85 resultados para requirement elicitation
Resumo:
In this note, we consider claims problems with indivisible goods. Specifically, by applying recursively the P-rights lower bound (Jiménez-Gómez and Marco-Gil (2008)), we ensure the fulfillment of Weak Order Preservation, considered by many authors as a minimal requirement of fairness. Moreover, we retrieve the Discrete Constrained Equal Losses and the Discrete Constrained Equal Awards rules (Herrero and Martíınez (2008)). Finally, by the recursive double imposition of a lower and an upper bound, we obtain the average between them. Keywords: Claims problems, Indivisibilities, Order Preservation, Constrained Egalitarian rules, Midpoint. JEL classification: C71, D63, D71.
Resumo:
Engineering of negotiation model allows to develop effective heuristic for business intelligence. Digital ecosystems demand open negotiation models. To define in advance effective heuristics is not compliant with the requirement of openness. The new challenge is to develop business intelligence in advance exploiting an adaptive approach. The idea is to learn business strategy once new negotiation model rise in the e-market arena. In this paper we present how recommendation technology may be deployed in an open negotiation environment where the interaction protocol models are not known in advance. The solution we propose is delivered as part of the ONE Platform, open source software that implements a fully distributed open environment for business negotiation
Resumo:
In experiments with two-person sequential games we analyzewhether responses to favorable and unfavorable actions dependon the elicitation procedure. In our hot treatment thesecond player responds to the first player s observed actionwhile in our cold treatment we follow the strategy method and have the second player decide on a contingent action foreach and every possible first player move, without firstobserving this move. Our analysis centers on the degree towhich subjects deviate from the maximization of their pecuniaryrewards, as a response to others actions. Our results show nodifference in behavior between the two treatments. We also findevidence of the stability of subjects preferences with respectto their behavior over time and to the consistency of theirchoices as first and second mover.
Resumo:
Scoring rules that elicit an entire belief distribution through the elicitation of point beliefsare time-consuming and demand considerable cognitive e¤ort. Moreover, the results are validonly when agents are risk-neutral or when one uses probabilistic rules. We investigate a classof rules in which the agent has to choose an interval and is rewarded (deterministically) onthe basis of the chosen interval and the realization of the random variable. We formulatean e¢ ciency criterion for such rules and present a speci.c interval scoring rule. For single-peaked beliefs, our rule gives information about both the location and the dispersion of thebelief distribution. These results hold for all concave utility functions.
Resumo:
This paper explores biases in the elicitation of utilities under risk and the contribution that generalizations of expected utility can make to the resolution of these biases. We used five methods to measure utilities under risk and found clear violations of expected utility. Of the theories studies, prospect theory was most consistent with our data. The main improvement of prospect theory over expected utility was in comparisons between a riskless and a risky prospect(riskless-risk methods). We observed no improvement over expected utility in comparisons between two risky prospects (risk-risk methods). An explanation why we found no improvement of prospect theory over expected utility in risk-risk methods may be that there was less overweighting of small probabilities in our study than has commonly been observed.
Resumo:
We characterize the set of Walrasian allocations of an economy as theset of allocations which can be supported by abstract equilibria that satisfy a recontracting condition which reflects the idea that agents can freely trade with each other. An alternative (and weaker) recontracting condition characterizesthe core. The results are extended to production economies by extending thedefinition of the recontracting condition to include the possibility of agentsto recontract with firms. However, no optimization requirement is imposed onfirms. In pure exchange economies, an abstract equilibrium is a feasible allocation and a list of choice sets, one for each agent, that satisfy thefollowing conditions: an agent's choice set is a subset of the commodity space that includes his endowment; and each agent's equilibrium bundle isa maximal element in his choice set, with respect to his preferences. Therecontracting condition requires that any agent can buy bundles from any other agent's choice set by offering the other agent a bundle he prefers tohis equilibrium bundle.
