Análisis de un input de las clases de economía pública: El nivel de cultura fiscal de los alumnos

El objetivo de este artículo es doble. Por un lado, cuantificar el nivel de cultura fiscal de los alumnos de Administración y Dirección de Empresas y de Economía antes de empezar a cursar asignaturas específicas de economía del sector público y de fiscalidad. Y, por otro lado, analizar los posibles factores determinantes de dicho nivel de cultura fiscal. Al tratarse de alumnos de segundo ciclo, éstos ya deberían conocer el funcionamiento de una economía de mercado y el papel que juega el sector público, lo que les debería comportar un mayor interés y una mayor motivación. La idea surgió del convencimiento de los profesores de que saber cuál es el nivel de conocimiento previo sobre cuestiones fiscales que tienen los estudiantes que van a cursar asignaturas de contenido fiscal es un input importante a considerar en el planteamiento de la docencia, puesto que permite mejorar el funcionamiento del curso, motivar el estudio de las asignaturas y mejorar los resultados.

Análisis de un input de las clases de economía pública: El nivel de cultura fiscal de los alumnos

El objetivo de este artículo es doble. Por un lado, cuantificar el nivel de cultura fiscal de los alumnos de Administración y Dirección de Empresas y de Economía antes de empezar a cursar asignaturas específicas de economía del sector público y de fiscalidad. Y, por otro lado, analizar los posibles factores determinantes de dicho nivel de cultura fiscal. Al tratarse de alumnos de segundo ciclo, éstos ya deberían conocer el funcionamiento de una economía de mercado y el papel que juega el sector público, lo que les debería comportar un mayor interés y una mayor motivación. La idea surgió del convencimiento de los profesores de que saber cuál es el nivel de conocimiento previo sobre cuestiones fiscales que tienen los estudiantes que van a cursar asignaturas de contenido fiscal es un input importante a considerar en el planteamiento de la docencia, puesto que permite mejorar el funcionamiento del curso, motivar el estudio de las asignaturas y mejorar los resultados.

The Effects of Corruption and Seigniorage on Growth and Inflation

In the last two decades, cases of corruption have been unveiled in different countries, raising public awareness and reinforcing a trend in which society expects more from their leaders. Our objective in this paper is to examine the effects of corruption and seigniorage on inflation and growth rates. The model used in this article is an extension of the model used by Huang and Wei (2006). We find interesting results and one of them is that, under some conditions, corruption has a positive impact on the growth rate. JEL classification : D73, E52, E58, E62. Keywords : Corruption; Fiscal Policy; Growth; Monetary Policy; Seigniorage.

Fiscal Regime Shifts in Portugal

We estimate changes in fiscal policy regimes in Portugal with a Markov Switching regression of fiscal policy rules for the period 1978-2007, using a new dataset of fiscal quarterly series. We find evidence of a deficit bias, while repeated reversals of taxes making the budget procyclical. Economic booms have typically been used to relax tax pressure, especially during elections. One-off measures have been preferred over structural ones to contain the deficit during economic crises. The EU fiscal rules prompted temporary consolidation, but did not permanently change the budgeting process.

Testing the FTPL across government tiers

Control on regional government budgets is important in a monetary union as lower tiers of government have fewer incentives to consolidate debt. According to the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level; unsustainable non-Ricardian fiscal policies eventually force monetary policy to adjust. Hence, uncoordinated and non-regulated regional fiscal policies would therefore threaten price stability for the monetary union as a whole. However, the union central bank is not without defense. A federal government that internalises the spillover effect of non-Ricardian fiscal policies on the price level can offset non-Ricardian regional fiscal policies. A federal government, which taxes and transfers resources between regions, may compensate for unsustainable regional fiscal policies so as to keep fiscal policy Ricardian on aggregate. Following Canzoneri et al. (2001), we test the validity of the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level for both federal and regional governments in Germany. We find evidence of a spillover effect of unsustainable policies on the price level for other Länder. However, the German federal government offsets this effect on the price level by running Ricardian policies. These results have implications for the regulation of fiscal policies in the EMU.

