A public key encryption based on third order linear sequences

Based on third order linear sequences, an improvement version of the Diffie-Hellman distribution key scheme and the ElGamal public key cryptosystem scheme are proposed, together with an implementation and computational cost. The security relies on the difficulty of factoring an RSA integer and on the difficulty of computing the discrete logarithm.

Organizational configurations of strategic choices and strategic management accounting

This is the first study to adopt a configurational paradigm in an investigation of strategic management accounting (SMA) adoption. The study examines the alignment and effectiveness of strategic choice and strategic management accounting (SMA) system design configurations. Six configurations were derived empirically by deploying a cluster analysis of data collected from a sample of 193 large Slovenian companies. The first four clusters appear to provide some support for the central configurational proposition that higher levels of vertical and horizontal configurational alignments are associated with higher levels of performance. Evidence that contradicts the theory is also apparent, however, as the remaining two clusters exhibit high degrees of SMA vertical and horizontal alignment, but low performance levels. A particular contribution of the paper concerns its demonstration of the way that the configurational paradigm can be operationalised to examine management accounting phenomena and the nature of management accounting insights that can derive from applying the approach.

Public policy for entrepreneurship and innovation: impact in managed and entrepreneurial economies

Many of the most advanced economies of the world have undergone significant transformation in the last few decades. Globalization and technological changes, especially developments in information technologies, have helped to stimulate this transformation. These have contributed to changing institutional frameworks in many respects within the economies including adjustments to economic policies. The results of these transformations take many different forms and are manifested in different areas of an economy. At the heart of these changes however, has been the increasingly important role of entrepreneurship in the economy. The transformed ("new") economy stimulates and supports activities in innovation and entrepreneurship and is labelled the entrepreneurial economy. The "old" economy on the other hand restricts such activities and is referred to as the managed economy (Audretsch & Thurik, 2001).

The Analysis of Accounting Multipliers: The NAMEA Approach in the Case of Catalonia

The aim of this paper is the analysis of the Catalan economy (2001) with the use of a National Accounting Matrix with environmental accounts (NAMEA) for the Catalan economy with 2001 data. We will focus on the analysis of the emission multipliers and we will also analyse the impact of a 10% reduction in greenhouse emissions on emission multipliers. This emission-reduction percentage would bring the Catalan economy into compliance with the maximum emissions level allowed by the Kyoto Protocol. We consider three possible scenarios that would allow this goal to be met. First, we will simulate a 10% reduction in regional emissions and a 5% drop in the endogenous income of the multipliers' model (production, factorial and private income). Second, we will simulate a 10% reduction in emissions and a 10% increase in endogenous income. Finally, we will simulate a 10% reduction in emissions and a 5% increase in endogenous income. Additionally, we will analyse the decomposition of the emission multipliers into own effects, open effects and circular effects to capture the different channels of the emission generation process. Keywords: NAMEA, emission multipliers, Kyoto Protocol.

Redistributive taxation, public expenditure, and size of governent

We introduce a model of redistributive income taxation and public expenditure. This joint treatment permits analyzing the interdependencies between the two policies: one cannot be chosen independently of the other. Empirical evidence reveals that partisan confrontation essentially falls on expenditure policies rather than on income taxation. We examine the case in which the expenditure policy (or the size of government) is chosen by majority voting and income taxation is consistently adjusted. This adjustment consists of designing the income tax schedule that, given the expenditure policy, achieves consensus among the population. The model determines the consensus in- come tax schedule, the composition of public expenditure and the size of government. The main results are that inequality is negatively related to the size of government and to the pro-rich bias in public expenditure, and positively or negatively related to the marginal income tax, depending on substitutability between government supplied and market goods. These implications are validated using OECD data.

Knowledge of Catalan, public/private sector choice and earnings: Evidence from a double sample selection model

This paper explores the earnings return to Catalan knowledge for public and private workers in Catalonia. In doing so, we allow for a double simultaneous selection process. We consider, on the one hand, the non-random allocation of workers into one sector or another, and on the other, the potential self-selection into Catalan proficiency. In addition, when correcting the earnings equations, we take into account the correlation between the two selectivity rules. Our findings suggest that the apparent higher language return for public sector workers is entirely accounted for by selection effects, whereas knowledge of Catalan has a significant positive return in the private sector, which is somewhat higher when the selection processes are taken into account.

Accounting conservatism and firm investment efficiency

Conservatism, through the timelier recognition of losses in the income statement, is expected to increase firm investment efficiency through three main channels: (1) by decreasing the adverse effect of information asymmetries between outside equity holders and managers, facilitating the monitoring of managerial investment decisions; (2) by increasing managerial incentives to abandon poorly performing projects earlier and to undertake fewer negative net present-value investments; and (3) by facilitating the access to external financing at lower cost. Using a large US sample for the period 1990-2007 we find a negative association between conservatism and measures of over- and under- investment, and a positive association between conservatism and future profitability. This is consistent with firms reporting more conservative numbers investing more efficiently and in more profitable projects. Our results add to a growing stream of literature suggesting that eliminating conservatism from accounting regulatory frameworks may lead to undesirable economic consequences.

Monitorització de rendiment i accounting de centres de computació grid

El Port d'Informació Científica és un centre de Computació Grid de referència que dona suport a comunitats científiques, com el LHC (CERN). Al PIC, trobem una gran varietat de tecnologies que proporcionen serveis al centre. Des de l'arquitectura i elements de la xarxa, fins a recursos informàtics de computació, sistemes d'emmagatzematge a disc i cinta magnètica, bases de dades (ORACLE/PostgreSQL). El projecte consisteix en el disseny i implementació d'una base de dades col·lectora de tota la informació rellevant dels diferents sistemes del centre, i un portal web on mostrar tots els valors i gràfiques, tot basat en programari lliure.

