79 resultados para Steady State Processes.
Resumo:
This paper presents and estimates a dynamic choice model in the attribute space considering rational consumers. In light of the evidence of several state-dependence patterns, the standard attribute-based model is extended by considering a general utility function where pure inertia and pure variety-seeking behaviors can be explained in the model as particular linear cases. The dynamics of the model are fully characterized by standard dynamic programming techniques. The model presents a stationary consumption pattern that can be inertial, where the consumer only buys one product, or a variety-seeking one, where the consumer shifts among varied products.We run some simulations to analyze the consumption paths out of the steady state. Underthe hybrid utility assumption, the consumer behaves inertially among the unfamiliar brandsfor several periods, eventually switching to a variety-seeking behavior when the stationary levels are approached. An empirical analysis is run using scanner databases for three different product categories: fabric softener, saltine cracker, and catsup. Non-linear specifications provide the best fit of the data, as hybrid functional forms are found in all the product categories for most attributes and segments. These results reveal the statistical superiority of the non-linear structure and confirm the gradual trend to seek variety as the level of familiarity with the purchased items increases.
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We study the dynamics of corruption relying on two fundamental observations:(a) Given agents detected as corrupt are typically fired and replaced, the historical levels of corruption have an impact on current corruption throughthe distribution of corruption costs of old agents; (b) Institutions negatively affected by their agents' corrupt activities are likely to respond optimally to it thereby decreasing the payoff from being corrupt. We model this situation by considering an agent who is supposed to monitor acontractor's delivery of a product or service and can manipulate hisreports thus allowing the contractor to deliver lower quality in exchange for a bribe. Given the two generations of agents overlapping at any particular date, the administration sets an optimal level of quality in eachperiod. We find that (i) A unique steady state level of corruption exists;(ii) Regardless of the initial distribution, apart from an initial period,equilibrium sequences are decreasing and converge to the steady state, aresult we term the "Hadleyburg effect". We use these findings to study thedynamic response of corruption to both temporary and permanent shocks to theprofitability of corruption and we find that the "Hadleyburg effect" hasimportant positive and normative implications.
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How do the liquidity functions of banks affect investment and growth at different stages ofeconomic development? How do financial fragility and the costs of banking crises evolve with the level of wealth of countries? We analyze these issues using an overlapping generations growth model where agents, who experience idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, can invest in a liquid storage technology or in a partially illiquid Cobb Douglas technology. By pooling liquidity risk, banks play a growth enhancing role in reducing inefficient liquidation of long term projects, but they may face liquidity crises associated with severe output losses. We show that middle income economies may find optimal to be exposed to liquidity crises, while poor and rich economies have more incentives to develop a fully covered banking system. Therefore, middle income economies could experience banking crises in the process of their development and, as they get richer, they eventually converge to a financially safe long run steady state. Finally, the model replicates the empirical fact of higher costs of banking crises for middle income economies.
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In this paper, we incorporate a positive theory of unemployment insuranceinto a dynamic overlapping generations model with search-matching frictionsand on-the-job learning-by-doing. The model shows that societies populatedby identical rational agents, but differing in the initial distributionof human capital across agents, may choose very different unemploymentinsurance levels in a politico-economic equilibrium. The interactionbetween the political decision about the level of the unemployment insuranceand the optimal search behavior of the unemployed gives rise to aself-reinforcing mechanism whichmay generate multiple steady-stateequilibria. In particular, a European-type steady-state with highunemployment, low employment turnover and high insurance can co-exist withan American-type steady-state with low unemployment, high employment turnoverand low unemployment insurance. A calibrated version of the model featurestwo distinct steady-state equilibria with unemployment levels and durationrates resembling those of the U.S. and Europe, respectively.
Resumo:
We study the issue of income convergence across countries and regions witha Bayesian estimator which allows us to use information in an efficient andflexible way. We argue that the very slow convergence rates to a commonlevel of per-capita income found, e.g., by Barro and Xavier Sala-i-Martin,is due to a 'fixed effect bias' that their cross-sectional analysisintroduces in the results. Our approach permits the estimation of differentconvergence rates to different steady states for each cross sectional unit.When this diversity is allowed, we find that convergence of each unit to(its own) steady state income level is much faster than previously estimatedbut that cross sectional differences persist: inequalities will only bereduced by a small amount by the passage of time. The cross countrydistribution of the steady state is largely explained by the cross countrydistribution of initial conditions.
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Since World War II, the United States government has made improved accessto higher education a priority. This e¤ort has substantially increasedthe number of people who complete college. We show that by reducing theeffective interest rate on borrowing for education, such policies canactually increase the gap in wages between those with a college educationand those without. The mechanism that drives our results is the signaling role of education first explored by Spence (1973). We argue that financialconstraints on education reduce the value of education as a signal. Wesolve for the reduced form relationship between the interest rate and thewage premium in the steady state of a dynamic asymmetric information model.In addition, we discuss evidence of decreases in borrowing costs for educationfinancing in the U.S.
Resumo:
The paper reports results on the effects of stylized stabilization policies on endogenously created fluctuations. A simple monetary model with intertemporally optimizing agents is considered. Fluctuations in output may occur due to fluctuations in labor supply which are again caused by volatile expectations which are ``self fulfilling'', i.e. correct given the model. It turns out that stabilization policies that are sufficiently countercyclical in the sense that government spending (on transfers or demand) depends sufficiently strongly negatively on GNP-increases can stabilize the economy at a monetary steadystate for an arbitrarily low degree of distortion of that steady state. Such stabilization has unambiguously good welfare effects and can be achieved without features such as positive lump sum taxation or negative income taxation as part of the stabilization policy.
