80 resultados para asymptotic efficiency
Resumo:
We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need to borrow in order to invest. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, the competitive equilibrium is typically inefficient. We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurs can only access monitored lending. If a new set of markets is added to provide entrepreneurs with additional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic of these additional markets is that lending in them must be unmonitored, in the sense that it does not condition total borrowing or investment by entrepreneurs. This makes it possible to attain efficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new markets while separating them in the markets for monitored loans.
Resumo:
We analyze the role of commitment in pre-play communication for ensuring efficient evolutionarily stable outcomes in coordination games. All players are a priori identical as they are drawn from the same population. In games where efficient outcomes can be reached by players coordinating on the same action we find commitment to be necessary to enforce efficiency. In games where efficienct outcomes only result from play of different actions, communication without commitment is most effective although efficiency can no longer be guaranteed. Only when there are many messages then inefficient outcomes are negligible as their basins of attraction become very small.
Resumo:
Standard methods for the analysis of linear latent variable models oftenrely on the assumption that the vector of observed variables is normallydistributed. This normality assumption (NA) plays a crucial role inassessingoptimality of estimates, in computing standard errors, and in designinganasymptotic chi-square goodness-of-fit test. The asymptotic validity of NAinferences when the data deviates from normality has been calledasymptoticrobustness. In the present paper we extend previous work on asymptoticrobustnessto a general context of multi-sample analysis of linear latent variablemodels,with a latent component of the model allowed to be fixed across(hypothetical)sample replications, and with the asymptotic covariance matrix of thesamplemoments not necessarily finite. We will show that, under certainconditions,the matrix $\Gamma$ of asymptotic variances of the analyzed samplemomentscan be substituted by a matrix $\Omega$ that is a function only of thecross-product moments of the observed variables. The main advantage of thisis thatinferences based on $\Omega$ are readily available in standard softwareforcovariance structure analysis, and do not require to compute samplefourth-order moments. An illustration with simulated data in the context ofregressionwith errors in variables will be presented.
Resumo:
The increased fragility of the banking industry has generatedgrowing concern about the risks associated with the paymentsystems. Although in most industrial countries differentinterbank payment systems coexist, little is really knownabout their propierties in terms of risk and efficiency. Wetackle this question by comparing the two main types ofpayment systems, gross and net, in a framework whereuncertainty arises from several sources: the time ofconsumption, the location of consumption and the return oninvestment. Payments across locations can be made either bydirectly transferrring liquidity or by transferring claimsagainst the bank in the other location. The two mechanism areinterpreted as the gross and net settlement systems ininterbank payments. We characterize the equilibria in the twosystems and identify the trade-off in terms of safety andefficiency.
Resumo:
It is proved the algebraic equality between Jennrich's (1970) asymptotic$X^2$ test for equality of correlation matrices, and a Wald test statisticderived from Neudecker and Wesselman's (1990) expression of theasymptoticvariance matrix of the sample correlation matrix.
Resumo:
Structural equation models are widely used in economic, socialand behavioral studies to analyze linear interrelationships amongvariables, some of which may be unobservable or subject to measurementerror. Alternative estimation methods that exploit different distributionalassumptions are now available. The present paper deals with issues ofasymptotic statistical inferences, such as the evaluation of standarderrors of estimates and chi--square goodness--of--fit statistics,in the general context of mean and covariance structures. The emphasisis on drawing correct statistical inferences regardless of thedistribution of the data and the method of estimation employed. A(distribution--free) consistent estimate of $\Gamma$, the matrix ofasymptotic variances of the vector of sample second--order moments,will be used to compute robust standard errors and a robust chi--squaregoodness--of--fit squares. Simple modifications of the usual estimateof $\Gamma$ will also permit correct inferences in the case of multi--stage complex samples. We will also discuss the conditions under which,regardless of the distribution of the data, one can rely on the usual(non--robust) inferential statistics. Finally, a multivariate regressionmodel with errors--in--variables will be used to illustrate, by meansof simulated data, various theoretical aspects of the paper.
