What is Abstinence? Definitions and Examples of Abstinence, to Prevent the Sexual Transmission of the HIV Virus, According to Spanish University Students

Research carried out in several Anglo-Saxon countries shows that many undergraduatesidentify oral sex and anal sex as examples of abstinent behaviour, while manyothers consider kissing and masturbation as examples of having sex. The objective ofthis research was to investigate whether a sample of Spanish students gave similarreplies. Seven hundred and fifty undergraduates (92% aged under 26, 67.6%women) produced examples or definitions of the term ‘abstinence’. Spanish studentsmade similar errors to those observed in the Anglo-Saxon samples, in thatbehaviours that were abstinent from a preventive point of view (masturbating andsex without penetration) were not considered as such, while a number of studentsreported oral sex as abstinent behaviour. The results suggest that the information onrisky and preventive sexual behaviour should cease to use ambiguous or euphemisticexpressions and use vocabulary that is clear and comprehensible to everyone

Transmission delays in residual computation

The design of control, estimation or diagnosis algorithms most often assumes that all available process variables represent the system state at the same instant of time. However, this is never true in current network systems, because of the unknown deterministic or stochastic transmission delays introduced by the communication network. During the diagnosing stage, this will often generate false alarms. Under nominal operation, the different transmission delays associated with the variables that appear in the computation form produce discrepancies of the residuals from zero. A technique aiming at the minimisation of the resulting false alarms rate, that is based on the explicit modelling of communication delays and on their best-case estimation is proposed

Influencia social y uso del preservativo en la prevención de la transmisión heterosexual del VIH = Social influence and condom use for VIH heterosexual transmission prevention

Se revisan diferentes formas en que la influencia social puede incidir sobre los comportamientosheterosexuales de prevención de la transmisión del VIH de los jóvenes y se presentanlos resultados de algunos trabajos de las autoras, así como de otros investigadores, en que seanalizan dichas relaciones. Se concluye resaltando: 1) la utilidad clínica de la evaluación de lasexpectativas de autoeficacia para poder intervenir específicamente en aquellas áreas en que losjóvenes se perciban con menores capacidades para ser preventivos, 2) la relación observadaentre el uso de preservativo autoinformado y la creencia en su aceptación por parte de los referentessociales más cercanos y 3) la conveniencia de que los jóvenes posean suficientes habilidadesde comunicación que les permitan negociar con éxito el uso del preservativo y les ayudena compensar posibles influencias sociales en contra de su empleo

Oil price shocks, income and democracy

We examine the effect of oil price fluctuations ondemocratic institutions over the 1960-2007 period. We also exploitthe very persistent response of income to oil price fluctuations tostudy the effect of persistent (oil price-driven) income shocks ondemocracy. Our results indicate that countries with greater net oilexports over GDP see improvements in democratic institutionsfollowing upturns in international oil prices. We estimate that a 1percentage point increase in per capita GDP growth due to apositive oil price shock increases the Polity democracy score byaround 0.2 percentage points on impact and by around 2 percentagepoints in the long run. The effect on the probability of a democratictransition is around 0.4 percentage points.

Consistent solutions in exchange economies: A characterization of the price mechanism

We characterize the Walrasian allocations correspondence by means offour axioms: consistency, replica invariance, individual rationality andPareto optimality. It is shown that for any given class of exchange economiesany solution that satisfies the axioms is a selection from the Walrasianallocations with slack. Preferences are assumed to be smooth, but may besatiated and non--convex. A class of economies is defined as all economieswhose agents' preferences belong to an arbitrary family (finite or infinite)of types. The result can be modified to characterize equal budget Walrasianallocations with slack by replacing individual rationality with individualrationality from equal division. The results are valid also for classes ofeconomies in which core--Walras equivalence does not hold.

On the cultural transmission of corruption

We provide a cultural explanation to the phenomenon of corruption in the framework of an overlapping generations model with intergenerational transmissionof values. We show that the economy has two steady states with different levels of corruption. The driving force in the equilibrium selection process is the education effort exerted by parents which depends on the distribution of ethics in the population and on expectations about future policies. We propose some policy interventions which via parents' efforts have long-lasting effects on corruption and show the success of intensive education campaigns. Educating the young is a key element in reducing corruption successfully.