Sustainability of EU fiscal policies. A panel test

The fiscal policy rule implicit in the Stability and Growth Pact, has been rationalised as a way to ensure that national fiscal policies remain sustainable within the EU, thereby endorsing the independence of the ECB. We empirically examine the sustainability of European fiscal policies over the period 1970-2001. The intertemporal government budget constraint provides a test based on the cointegration relation between government revenues, expenditures and interest payments. Sustainability is analysed at both the national level and for a European panel. Results show that European fiscal policy has been sustainable overall, yet national experiences differ considerably.

Fiscal sustainability across government tiers: an assessment of soft budget constraints

This paper analyses how fiscal adjustment comes about when both central and sub-national governments are involved in consolidation. We test sustainability of public debt with a fiscal rule for both the federal and regional government. Results for the German Länder show that lower tier governments bear a relatively smaller part of the burden of debt consolidation, if they consolidate at all. Most of the fiscal adjustment occurs via central government debt. In contrast, both the US federal and state levels contribute to consolidation of public finances.

La reforma fiscal 2014 y la opinión de los asesores fiscales

La reforma fiscal en España ha sido una demanda recurrente en los últimos tiempos, posiblemente reforzada por la crisis económica. Esta fue aprobada a finales de 2014, entrando en vigor en 2015 y 2016. No se trata de una reforma global, habiéndose centrado en el IRPF y en el impuesto sobre sociedades. Este artículo repasa sus, a nuestro entender, aspectos más relevantes y, de manera novedosa, para identificar sus disfunciones, los contrasta con la opinión de los asesores fiscales, actores clave en nuestro sistema fiscal, dado el alcance mayoritario del mecanismo de autoliquidación. En general, se puede concluir que los trade-offs resueltos en esta reforma van en la dirección de elimi­nar, cuanto menos parcialmente, disfunciones previas, aunque, como se ha sugerido, hay aspectos todavía sin tratar (IVA o imposición sobre la riqueza).

Debt and deficit fluctuations and the structure of bond markets

We analyse the implications of optimal taxation for the stochastic behaviour of debt. We show that when a government pursues an optimal fiscal policy under complete markets, the value of debt has the same or less persistence than other variables in the economy and it declines in response to shocks that cause the deficit to increase. By contrast, under incomplete markets debt shows more persistence than other variables and it increases in response to shocks that cause a higher deficit. Data for US government debt reveals diametrically opposite results from those of complete markets and is much more supportive of bond market incompleteness.

In Search of a theory of debt management

A growing literature integrates theories of debt management into models of optimal fiscal policy. One promising theory argues that the composition of government debt should be chosen so that fluctuations in the market value of debt offset changes in expected future deficits. This complete market approach to debt management is valid even when the government only issues non-contingent bonds. A number of authors conclude from this approach that governments should issue long term debt and invest in short term assets. We argue that the conclusions of this approach are too fragile to serve as a basis for policy recommendations. This is because bonds at different maturities have highly correlated returns, causing the determination of the optimal portfolio to be ill-conditioned. To make this point concrete we examine the implications of this approach to debt management in various models, both analytically and using numerical methods calibrated to the US economy. We find the complete market approach recommends asset positions which are huge multiples of GDP. Introducing persistent shocks or capital accumulation only worsens this problem. Increasing the volatility of interest rates through habits partly reduces the size of these simulations we find no presumption that governments should issue long term debt ? policy recommendations can be easily reversed through small perturbations in the specification of shocks or small variations in the maturity of bonds issued. We further extend the literature by removing the assumption that governments every period costlessly repurchase all outstanding debt. This exacerbates the size of the required positions, worsens their volatility and in some cases produces instability in debt holdings. We conclude that it is very difficult to insulate fiscal policy from shocks by using the complete markets approach to debt management. Given the limited variability of the yield curve using maturities is a poor way to substitute for state contingent debt. The result is the positions recommended by this approach conflict with a number of features that we believe are important in making bond markets incomplete e.g allowing for transaction costs, liquidity effects, etc.. Until these features are all fully incorporated we remain in search of a theory of debt management capable of providing robust policy insights.