Public and private learning from prices, strategic substitutability and complementarity, and equilibrium multiplicity

We study a general static noisy rational expectations model where investors have private information about asset payoffs, with common and private components, and about their own exposure to an aggregate risk factor, and derive conditions for existence and uniqueness (or multiplicity) of equilibria. We find that a main driver of the characterization of equilibria is whether the actions of investors are strategic substitutes or complements. This latter property in turn is driven by the strength of a private learning channel from prices, arising from the multidimensional sources of asymmetric information, in relation to the usual public learning channel. When the private learning channel is strong (weak) in relation to the public we have strong (weak) strategic complementarity in actions and potentially multiple (unique) equilibria. The results enable a precise characterization of whether information acquisition decisions are strategic substitutes or complements. We find that the strategic substitutability in information acquisition result obtained in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) is robust. JEL Classification: D82, D83, G14 Keywords: Rational expectations equilibrium, asymmetric information, risk exposure, hedging, supply information, information acquisition.

Linear Aggregation In The Social Accounting Matrix Framework

In economic literature, information deficiencies and computational complexities have traditionally been solved through the aggregation of agents and institutions. In inputoutput modelling, researchers have been interested in the aggregation problem since the beginning of 1950s. Extending the conventional input-output aggregation approach to the social accounting matrix (SAM) models may help to identify the effects caused by the information problems and data deficiencies that usually appear in the SAM framework. This paper develops the theory of aggregation and applies it to the social accounting matrix model of multipliers. First, we define the concept of linear aggregation in a SAM database context. Second, we define the aggregated partitioned matrices of multipliers which are characteristic of the SAM approach. Third, we extend the analysis to other related concepts, such as aggregation bias and consistency in aggregation. Finally, we provide an illustrative example that shows the effects of aggregating a social accounting matrix model.

Cronyism in Business, Public Sector and Politics

This paper contrasts the incentives for cronyism in business, the public sector and politics within an agency problem model with moral hazard. The analysis is focused on the institutional differences between private, public and political organizations. In business, when facing a residual claimant contract, a chief manager ends up with a relatively moderate …rst-best level of cronyism within a …firm. The institutional framework of the public sector does not allow explicit contracting, which leads to a more severe cronyism problem within public organizations. Finally, it is shown that the nature of political appointments (such that the subordinate's reappointment is conditioned on the chief's re-election) together with implicit contracting makes political cronyism the most extreme case. JEL classifi…cation: D72, D73, D86. Keywords: Cronyism; Meritocracy; Manager; Bureaucrat; Politician.

How much risk is mitigated by LTC Insurance? A case study of the public system in Spain

We present a methodology that allows to calculate the impact of a given Long-Term Care (LTC) insurance protection system on the risk of incurring extremely large individual lifetime costs. Our proposed methodology is illustrated with a case study. According to our risk measure, the current Spanish public LTC system mitigates individual risk by more than 30% compared to the situation where no public protection were available. We show that our method can be used to compare risk reduction of alternative LTC insurance plans.

The link between public support and private R&D effort: What is the optimal subsidy?

The effectiveness of R&D subsidies can vary substantially depending on their characteristics. Specifically, the amount and intensity of such subsidies are crucial issues in the design of public schemes supporting private R&D. Public agencies determine the intensities of R&D subsidies for firms in line with their eligibility criteria, although assessing the effects of R&D projects accurately is far from straightforward. The main aim of this paper is to examine whether there is an optimal intensity for R&D subsidies through an analysis of their impact on private R&D effort. We examine the decisions of a public agency to grant subsidies taking into account not only the characteristics of the firms but also, as few previous studies have done to date, those of the R&D projects. In determining the optimal subsidy we use both parametric and nonparametric techniques. The results show a non-linear relationship between the percentage of subsidy received and the firms’ R&D effort. These results have implications for technology policy, particularly for the design of R&D subsidies that ensure enhanced effectiveness.

A never-ending debate: Demand versus supply water policies. A CGE analysis for Catalonia

Water scarcity is a long-standing problem in Catalonia, as there are significant differences in the spatial and temporal distribution of water through the territory. There has consequently been a debate for many years about whether the solution to water scarcity must be considered in terms of efficiency or equity, the role that the public sector must play and the role that market-based instruments should play in water management. The aim of this paper is to use a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model to analyze the advantages and disadvantages associated with different policy instruments, from both a supply and a demand viewpoint, which can be applied to water management in Catalonia. We also introduce an ecological sector in our CGE model, allowing us to analyze the environmental impact of the alternative policies simulated. The calibration of the exogenous variables of the CGE model is performed by using a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for the Catalan economy with 2001 data. The results suggest that taking into account the principle of sustainability of the resource, the policy debate between supply and demand in water policies is obsolete, and a new combination of policies is required to respect the different values associated with water. Keywords: Water Policies; Computable General Equilibrium Model; Economic Effects; Environmental Effects.

Public Monitoring with Uncertainty in the Time Repetitions

This paper study repeated games where the time repetitions of the stage game are not known or controlled by the players. We call this feature random monitoring. Kawamori's (2004) shows that perfect random monitoring is always better than the canonical case. Surprisingly, when the monitoring is public, the result is less clear-cut and does not generalize in a straightforward way. Unless the public signals are sufficiently informative about player's actions and/or players are patient enough. In addition to a discount effect, that tends to consistently favor the provision of incentives, we found an information effect, associated with the time uncertainty on the distribution of public signals. Whether payoff improvements are or not possible, depends crucially on the direction and strength of these effects. JEL: C73, D82, D86. KEYWORDS: Repeated Games, Frequent Monitoring, Random Public Monitoring, Moral Hazard, Stochastic Processes.