study the short-run dynamics of our model and derive its policy recommendations, particularly with respect to central bank communications. We demonstrate that two-sided learning can generate substantial increases in volatility and persistence, and alter the behavior of the variables in the model in a signifficant way. Our simulations do not converge to a symmetric rational expectations equilibrium and we highlight one source that invalidates the convergence results of Marcet and Sargent (1989). Finally, we identify a novel aspect of central bank communication in models of learning: communication can be harmful if the central bank's model is substantially mis-specified

Capital cities of federations. On the way to analysing the normative base of their asymmetrical status

Federal Capitals often have special statutes. Compared with member states, they often enjoy a lower degree of self-government and a lesser share in the governing of the federation. Why do actors choose such devices, and how can they be justified in a liberal democracy? Surprisingly, the burgeoning literature on asymmetric federalism (to which our research group has contributed significantly) has overlooked this important feature of a de iure asymmetry, perhaps because political theory up to now has concentrated on cases of multicultural and plurinational federations. However, comparative literature is also rare. This paper is the first step to filling in this gap by comparing some federal capitals. The Federal District model (Washington) is compared to capitals organized as member-states (Berlin and Brussels), and capitals that are cities belonging to a single member state (Ottawa in Ontario). The different features of de iure asymmetry will thereby be highlighted. Some light will be shed on the possible motives, reasons and justifications for the choice of each respective status. The paper opens the door to further research on such status questions by analysing public and parliamentary debates, for example. It paves the way for more thorough research. Sicne the author has been awarded a grant by the Institut d’Estudis Autonòmics, this research will be carried out soon.

Money, Fame and the Allocation of Talent: Brain Drain, the Matthew Effect and the Institution of Science

The earning structure in science is known to be flat relative to the one in the private sector, which could cause a brain drain toward the private sector. In this paper, we assume that agents value both money and fame and study the role of the institution of science in the allocation of talent between the science sector and the private sector. Following works on the Sociology of Science, we model the institution of science as a mechanism distributing fame (i.e. peer recognition). We show that since the intrinsic performance is less noisy signal of talent in the science sector than in the private sector, a good institution of science can mitigate the brain drain. We also find that providing extra monetary incentives through the market might undermine the incentives provided by the institution and thereby worsen the brain drain. Finally, we study the optimal balance between monetary and non-monetary incentives in science.

Financial Crises and International Portfolio Dynamics

This paper analyzes the behavior of international capital flows by foreigners and domestic agents, especially during financial crises. We show that gross capital flows by foreigners and domestic agents are very large and volatile, especially relative to net capital flows. This is because when foreigners invest in a country domestic agents tend to invest abroad and vice versa. Gross capital flows are also pro-cyclical. During expansions, foreigners tend to bring in more capital and domestic agents tend to invest more abroad. During crises, there is retrenchment, i.e. a reduction in capital inflows by foreigners and an increase in capital inflows by domestic agents. This is especially true during severe crises and during systemic crises. The evidence can shed light on the nature of shocks driving international capital flows. It seems to favor shocks that affect foreigners and domestic agents asymmetrically -e.g. sovereign risk and asymmetric information- over productivity shocks.