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This note describes how the Kalman filter can be modified to allow for thevector of observables to be a function of lagged variables without increasing the dimensionof the state vector in the filter. This is useful in applications where it is desirable to keepthe dimension of the state vector low. The modified filter and accompanying code (whichnests the standard filter) can be used to compute (i) the steady state Kalman filter (ii) thelog likelihood of a parameterized state space model conditional on a history of observables(iii) a smoothed estimate of latent state variables and (iv) a draw from the distribution oflatent states conditional on a history of observables.
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I formulate and estimate a model of externalities within countriesand technological interdependence across countries. I find that externalreturns to scale to physical capital within countries are 8 percent; thata 10 percent increase of total factor productivity of a country's neighborsraises its total factor productivity by 6 percent; and that a 2 percentannual growth rate of labor productivity can be explained as an endogenousresponse to an exogenous 0.2 percent annual growth rate of total factorproductivity in the steady--state.
Resumo:
We postulate a two-region world, comprised of North (calibrated after the US) and South(calibrated after China). Our optimization results show the compatibility of the following threedesiderata:(1) Global CO2 emissions follow a conservative path that leads to the stabilizationof concentrations at 450 ppm.(2) North and South converge to a path of sustained growth at 1% per year (28.2%per generation) in 2075.(3) During the transition to the steady state, North also grows at 1% per year whileSouth s rates of growth are markedly higher.The transition paths require a drastic reduction of the share of emissions allocated to North,large investments in knowledge, both in North and South, as well as very large investments ineducation in South. Surprisingly, in order to sustain North s utility growth rate, some output mustbe transferred from South to North during the transition.Although undoubtedly subject to many caveats, our results support a degree of optimism byproviding prima facie evidence of the possibility of tackling climate change in a way that is fairboth across generations and across regions while allowing for positive rates of humandevelopment.
Resumo:
We analyze a monetary model with flexible labor supply, cash-inadvance constraints and seigniorage-financed government deficits. If the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of labor is greater than one, there are two steady states, one determinate and the other indeterminate. If the elasticity is less than one, there is a unique steady state, which can be indeterminate. Only in the latter case do there exist sunspot equilibria that are stable under adaptive learning. A sufficient reduction in government purchases can in many cases eliminate the sunspot equilibria while raising consumption/labor taxes even enough to balance the budget may fail to achieve determinacy.
Resumo:
This paper argues that Malthusian regimes are capable of sustained changes in per capita incomes. Shifting mortality and fertility schedules can lead to different steady-state income levels, with long periods of growth during the transition. Europe checked the downward pressure on wages through late marriage, which reduced fertility, and a mortality regime that combined high death rates with high incomes. We argue that both emerged as a result of the Black Death.
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In this paper we present a simple theory-based measure of the variations in aggregate economic efficiency: the gap between the marginal product of labor and the household s consumption/leisure tradeoff. We show that this indicator corresponds to the inverse of the markup of price over social marginal cost, and give some evidence in support of this interpretation. We then show that, with some auxilliary assumptions our gap variable may be used to measure the efficiency costs of business fluctuations. We find that the latter costs are modest on average. However, to the extent the flexible price equilibrium is distorted,the gross efficiency losses from recessions and gains from booms may be large. Indeed, we find that the major recessions involved large efficiency losses. These results hold for reasonable parameterizations of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and steady state distortions.
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How did Europe escape the "Iron Law of Wages?" We construct a simple Malthusian model withtwo sectors and multiple steady states, and use it to explain why European per capita incomes andurbanization rates increased during the period 1350-1700. Productivity growth can only explain a smallfraction of the rise in output per capita. Population dynamics changes of the birth and death schedules were far more important determinants of steady states. We show how a major shock to population cantrigger a transition to a new steady state with higher per-capita income. The Black Death was such ashock, raising wages substantially. Because of Engel's Law, demand for urban products increased, andurban centers grew in size. European cities were unhealthy, and rising urbanization pushed up aggregatedeath rates. This effect was reinforced by diseases spread through war, financed by higher tax revenues.In addition, rising trade also spread diseases. In this way higher wages themselves reduced populationpressure. We show in a calibration exercise that our model can account for the sustained rise in Europeanurbanization as well as permanently higher per capita incomes in 1700, without technological change.Wars contributed importantly to the "Rise of Europe", even if they had negative short-run effects. We thustrace Europe s precocious rise to economic riches to interactions of the plague shock with the belligerentpolitical environment and the nature of cities.
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This paper presents a tractable dynamic general equilibrium model thatcan explain cross-country empirical regularities in geographical mobility,unemployment and labor market institutions. Rational agents vote overunemployment insurance (UI), taking the dynamic distortionary effects ofinsurance on the performance of the labor market into consideration.Agents with higher cost of moving, i.e., more attached to their currentlocation, prefer more generous UI. The key assumption is that an agent'sattachment to a location increases the longer she has resided there. UIreduces the incentive for labor mobility and increases, therefore, thefraction of attached agents and the political support for UI. The mainresult is that this self-reinforcing mechanism can give rise to multiplesteady-states-one 'European' steady-state featuring high unemployment,low geographical mobility and high unemployment insurance, and one'American' steady-state featuring low unemployment, high mobility andlow unemployment insurance.