The short arm of the law: judicial institutions and local governance in Brazil

This paper estimates the effect of judicial institutions on governance at the local level in Brazil. Our estimation strategy exploits a unique institutional feature of state judiciary branches which assigns prosecutors and judges to the most populous among contiguous counties forming a judiciary district. As a result of this assignment mechanism there are counties with nearly identical populations, some with and some without local judicial presence, which we exploit to impute counterfactual outcomes. Conditional on observable county characteristics, offenses per civil servant are about 35% lower in counties that have a local seat of the state judiciary. The lower incidence of infractions stems mostly from fewer violations of financial management regulations by local administrators, fewer instances of problems in project execution and project managment, fewer cases of non-existent or ineffective civil society oversight and fewer cases of improper handling of remittances to local residents.

The Law of Impersonal Transactions: Meaning and Difficulties

Most economic interactions happen in a context of sequential exchange in which innocent third parties suffer information asymmetry with respect to previous "originative" contracts. The law reduces transaction costs by protecting these third parties but preserves some element of consent by property right holders to avoid damaging property enforcement-e.g., it is they as principals who authorize agents in originative contracts. Judicial verifiability of these originative contracts is obtained either as an automatic byproduct of transactions or, when these would have remained private, by requiring them to be made public. Protecting third parties produces a sort of legal commodity which is easy to trade impersonally, improving the allocation and specialization of resources. Historical delay in generalizing this legal commoditization paradigm is attributed to path dependency-the law first developed for personal trade-and an unbalance in vested interests, as luddite legal professionals face weak public bureaucracies.

Cashing by the hour: Why large law firms prefer hourly fees over contingent fees

Large law firms seem to prefer hourly fees over contingent fees. Thispaper provides a moral hazard explanation for this pattern of behavior.Contingent legal fees align the interests of the attorney with those ofthe client, but not necessarily with those of the partnership. We showthat the choice of hourly fees is a solution to an agency problem withmultiple principals, where the interests of one principal (law firm)collide with the interests of the other principal (client).

It's parties that choose electoral systems (or Duverger's Law upside down)

This article presents, discusses and tests the hypothesis that it is the number of parties what can explain the choice of electoral systems, rather than the other way round. Already existing political parties tend to choose electoral systems that, rather than generate new party systems by themselves, will crystallize, consolidate or reinforce previously existing party configurations. A general model develops the argument and presents the concept of 'behavioral-institutional equilibrium' to account for the relation between electoral systems and party systems. The most comprehensive dataset and test of these notions to date, encompassing 219 elections in 87 countries since the 19th century, are presented. The analysis gives strong support to the hypotheses that political party configurations dominated by a few parties tend to establish majority rule electoral systems, while multiparty systems already existed before the introduction of proportional representation. It also offers the new theoretical proposition that strategic party choice of electoral systems leads to a general trend toward proportional representation over time.

Sources and propagation of international cycles: Common shocks or transmission?

This paper studies the generation and transmission of international cycles in a multi-country model with production and consumption interdependencies. Two sources of disturbance are considered and three channels of propagation are compared. In the short run the contemporaneous correlation of disturbances determines the main features of the transmission. In the medium run production interdependencies account for the transmission of technology shocks and consumption interdependencies account for the transmission of government shocks. Technology disturbances, which are mildly correlated across countries, are more successful than government expenditure disturbances in reproducing actual data. The model also accounts for the low cross country consumption correlations observed in the data.

Separated by a common currency? Evidence from the Euro changeover

We study the price convergence of goods and services in the euro area in 2001-2002. To measure the degree of convergence, we compare the prices of around 220 items in 32 European cities. The width of the border is the price di¤erence attributed to the fact that the two cities are in different countries. We find that the 2001 European borders are negative, which suggests that the markets were very integrated before the euro changeover. Moreover, we do not identify an integration effect attributable to the introduction of the euro. We then explore the determinants of the European borders. We find that different languages, wealth and population differences tend to split the markets. Historical inflation, though, tends to lead to price convergence.

