A Folk Theorem for Games when Frequent Monitoring Decreases Noise

This paper studies frequent monitoring in an infinitely repeated game with imperfect public information and discounting, where players observe the state of a continuous time Brownian process at moments in time of length _. It shows that a limit folk theorem can be achieved with imperfect public monitoring when players monitor each other at the highest frequency, i.e., _. The approach assumes that the expected joint output depends exclusively on the action profile simultaneously and privately decided by the players at the beginning of each period of the game, but not on _. The strong decreasing effect on the expected immediate gains from deviation when the interval between actions shrinks, and the associated increase precision of the public signals, make the result possible in the limit. JEL: C72/73, D82, L20. KEYWORDS: Repeated Games, Frequent Monitoring, Public Monitoring, Brownian Motion.

Public Monitoring with Uncertainty in the Time Repetitions

This paper study repeated games where the time repetitions of the stage game are not known or controlled by the players. We call this feature random monitoring. Kawamori's (2004) shows that perfect random monitoring is always better than the canonical case. Surprisingly, when the monitoring is public, the result is less clear-cut and does not generalize in a straightforward way. Unless the public signals are sufficiently informative about player's actions and/or players are patient enough. In addition to a discount effect, that tends to consistently favor the provision of incentives, we found an information effect, associated with the time uncertainty on the distribution of public signals. Whether payoff improvements are or not possible, depends crucially on the direction and strength of these effects. JEL: C73, D82, D86. KEYWORDS: Repeated Games, Frequent Monitoring, Random Public Monitoring, Moral Hazard, Stochastic Processes.

After Art. Una propuesta de implementación digital en el Museu d'Art Contemporani de Barcelona a través de Google Art Project

L’aplicació de la tecnologia de Google Art Project al Museu d’Art Contemporani de Barcelona (MACBA) com a forma d’aproximació de l’art a un públic més internacional és el plantejament d’aquest treball. Amb aquesta finalitat es desenvoluparà una estratègia de comunicació digital que comprengui aquesta eina com a principal i abasti altres mètodes interactius a xarxes socials i a altres espais de socialització 2.0. L’elaboració d’aquesta estratègia estarà basada dins un context real de l’art contemporani a Barcelona i de la seva màxima compenetració amb aquesta innovadora iniciativa.

Aplicación de la ingeniería software sobre la herramienta MATE Analyzer

MATE (Monitoring, Analysis and Tuning Environment) es un proyecto que surge en 2004 como tesis doctoral de Anna Sikora con el propósito de investigar la mejora de rendimiento de aplicaciones paralelas a través de la modificación dinámica. Nuestro proyecto supone un paso adelante en cuestiones de calidad de software y pretende dotar al proyecto MATE de una base de desarrollo sólida de cara a futuras lineas de trabajo. Para ello se hace frente a la problemática desde tres perspectivas: la creación de una metodología de desarrollo (y su aplicación sobre el proyecto existente), la implantación de un entorno de desarrollo de soporte y el desarrollo de nuevas características para favorecer la portabilidad y la usabilidad, entre otros aspectos.