Resumo:
In moment structure analysis with nonnormal data, asymptotic valid inferences require the computation of a consistent (under general distributional assumptions) estimate of the matrix $\Gamma$ of asymptotic variances of sample second--order moments. Such a consistent estimate involves the fourth--order sample moments of the data. In practice, the use of fourth--order moments leads to computational burden and lack of robustness against small samples. In this paper we show that, under certain assumptions, correct asymptotic inferences can be attained when $\Gamma$ is replaced by a matrix $\Omega$ that involves only the second--order moments of the data. The present paper extends to the context of multi--sample analysis of second--order moment structures, results derived in the context of (simple--sample) covariance structure analysis (Satorra and Bentler, 1990). The results apply to a variety of estimation methods and general type of statistics. An example involving a test of equality of means under covariance restrictions illustrates theoretical aspects of the paper.
Efficiency and equilibrium with locally increasing aggregate returns due to demand complementarities
Resumo:
Many workers believe that personal contacts are crucial for obtainingjobs in high-wage sectors. On the other hand, firms in high-wage sectorsreport using employee referrals because they help provide screening andmonitoring of new employees. This paper develops a matching model thatcan explain the link between inter-industry wage differentials and useof employee referrals. Referrals lower monitoring costs because high-effortreferees can exert peer pressure on co-workers, allowing firms to pay lowerefficiency wages. On the other hand, informal search provides fewer job andapplicant contacts than formal methods (e.g., newspaper ads). In equilibrium,the matching process generates segmentation in the labor market becauseof heterogeneity in the size of referral networks. Referrals match good high-paying jobs to well-connected workers, while formal methods matchless attractive jobs to less-connected workers. Industry-level data show apositive correlation between industry wage premia and use of employeereferrals. Moreover, evidence using the NLSY shows similar positive andsignificant OLS and fixed-effects estimates of the returns to employeereferrals, but insignificant effects once sector of employment is controlledfor. This evidence suggests referred workers earn higher wages not becauseof higher unobserved ability or better matches but rather because theyare hired in high-wage sectors.
Resumo:
166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forcescreate and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999b) document several of the internationally and historically common features of social security programs, and explore "political" theories of Social Security. This paper discusses the "efficiency theories", which view creation of the SS program as a full of partial solution to some market failure. Efficiency explanations of social security include the "SS as welfare for the elderly" the "retirement increases productivity to optimally manage human capital externalities", "optimal retirement insurance", the "prodigal father problem", the "misguided Keynesian", the "optimal longevity insurance", the "governmenteconomizing transaction costs", and the "return on human capital investment". We also analyze four "narrative" theories of social security: the "chain letter theory", the "lump of labor theory", the "monopoly capitalism theory", and the "Sub-but-Nearly-Optimal policy response to private pensions theory".The political and efficiency explanations are compared with the international and historical facts and used to derive implications for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan. Most of the explanations suggest that forced savings does not increase welfare, and may decrease it.
Resumo:
We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment,entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need toborrow from banks. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, the competitiveequilibrium is typically inefficient.We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurscan only borrow from banks. If an additional market is added to provide entrepreneurs withadditional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic of thisadditional market is that it must be non-exclusive, in the sense that entrepreneurs must be ableto simultaneously borrow from many different lenders operating in it. This makes it possible toattain efficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new market while separating them in themarket for bank loans.
Resumo:
Consider the density of the solution $X(t,x)$ of a stochastic heat equation with small noise at a fixed $t\in [0,T]$, $x \in [0,1]$.In the paper we study the asymptotics of this density as the noise is vanishing. A kind of Taylor expansion in powers of the noiseparameter is obtained. The coefficients and the residue of the expansion are explicitly calculated.In order to obtain this result some type of exponential estimates of tail probabilities of the difference between the approximatingprocess and the limit one is proved. Also a suitable local integration by parts formula is developped.
Resumo:
We show that unconditionally efficient returns do not achieve the maximum unconditionalSharpe ratio, neither display zero unconditional Jensen s alphas, when returns arepredictable. Next, we define a new type of efficient returns that is characterized by thoseunconditional properties. We also study a different type of efficient returns that is rationalizedby standard mean-variance preferences and motivates new Sharpe ratios and Jensen salphas. We revisit the testable implications of asset pricing models from the perspective ofthe three sets of efficient returns. We also revisit the empirical evidence on the conditionalvariants of the CAPM and the Fama-French model from a portfolio perspective.