Salience theory of choice under risk

We present a theory of choice among lotteries in which the decision maker's attention is drawn to (precisely defined) salient payoffs. This leads the decision maker to a context-dependent representation of lotteries in which true probabilities are replaced by decision weights distorted in favor of salient payoffs. By endogenizing decision weights as a function of payoffs, our model provides a novel and unified account of many empirical phenomena, including frequent risk-seeking behavior, invariance failures such as the Allais paradox, and preference reversals. It also yields new predictions, including some that distinguish it from Prospect Theory, which we test.

Locating emergency services with priority rules: The priority queuing covering location problem

One of the assumptions of the Capacitated Facility Location Problem (CFLP) is thatdemand is known and fixed. Most often, this is not the case when managers take somestrategic decisions such as locating facilities and assigning demand points to thosefacilities. In this paper we consider demand as stochastic and we model each of thefacilities as an independent queue. Stochastic models of manufacturing systems anddeterministic location models are put together in order to obtain a formula for thebacklogging probability at a potential facility location.Several solution techniques have been proposed to solve the CFLP. One of the mostrecently proposed heuristics, a Reactive Greedy Adaptive Search Procedure, isimplemented in order to solve the model formulated. We present some computationalexperiments in order to evaluate the heuristics performance and to illustrate the use ofthis new formulation for the CFLP. The paper finishes with a simple simulationexercise.

Network revenue management with product-specific no-shows

Revenue management practices often include overbooking capacity to account for customerswho make reservations but do not show up. In this paper, we consider the network revenuemanagement problem with no-shows and overbooking, where the show-up probabilities are specificto each product. No-show rates differ significantly by product (for instance, each itinerary andfare combination for an airline) as sale restrictions and the demand characteristics vary byproduct. However, models that consider no-show rates by each individual product are difficultto handle as the state-space in dynamic programming formulations (or the variable space inapproximations) increases significantly. In this paper, we propose a randomized linear program tojointly make the capacity control and overbooking decisions with product-specific no-shows. Weestablish that our formulation gives an upper bound on the optimal expected total profit andour upper bound is tighter than a deterministic linear programming upper bound that appearsin the existing literature. Furthermore, we show that our upper bound is asymptotically tightin a regime where the leg capacities and the expected demand is scaled linearly with the samerate. We also describe how the randomized linear program can be used to obtain a bid price controlpolicy. Computational experiments indicate that our approach is quite fast, able to scale to industrialproblems and can provide significant improvements over standard benchmarks.

Efficient interval scoring rules

Scoring rules that elicit an entire belief distribution through the elicitation of point beliefsare time-consuming and demand considerable cognitive e¤ort. Moreover, the results are validonly when agents are risk-neutral or when one uses probabilistic rules. We investigate a classof rules in which the agent has to choose an interval and is rewarded (deterministically) onthe basis of the chosen interval and the realization of the random variable. We formulatean e¢ ciency criterion for such rules and present a speci.c interval scoring rule. For single-peaked beliefs, our rule gives information about both the location and the dispersion of thebelief distribution. These results hold for all concave utility functions.

Resolving inconsistencies in utility measurement under risk: Tests of generalizations of expected utility

This paper explores biases in the elicitation of utilities under risk and the contribution that generalizations of expected utility can make to the resolution of these biases. We used five methods to measure utilities under risk and found clear violations of expected utility. Of the theories studies, prospect theory was most consistent with our data. The main improvement of prospect theory over expected utility was in comparisons between a riskless and a risky prospect(riskless-risk methods). We observed no improvement over expected utility in comparisons between two risky prospects (risk-risk methods). An explanation why we found no improvement of prospect theory over expected utility in risk-risk methods may be that there was less overweighting of small probabilities in our study than has commonly been observed.

Regions of rationality: Maps for bounded agents

An important problem in descriptive and prescriptive research in decision making is to identify regions of rationality, i.e., the areas for which heuristics are and are not effective. To map the contours of such regions, we derive probabilities that heuristics identify the best of m alternatives (m > 2) characterized by k attributes or cues (k > 1). The heuristics include a single variable (lexicographic), variations of elimination-by-aspects, equal weighting, hybrids of the preceding, and models exploiting dominance. We use twenty simulated and four empirical datasets for illustration. We further provide an overview by regressing heuristic performance on factors characterizing environments. Overall, sensible heuristics generally yield similar choices in many environments. However, selection of the appropriate heuristic can be important in some regions (e.g., if there is low inter-correlation among attributes/cues). Since our work assumes a hit or miss decision criterion, we conclude by outlining extensions for exploring the effects of different loss functions.

