Clathrin Assembly Lymphoid Myeloid Leukemia (CALM) Protein: Localization in Endocytic-coated Pits, Interactions with Clathrin, and the Impact of Overexpression on Clathrin-mediated Traffic

The clathrin assembly lymphoid myeloid leukemia (CALM) gene encodes a putative homologue of the clathrin assembly synaptic protein AP180. Hence the biochemical properties, the subcellular localization, and the role in endocytosis of a CALM protein were studied. In vitro binding and coimmunoprecipitation demonstrated that the clathrin heavy chain is the major binding partner of CALM. The bulk of cellular CALM was associated with the membrane fractions of the cell and localized to clathrin-coated areas of the plasma membrane. In the membrane fraction, CALM was present at near stoichiometric amounts relative to clathrin. To perform structure-function analysis of CALM, we engineered chimeric fusion proteins of CALM and its fragments with the green fluorescent protein (GFP). GFP-CALM was targeted to the plasma membrane-coated pits and also found colocalized with clathrin in the Golgi area. High levels of expression of GFP-CALM or its fragments with clathrin-binding activity inhibited the endocytosis of transferrin and epidermal growth factor receptors and altered the steady-state distribution of the mannose-6-phosphate receptor in the cell. In addition, GFP-CALM overexpression caused the loss of clathrin accumulation in the trans-Golgi network area, whereas the localization of the clathrin adaptor protein complex 1 in the trans-Golgi network remained unaffected. The ability of the GFP-tagged fragments of CALM to affect clathrin-mediated processes correlated with the targeting of the fragments to clathrin-coated areas and their clathrin-binding capacities. Clathrin-CALM interaction seems to be regulated by multiple contact interfaces. The C-terminal part of CALM binds clathrin heavy chain, although the full-length protein exhibited maximal ability for interaction. Altogether, the data suggest that CALM is an important component of coated pit internalization machinery, possibly involved in the regulation of clathrin recruitment to the membrane and/or the formation of the coated pit.

Immunoelectron microscopic localization of transforming growth factor alpha in rat colon

Transforming growth factor alpha (TGF alpha) is a polypeptide, which binds to the epidermal growth factor receptor to carry out its function related to cell proliferation and differentiation. The ultrastructural localisation of TGF alpha was studied in both the proximal and the distal colon. The columnar cells, lining the surface epithelium of the proximal colon, showed a strong immunoreactivity in the polyribosomes and in the interdigitations of the lateral membrane. The columnar cells of the crypts and the goblet cells in both the proximal and the distal colon showed the immunostaining in the cis and trans cisternae of the Golgi apparatus. TGF alpha seems to be processed differently in the surface columnar cells and in the crypt columnar cells and goblet cells. Moreover, it probably has different roles in proliferation and differentiation.

On the dimension of the core of the assignment game

The set of optimal matchings in the assignment matrix allows to define a reflexive and symmetric binary relation on each side of the market, the equal-partner binary relation. The number of equivalence classes of the transitive closure of the equal-partner binary relation determines the dimension of the core of the assignment game. This result provides an easy procedure to determine the dimension of the core directly from the entries of the assignment matrix and shows that the dimension of the core is not as much determined by the number of optimal matchings as by their relative position in the assignment matrix.

Single-valued solutions for the Böhm-Bawerk horse market game

Single-valued solutions for the case of two-sided market games without product differentiation, also known as Böhm-Bawerk horse market games, are analyzed. The nucleolus is proved to coincide with the tau-value, and is thus the midpoint of the core. Moreover a characterization of this setof games in terms of the assignment matrix is provided.

An axiomatization of the nucleolus of the assignment game

[cat] En el domini dels jocs bilaterals d’assignació, es presenta una axiomàtica del nucleolus com l´unica solució que compleix les propietats de consistència respecte del joc derivat definit per Owen (1992) i monotonia de les queixes dels sectors respecte de la seva cardinalitat. Com a conseqüència obtenim una caracterització geomètrica del nucleolus mitjançant una propietat de bisecció més forta que la que satisfan els punts del kernel (Maschler et al, 1979).

A note on the coincidence between Stackelberg and Nash equilibria in a differential game between government and firms

[cat] A Navas i Marín Solano es va demostrar la coincidència entre els equilibris de Nash i de Stackelberg per a una versi´o modificada del joc diferencial proposat por Lancaster (1973). Amb l’objectiu d’obtenir una solució interior, es van imposar restriccions importants sobre el valors dels paràmetres del model. En aquest treball estenem aquest resultat, en el límit en que la taxa de descompte és igual a zero, eliminant les restriccions i considerant totes les solucions possibles.