Dynamic price competition with fixed capacities

Many revenue management (RM) industries are characterized by (a) fixed capacities in theshort term (e.g., hotel rooms, seats on an airline flight), (b) homogeneous products (e.g., twoairline flights between the same cities at similar times), and (c) customer purchasing decisionslargely influenced by price. Competition in these industries is also very high even with just twoor three direct competitors in a market. However, RM competition is not well understood andpractically all known implementations of RM software and most published models of RM donot explicitly model competition. For this reason, there has been considerable recent interestand research activity to understand RM competition. In this paper we study price competitionfor an oligopoly in a dynamic setting, where each of the sellers has a fixed number of unitsavailable for sale over a fixed number of periods. Demand is stochastic, and depending on howit evolves, sellers may change their prices at any time. This reflects the fact that firms constantly,and almost costlessly, change their prices (alternately, allocations at a price in quantity-basedRM), reacting either to updates in their estimates of market demand, competitor prices, orinventory levels. We first prove existence of a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium for a duopoly.In equilibrium, in each state sellers engage in Bertrand competition, so that the seller withthe lowest reservation value ends up selling a unit at a price that is equal to the equilibriumreservation value of the competitor. This structure hence extends the marginal-value conceptof bid-price control, used in many RM implementations, to a competitive model. In addition,we show that the seller with the lowest capacity sells all its units first. Furthermore, we extendthe results transparently to n firms and perform a number of numerical comparative staticsexploiting the uniqueness of the subgame-perfect equilibrium.

The impact of the reference price system on the pharmaceutical market: A theoretical approach

This article analyses the impact of the reference pricesystem on the price-setting strategies of thepharmaceutical firms and on the level of generic usage.This model is the first to take explicitly into accountthe impact of the reference price mechanism on the levelof competition between brand-name and generic drugs andnational pharmaceutical spending. We consider aduopolistic model with one firm producing the brand-namedrug, whose patent has already expired, and the otherproducing the corresponding generic version. We work ina partial equilibrium framework where firms set pricessequentially and consumers face heterogeneous switchingcosts.We show that brand producers compensate thedecline of profits by selling greater quantities insteadof charging higher prices, thus fostering pricecompetition in the pharmaceutical market. This result isa consequence of both the assumption of a verticallydifferentiated model and the introduction of thereference price system.

Relative price riddles in international business cycle theory: Are transport costs the explanation?

We study relative price behavior in an international business cyclemodel with specialization in production, in which a goods marketfriction is introduced through transport costs. The transporttechnology allows for flexible transport costs. We analyze whetherthis extension can account for the striking differences betweentheory and data as far as the moments of terms of trade and realexchange rates are concerned. We find that transport costs increaseboth the volatility of the terms of trade and the volatility of thereal exchange rate. However, unless the transport technology isspecified by a Leontief technology, transport costs do not resolvethe quantitative discrepancies between theory and data. Asurprising result is that transport costs may actually lower thepersistence of the real exchange rate, a finding that is in contrastto much of the emphasis of the empirical literature.

Price increase and stability with new entries in Cournot markets

It is widely accepted in the literature about the classicalCournot oligopoly model that the loss of quasi competitiveness is linked,in the long run as new firms enter the market, to instability of the equilibrium. In this paper, though, we present a model in which a stableunique symmetric equilibrium is reached for any number of oligopolistsas industry price increases with each new entry. Consequently, the suspicion that non quasi competitiveness implies, in the long run, instabilityis proved false.

Endogenous price leadership

We consider a linear price setting duopoly game with di®erentiatedproducts and determine endogenously which of the players will lead andwhich will follow. While the follower role is most attractive for each firm, we show that waiting is more risky for the low cost firm so that,consequently, risk dominance considerations, as in Harsanyi and Selten(1988), allow the conclusion that only the high cost firm will choose towait. Hence, the low cost firm will emerge as the endogenous price leader.