The effects of employment uncertainty and wealth shocks on the labor supply and claiming behavior of older American workers

Unemployment rates in developed countries have recently reached levels not seenin a generation, and workers of all ages are facing increasing probabilities of losingtheir jobs and considerable losses in accumulated assets. These events likely increasethe reliance that most older workers will have on public social insurance programs,exactly at a time that public finances are suffering from a large drop in contributions.Our paper explicitly accounts for employment uncertainty and unexpectedwealth shocks, something that has been relatively overlooked in the literature, butthat has grown in importance in recent years. Using administrative and householdlevel data we empirically characterize a life-cycle model of retirement and claimingdecisions in terms of the employment, wage, health, and mortality uncertainty facedby individuals. Our benchmark model explains with great accuracy the strikinglyhigh proportion of individuals who claim benefits exactly at the Early RetirementAge, while still explaining the increased claiming hazard at the Normal RetirementAge. We also discuss some policy experiments and their interplay with employmentuncertainty. Additionally, we analyze the effects of negative wealth shocks on thelabor supply and claiming decisions of older Americans. Our results can explainwhy early claiming has remained very high in the last years even as the early retirementpenalties have increased substantially compared with previous periods, andwhy labor force participation has remained quite high for older workers even in themidst of the worse employment crisis in decades.

Measuring strategic uncertainty in coordination games

This paper explores three aspects of strategic uncertainty: its relation to risk, predictability of behavior and subjective beliefs of players. In a laboratory experiment we measure subjects certainty equivalents for three coordination games and one lottery. Behavior in coordination games is related to risk aversion, experience seeking, and age.From the distribution of certainty equivalents we estimate probabilities for successful coordination in a wide range of games. For many games, success of coordination is predictable with a reasonable error rate. The best response to observed behavior is close to the global-game solution. Comparing choices in coordination games with revealed risk aversion, we estimate subjective probabilities for successful coordination. In games with a low coordination requirement, most subjects underestimate the probability of success. In games with a high coordination requirement, most subjects overestimate this probability. Estimating probabilistic decision models, we show that the quality of predictions can be improved when individual characteristics are taken into account. Subjects behavior is consistent with probabilistic beliefs about the aggregate outcome, but inconsistent with probabilistic beliefs about individual behavior.

A simple adaptive procedure leading to correlated equilibrium

We propose a simple adaptive procedure for playing a game. In thisprocedure, players depart from their current play with probabilities thatare proportional to measures of regret for not having used other strategies(these measures are updated every period). It is shown that our adaptiveprocedure guaranties that with probability one, the sample distributionsof play converge to the set of correlated equilibria of the game. Tocompute these regret measures, a player needs to know his payoff functionand the history of play. We also offer a variation where every playerknows only his own realized payoff history (but not his payoff function).

Asymptotic behaviour of the density in a parabolic SPDE

Consider the density of the solution $X(t,x)$ of a stochastic heat equation with small noise at a fixed $t\in [0,T]$, $x \in [0,1]$.In the paper we study the asymptotics of this density as the noise is vanishing. A kind of Taylor expansion in powers of the noiseparameter is obtained. The coefficients and the residue of the expansion are explicitly calculated.In order to obtain this result some type of exponential estimates of tail probabilities of the difference between the approximatingprocess and the limit one is proved. Also a suitable local integration by parts formula is developped.

The gain-loss asymmetry and single-self preferences

Kahneman and Tversky asserted a fundamental asymmetry between gains and losses, namely a reflection effect which occurs when an individual prefers a sure gain of $ pz to anuncertain gain of $ z with probability p, while preferring an uncertain loss of $z with probability p to a certain loss of $ pz.We focus on this class of choices (actuarially fair), and explore the extent to which thereflection effect, understood as occurring at a range of wealth levels, is compatible with single-self preferences.We decompose the reflection effect into two components, a probability switch effect,which is compatible with single-self preferences, and a translation effect, which is not. To argue the first point, we analyze two classes of single-self, nonexpected utility preferences, which we label homothetic and weakly homothetic. In both cases, we characterize the switch effect as well as the dependence of risk attitudes on wealth.We also discuss two types of utility functions of a form reminiscent of expected utility but with distorted probabilities. Type I always distorts the probability of the worst outcome downwards, yielding attraction to small risks for all probabilities. Type II distorts low probabilities upwards, and high probabilities downwards, implying risk aversion when the probability of the worst outcome is low. By combining homothetic or weak homothetic preferences with Type I or Type II distortion functions, we present four explicit examples: All four display a switch effect and, hence, a form of reflection effect consistent a single self preferences.