The assignment game: core bounds for mixed-pair coalitions

In the assignment game framework, we try to identify those assignment matrices in which no entry can be increased without changing the coreof the game. These games will be called buyer¿seller exact games and satisfy the condition that each mixed¿pair coalition attains the corresponding matrix entry in the core of the game. For a given assignment game, a unique buyerseller exact assignment game with the same core is proved to exist. In order to identify this matrix and to provide a characterization of those assignment games which are buyer¿seller exact in terms of the assignment matrix, attainable upper and lower core bounds for the mixed¿pair coalitions are found. As a consequence, an open question posed in Quint (1991) regarding a canonical representation of a ¿45o¿lattice¿ by means of the core of an assignment game can now be answered

The extreme core allocations of the assignment game

Although assignment games are hardly ever convex, in this paper a characterization of their set or extreme points of the core is provided, which is also valid for the class of convex games. For each ordering in the player set, a payoff vector is defined where each player receives his marginal contribution to a certain reduced game played by his predecessors. We prove that the whole set of reduced marginal worth vectors, which for convex games coincide with the usual marginal worth vectors, is the set of extreme points of the core of the assignment game

The extreme core allocations of the assignment game

Although assignment games are hardly ever convex, in this paper a characterization of their set or extreme points of the core is provided, which is also valid for the class of convex games. For each ordering in the player set, a payoff vector is defined where each player receives his marginal contribution to a certain reduced game played by his predecessors. We prove that the whole set of reduced marginal worth vectors, which for convex games coincide with the usual marginal worth vectors, is the set of extreme points of the core of the assignment game

On the dimension of the core of the assignment game

The set of optimal matchings in the assignment matrix allows to define a reflexive and symmetric binary relation on each side of the market, the equal-partner binary relation. The number of equivalence classes of the transitive closure of the equal-partner binary relation determines the dimension of the core of the assignment game. This result provides an easy procedure to determine the dimension of the core directly from the entries of the assignment matrix and shows that the dimension of the core is not as much determined by the number of optimal matchings as by their relative position in the assignment matrix.

Single-valued solutions for the Böhm-Bawerk horse market game

Single-valued solutions for the case of two-sided market games without product differentiation, also known as Böhm-Bawerk horse market games, are analyzed. The nucleolus is proved to coincide with the tau-value, and is thus the midpoint of the core. Moreover a characterization of this setof games in terms of the assignment matrix is provided.

An axiomatization of the nucleolus of the assignment game

[cat] En el domini dels jocs bilaterals d’assignació, es presenta una axiomàtica del nucleolus com l´unica solució que compleix les propietats de consistència respecte del joc derivat definit per Owen (1992) i monotonia de les queixes dels sectors respecte de la seva cardinalitat. Com a conseqüència obtenim una caracterització geomètrica del nucleolus mitjançant una propietat de bisecció més forta que la que satisfan els punts del kernel (Maschler et al, 1979).

A note on the coincidence between Stackelberg and Nash equilibria in a differential game between government and firms

[cat] A Navas i Marín Solano es va demostrar la coincidència entre els equilibris de Nash i de Stackelberg per a una versi´o modificada del joc diferencial proposat por Lancaster (1973). Amb l’objectiu d’obtenir una solució interior, es van imposar restriccions importants sobre el valors dels paràmetres del model. En aquest treball estenem aquest resultat, en el límit en que la taxa de descompte és igual a zero, eliminant les restriccions i considerant totes les solucions possibles.

The assignment game: core bounds for mixed-pair coalitions

In the assignment game framework, we try to identify those assignment matrices in which no entry can be increased without changing the coreof the game. These games will be called buyer¿seller exact games and satisfy the condition that each mixed¿pair coalition attains the corresponding matrix entry in the core of the game. For a given assignment game, a unique buyerseller exact assignment game with the same core is proved to exist. In order to identify this matrix and to provide a characterization of those assignment games which are buyer¿seller exact in terms of the assignment matrix, attainable upper and lower core bounds for the mixed¿pair coalitions are found. As a consequence, an open question posed in Quint (1991) regarding a canonical representation of a ¿45o¿lattice¿ by means of the core of an assignment game can now be answered

Immunoelectron microscopic localization of transforming growth factor alpha in rat colon

Transforming growth factor alpha (TGF alpha) is a polypeptide, which binds to the epidermal growth factor receptor to carry out its function related to cell proliferation and differentiation. The ultrastructural localisation of TGF alpha was studied in both the proximal and the distal colon. The columnar cells, lining the surface epithelium of the proximal colon, showed a strong immunoreactivity in the polyribosomes and in the interdigitations of the lateral membrane. The columnar cells of the crypts and the goblet cells in both the proximal and the distal colon showed the immunostaining in the cis and trans cisternae of the Golgi apparatus. TGF alpha seems to be processed differently in the surface columnar cells and in the crypt columnar cells and goblet cells. Moreover, it probably has different roles in proliferation and differentiation.