The economics of organized crime and optimal law enforcement

This paper extends the optimal law enforcement literature to organized crime.We model the criminal organization as a vertical structure where the principal extracts some rents from the agents through extortion. Depending on the principal's information set, threats may or may not be credible. As long as threats are credible, the principal is able to fully extract rents.In that case, the results obtained by applying standard theory of optimal law enforcement are robust: we argue for a tougher policy. However, when threats are not credible, the principal is not able to fully extract rents and there is violence. Moreover, we show that it is not necessarily true that a tougher law enforcement policy should be chosen when in presence of organized crime.

Optimal law enforcement and criminal organization

In this paper, we take an organizational view of organized crime. In particular, we study the organizational consequences of product illegality attending at the following characteristics: (i) contracts are not enforceable in court, (ii) all participants are subject to the risk of being punished, (iii) employees present a major threat to the entrepreneur having the most detailed knowledge concerning participation, (iv) separation between ownership and management is difficult because record-keeping and auditing augments criminal evidence.

Location of multiple server common service centers or public facilities for minimizing general congestion and travel cost functions

We propose a model and solution methods, for locating a fixed number ofmultiple-server, congestible common service centers or congestible publicfacilities. Locations are chosen so to minimize consumers congestion (orqueuing) and travel costs, considering that all the demand must be served.Customers choose the facilities to which they travel in order to receiveservice at minimum travel and congestion cost. As a proxy for thiscriterion, total travel and waiting costs are minimized. The travel costis a general function of the origin and destination of the demand, whilethe congestion cost is a general function of the number of customers inqueue at the facilities.

Market institutions and judicial rulemaking

Assuming that the degree of discretion granted to judges was the main distinguishing feature between common and civil law until the 19th century, we argue that constraining judicial discretion was instrumental in protecting freedom of contract and developing the market order in civil law. We test this hypothesis by analyzing the history of Western law. In England, a unique institutional balance between the Crown and the Parliament guaranteed private property and prompted the gradual evolution towards a legal framework that facilitated market relationships, a process that was supported by the English judiciary. On the Continent, however, legal constraints on the market were suppressed in a top-down fashion by the founders of the liberal state, often against the will of the incumbent judiciary. Constraining judicial discretion there was essential for enforcing freedom of contract and establishing the legal order of the market economy. In line with this evidence, our selection hypothesis casts doubts on the normative interpretation of empirical results that proclaim the superiority of one legal system over another, disregarding the local conditions and institutional interdependencies on which each legal system was grounded.

Dynamic optimal law enforcement with learning

We incorporate the process of enforcement learning by assuming that the agency's current marginal cost is a decreasing function of its past experience of detecting and convicting. The agency accumulates data and information (on criminals, on opportunities of crime) enhancing the ability to apprehend in the future at a lower marginal cost.We focus on the impact of enforcement learning on optimal stationary compliance rules. In particular, we show that the optimal stationary fine could be less-than-maximal and the optimal stationary probability of detection could be higher-than-otherwise.

Optimal law enforcement under asymmetric information

In this paper, we focus on the problem created by asymmetric informationabout the enforcer's (agent's) costs associated to enforcement expenditure. This adverse selection problem affects optimal law enforcement because a low cost enforcer may conceal its information by imitating a high cost enforcer, and must then be given a compensation to be induced to reveal its true costs. The government faces a trade-off between minimizing the enforcer's compensation and maximizing the net surplus of harmful acts. As a consequence, the probability of apprehension and punishment is usually reduced leading to more offenses being committed. We show that asymmetry of information does not affect law enforcement as long as raising public funds is costless. The consideration of costly raising of public funds permits to establish the positive correlation between asymmetry of information between government and enforcers andthe crime rate.