Resumo:
Using historical data for all Swiss cantons from 1890 to 2000, we estimate the causal effect of direct democracy on government spending. The main innovation in this paper is that we use fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity and instrumental variables to address the potential endogeneity of institutions. We find that the budget referendum and lower costs to launch a voter initiative are effective tools in reducing canton level spending. However, we find no evidence that the budget referendum results in more decentralized government or a larger local government. Our instrumental variable estimates suggest that a mandatory budget referendum reduces the size of canton spending between 13 and 19 percent. A 1 percent lower signature requirement for the initiative reduces canton spending by up to 2 percent.
Resumo:
This paper explores three aspects of strategic uncertainty: its relation to risk, predictability of behavior and subjective beliefs of players. In a laboratory experiment we measure subjects certainty equivalents for three coordination games and one lottery. Behavior in coordination games is related to risk aversion, experience seeking, and age.From the distribution of certainty equivalents we estimate probabilities for successful coordination in a wide range of games. For many games, success of coordination is predictable with a reasonable error rate. The best response to observed behavior is close to the global-game solution. Comparing choices in coordination games with revealed risk aversion, we estimate subjective probabilities for successful coordination. In games with a low coordination requirement, most subjects underestimate the probability of success. In games with a high coordination requirement, most subjects overestimate this probability. Estimating probabilistic decision models, we show that the quality of predictions can be improved when individual characteristics are taken into account. Subjects behavior is consistent with probabilistic beliefs about the aggregate outcome, but inconsistent with probabilistic beliefs about individual behavior.
Resumo:
In 1990 a new Spanish 'Plan General de Contabilidad' (PGC) implementedthe requirements of the EU 4th and 7th Directives in Spain. Included in the PGC is the requirement, derived from the 4th Directive, that accounts should present a 'true and fair view', in Spanish 'imagen fiel'. Where the term has been used in English speaking jurisdictions it has proved to have a variety of shades of meaning, and to have had strikingly different impact in different countries. Within the European Union the term has been seen as a 'Trojan horse', inserted into the 4th Directive to inject an Anglo-Saxon approach of flexibility and judgement dependent accounting into a Continental European accounting tradition of detailed prescription and uniformity. In this paper we report on a survey of the views and experience of Spanish auditors relating to 'imagen fiel'. Specifically, we:1) Review the English language literature on 'true and fair view' to identify the key areas of controversy.2) Consider the significance of the 'true and fair view' within the EU 4th Directive.3) Report on the experience of Spanish auditors in working with this concept, their views on the value of the term, and their experience in use of the true and fair view 'override'.
Resumo:
This paper addresses the issue of the optimal behaviour of the Lender of Last Resort (LOLR) in its microeconomic role regarding individual financial institutions in distress. It has been argued that the LOLR should not intervene at the microeconomic level and let any defaulting institution face the market discipline, as it will be confronted with the consequences of the risks it has taken. By considering a simple costbenefit analysis we show that this position may lack a sufficient foundation. We establish that, instead, uder reasonable assumptions, the optimal policy has to be conditional on the amount of uninsured debt issued by the defaulting bank. Yet in equilibrium, because the rescue policy is costly, the LOLR will not rescue all the banks that fulfill the uninsured debt requirement condition, but will follow a mixed strategy. This we interpret as the confirmation of the "creative ambiguity" principle, perfectly in line with the central bankers claim that it is efficient for them to have discretion in lending to individual institutions. Alternatively, in other cases, when the social cost of a bank's bankruptcy is too high, it is optimal for the LOLR to bail out the insititution, and this gives support to the "too big to fail" policy.
Resumo:
We use subjects actions in modified dictator games to perform a within-subject classification ofindividuals into four different types of interdependent preferences: Selfish, Social Welfaremaximizers, Inequity Averse and Competitive. We elicit beliefs about other subjects actions inthe same modified dictator games to test how much of the existent heterogeneity in others actions is known by subjects. We find that subjects with different interdependent preferences infact have different beliefs about others actions. In particular, Selfish individuals cannotconceive others being non-Selfish while Social Welfare maximizers are closest to the actualdistribution of others actions. We finally provide subjects with information on other subjects actions and re-classify individuals according to their (new) actions in the same modified dictatorgames. We find that social information does not affect Selfish individuals, but that individualswith interdependent preferences are more likely to change their behavior and tend to behavemore selfishly.