Growth, unemployment and wage inertia

We introduce wage setting via efficiency wages in the neoclassical one-sector growth model to study the growth effects of wage inertia. We compare the dynamic equilibrium of an economy with wage inertia with the equilibrium of an economy without wage inertia. We show that wage inertia affects the long run employment rate and that the transitional dynamics of the main economic variables will be different because wages are a state variable when wage inertia is introduced. In particular, we show non-monotonic transitions in the economy with wage inertia that do not arise in the economy with flexible wages. We also study the growth effects of permanent technological and fiscal policy shocks in these two economies. During the transition, the growth effects of technological shocks obtained when wages exhibit inertia may be the opposite from the ones obtained when wages are flexible. In the long run, these technological shocks may have long run effects if there is wage inertia. We also show that the growth effects of fiscal policies will be delayed when there is wage inertia.

Debt and deficit fluctuations and the structure of bond markets

This paper tests for the market environment within which US fiscal policyoperates, that is we test for the incompleteness of the US government bondmarket. We document the stochastic properties of US debt and deficits andthen consider the ability of competing optimal tax models to account forthis behaviour. We show that when a government pursues an optimal taxpolicy and issues a full set of contingent claims, the value of debthas the same or less persistence than other variables in the economyand declines in response to higher deficit shocks. By contrast, ifgovernments only issue one-period risk free bonds (incomplete markets),debt shows more persistence than other variables and it increases inresponse to expenditure shocks. Maintaining the hypothesis of Ramseybehavior, US data conflicts.

Theoretical notes on bubbles and the current crisis

We explore a view of the crisis as a shock to investor sentiment that led to the collapse of abubble or pyramid scheme in financial markets. We embed this view in a standard model of thefinancial accelerator and explore its empirical and policy implications. In particular, we show howthe model can account for: (i) a gradual and protracted expansionary phase followed by a suddenand sharp recession; (ii) the connection (or lack of connection!) between financial and real economicactivity and; (iii) a fast and strong transmission of shocks across countries. We also use the modelto explore the role of fiscal policy.

Austerity and anarchy: Budget cuts and social unrest in Europe, 1919-2008

Does fiscal consolidation lead to social unrest? Using cross-country evidencefor the period 1919 to 2008, we examine the extent to which societies becomeunstable after budget cuts. The results show a clear correlation between fiscalretrenchment and instability. Expenditure cuts are particularly potent infueling protests; tax rises have only small and insignificant effects. We test ifthe relationship simply reflects economic downturns, using a recently-developedIMF dataset on exogenous expenditure shocks, and conclude that this is not thecase. While autocracies and democracies show broadly similar responses to budgetcuts, countries with more constraints on the executive are less likely to seeunrest after austerity measures. Growing media penetration does not strengthenthe effect of cut-backs on the level of unrest. We also find that austerity episodesthat result in unrest lead to quick reversals of fiscal policy.

Does direct democracy reduce the size of government? New evidence from historical data, 1890-2000

Using historical data for all Swiss cantons from 1890 to 2000, we estimate the causal effect of direct democracy on government spending. The main innovation in this paper is that we use fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity and instrumental variables to address the potential endogeneity of institutions. We find that the budget referendum and lower costs to launch a voter initiative are effective tools in reducing canton level spending. However, we find no evidence that the budget referendum results in more decentralized government or a larger local government. Our instrumental variable estimates suggest that a mandatory budget referendum reduces the size of canton spending between 13 and 19 percent. A 1 percent lower signature requirement for the initiative reduces canton spending by up to 2 percent.