The second law of thermodynamics and the global climate system : A review of the maximum entropy production principle

The long-term mean properties of the global climate system and those of turbulent fluid systems are reviewed from a thermodynamic viewpoint. Two general expressions are derived for a rate of entropy production due to thermal and viscous dissipation (turbulent dissipation) in a fluid system. It is shown with these expressions that maximum entropy production in the Earth s climate system suggested by Paltridge, as well as maximum transport properties of heat or momentum in a turbulent system suggested by Malkus and Busse, correspond to a state in which the rate of entropy production due to the turbulent dissipation is at a maximum. Entropy production due to absorption of solar radiation in the climate system is found to be irrelevant to the maximized properties associated with turbulence. The hypothesis of maximum entropy production also seems to be applicable to the planetary atmospheres of Mars and Titan and perhaps to mantle convection. Lorenz s conjecture on maximum generation of available potential energy is shown to be akin to this hypothesis with a few minor approximations. A possible mechanism by which turbulent fluid systems adjust themselves to the states of maximum entropy production is presented as a selffeedback mechanism for the generation of available potential energy. These results tend to support the hypothesis of maximum entropy production that underlies a wide variety of nonlinear fluid systems, including our planet as well as other planets and stars

Microsatellite markers reveal shallow genetic differentiation between cohorts of the common sea urchin Paracentrotus lividus (Lamarck) in northwest Mediterranean

Temporal variability was studied in the common sea urchin Paracentrotus lividus through the analysis of the genetic composition of three yearly cohorts sampled over two consecutive springs in a locality in northwestern Mediterranean. Individuals were aged using growth ring patterns observed in tests and samples were genotyped for five microsatellite loci. No reduction of genetic diversity was observed relative to a sample of the adult population from the same location or within cohorts across years. FST and amova results indicated that the differentiation between cohorts is rather shallow and not significant, as most variability is found within cohorts and within individuals. This mild differentiation translated into estimates of effective population size of 90100 individuals. When the observed excess of homozygotes was taken into account, the estimate of the average number of breeders increased to c. 300 individuals. Given our restricted sampling area and the known small-scale heterogeneity in recruitment in this species, our results suggest that at stretches of a few kilometres of shoreline, large numbers of progenitors are likely to contribute to the larval pool at each reproduction event. Intercohort variation in our samples is six times smaller than spatial variation between adults of four localities in the western Mediterranean. Our results indicate that, notwithstanding the stochastic events that take place during the long planktonic phase and during the settlement and recruitment processes, reproductive success in this species is high enough to produce cohorts genetically diverse and with little differentiation between them. Further research is needed before the link between genetic structure and underlying physical and biological processes can be well established.

Time-scale and other invariants of integrative mechanical behavior in living cells.

In dealing with systems as complex as the cytoskeleton, we need organizing principles or, short of that, an empirical framework into which these systems fit. We report here unexpected invariants of cytoskeletal behavior that comprise such an empirical framework. We measured elastic and frictional moduli of a variety of cell types over a wide range of time scales and using a variety of biological interventions. In all instances elastic stresses dominated at frequencies below 300 Hz, increased only weakly with frequency, and followed a power law; no characteristic time scale was evident. Frictional stresses paralleled the elastic behavior at frequencies below 10 Hz but approached a Newtonian viscous behavior at higher frequencies. Surprisingly, all data could be collapsed onto master curves, the existence of which implies that elastic and frictional stresses share a common underlying mechanism. Taken together, these findings define an unanticipated integrative framework for studying protein interactions within the complex microenvironment of the cell body, and appear to set limits on what can be predicted about integrated mechanical behavior of the matrix based solely on cytoskeletal constituents considered in isolation. Moreover, these observations are consistent with the hypothesis that the cytoskeleton of the living cell behaves as a soft glassy material, wherein cytoskeletal proteins modulate cell mechanical properties mainly by changing an effective temperature of the cytoskeletal matrix. If so, then the effective temperature becomes an easily quantified determinant of the ability of the cytoskeleton to deform, flow, and reorganize.