Resumo:
This paper presents evidence that the existence of deposit and lending facilities combined with an averaging provision for the reserve requirement are powerful tools to stabilize the overnight rate. We reach this conclusion by comparing the behavior of this rate in Germany before and after thestart of Stage III of the EMU. The analysis of the German experience is useful because it allows us to isolate the effects on the overnight rate of these particular instruments of monetary policy. To show that this outcome is a general conclusion and not a particular result of the German market, we develop a theoretical model of reserve management which isable to reproduce our empirical findings.
Resumo:
Despite attempts to secure harmonisation of accounting practice,significant variations in accounting rules and practice continueto arise in European countries, variations which give rise tocompliance costs for multinational companies.Firstly, this paper considers the relevance of internationalaccounting harmonisation for European business. It then proceedsto examine accounting regulation in three countries: Spain, Swedenand Austria, highlighting the key regulatory issues of the 'trueand fair' view requirement and the link between taxation andaccounting. The three countries are selected because of theinteresting contrasts which they provide; these contrasts areexamined in detail in the paper.The work is based upon a series of interviews carried out withleading accounting practitioners in the three countries during1996-97.The paper concludes that there are significant obstacles toaccounting harmonisation in Europe and that there is potentialfor continuing diversity of national accounting practice.
Resumo:
This study addressed the contribution of acidic sphingomyelinase (ASMase) in TNF-alpha-mediated hepatocellular apoptosis. Cultured hepatocytes depleted of mitochondrial glutathione (mGSH) became sensitive to TNF-alpha, undergoing a time-dependent apoptotic cell death preceded by mitochondrial membrane depolarization, cytochrome c release, and caspase activation. Cyclosporin A treatment rescued mGSH-depleted hepatocytes from TNF-alpha-induced cell death. In contrast, mGSH-depleted hepatocytes deficient in ASMase were resistant to TNF-alpha-mediated cell death but sensitive to exogenous ASMase. Furthermore, although in vivo administration of TNF-alpha or LPS to galactosamine-pretreated ASMase(+/+) mice caused liver damage, ASMase(-/-) mice exhibited minimal hepatocellular injury. To analyze the requirement of ASMase, we assessed the effect of glucosylceramide synthetase inhibition on TNF-alpha-mediated apoptosis. This approach, which blunted glycosphingolipid generation by TNF-alpha, protected mGSH-depleted ASMase(+/+) hepatocytes from TNF-alpha despite enhancement of TNF-alpha-stimulated ceramide formation. To further test the involvement of glycosphingolipids, we focused on ganglioside GD3 (GD3) because of its emerging role in apoptosis through interaction with mitochondria. Analysis of the cellular redistribution of GD3 by laser scanning confocal microscopy revealed the targeting of GD3 to mitochondria in ASMase(+/+) but not in ASMase(-/-) hepatocytes. However, treatment of ASMase(-/-) hepatocytes with exogenous ASMase induced the colocalization of GD3 and mitochondria. Thus, ASMase contributes to TNF-alpha-induced hepatocellular apoptosis by promoting the mitochondrial targeting of glycosphingolipids.
Resumo:
El principal objectiu d'aquest estudi és reflectir quins són els principals factors competitius per a les pymes a Catalunya. Per això, es va escollir una mostra de 1000 empreses de diferents sectors i amb els límits que marca la Unió Europea per a definir una pyme. A partir d'aquí, es va analitzar la informació financera. Amb aquesta font d'informació, es va poder arribar a la conclusió que tots aquells aspectes relacionats amb el personal i reflectits a través de ràtios, eren els més significatius estadísticament per a poder explicar la rendibilitat en les empreses. També es va enviar un qüestionari a la mostra esmentada i es va preguntar el punt de vista del gestor o empresari. Només 50 empreses van contestar, i una vegada més, el factor humà es va revelar com el més important. S'ha d'assenyalar que altres elements tals com la inversió en tecnologia, que s'esperava fossin significatius, no van donar els resultats esperats en el sentit que cap altre fos considerat tan rellevant com els recursos humans.