The evolution of inequity in the access to health care in Spain: 1987-2001

This paper reports an analysis of the evolution of equity in access to health care in Spain over the period 1987-2001, a time span covering the development of the modern Spanish National Health System. Our measures of access are the probabilities of visiting a doctor, using emergency services and being hospitalised. For these three measures we obtain indices of horizontal inequity from microeconometric models of utilization that exploit the individual information in the Spanish National Health Surveys of 1987 and 2001. We find that by 2001 the system has improved in the sense that differences in income no longer lead to different access given the same level of need. However, the tenure of private health insurance leads to differences in access given the same level of need, and its contribution to inequity has increased over time, both because insurance is more concentrated among the rich and because the elasticity of utilization for the three services has increased too.

A finite-population revenue management model and a risk-ratio procedure for the joint estimation of population size and parameters

Many dynamic revenue management models divide the sale period into a finite number of periods T and assume, invoking a fine-enough grid of time, that each period sees at most one booking request. These Poisson-type assumptions restrict the variability of the demand in the model, but researchers and practitioners were willing to overlook this for the benefit of tractability of the models. In this paper, we criticize this model from another angle. Estimating the discrete finite-period model poses problems of indeterminacy and non-robustness: Arbitrarily fixing T leads to arbitrary control values and on the other hand estimating T from data adds an additional layer of indeterminacy. To counter this, we first propose an alternate finite-population model that avoids this problem of fixing T and allows a wider range of demand distributions, while retaining the useful marginal-value properties of the finite-period model. The finite-population model still requires jointly estimating market size and the parameters of the customer purchase model without observing no-purchases. Estimation of market-size when no-purchases are unobservable has rarely been attempted in the marketing or revenue management literature. Indeed, we point out that it is akin to the classical statistical problem of estimating the parameters of a binomial distribution with unknown population size and success probability, and hence likely to be challenging. However, when the purchase probabilities are given by a functional form such as a multinomial-logit model, we propose an estimation heuristic that exploits the specification of the functional form, the variety of the offer sets in a typical RM setting, and qualitative knowledge of arrival rates. Finally we perform simulations to show that the estimator is very promising in obtaining unbiased estimates of population size and the model parameters.

Non-stationary job search when jobs are not forever: A structural estimation

This paper considers a job search model where the environment is notstationary along the unemployment spell and where jobs do not lastforever. Under this circumstance, reservation wages can be lower thanwithout separations, as in a stationary environment, but they can alsobe initially higher because of the non-stationarity of the model. Moreover,the time-dependence of reservation wages is stronger than with noseparations. The model is estimated structurally using Spanish data forthe period 1985-1996. The main finding is that, although the decrease inreservation wages is the main determinant of the change in the exit ratefrom unemployment for the first four months, later on the only effect comesfrom the job offer arrival rate, given that acceptance probabilities areroughly equal to one.

Insurance and safety after September 11, 2001: Coming to grips with the costs and threats of terrorism

This chapter, originally written as a consequence of the terrorist attacksof September 11, 2001, provides an elementary, everyday introduction tothe concepts of risk and insurance. Conceptually, risk has two dimensions:a potential loss, and the chance of that loss being realized. People can,however, transfer risk to insurance companies against the payment ofso-called premiums. In practice, however, one needs accurate assessmentsof both losses and probabilities to judge whether premiums are appropriate.For many risks, this poses little problem (e.g., life insurance); however,it is difficult to assess risks of many other kinds of events such as actsof terrorism. It is emphasized, that through evolution and learning, peopleare able to handle many of the common risks that they face in life. Butwhen people lack experience (e.g., new technologies, threats of terrorism),risk can only be assessed through imagination. Not surprisingly, insurancecompanies demand high prices when risks are poorly understood. In particular,the cost of insurance against possible acts of terrorism soared afterSeptember 11. How should people approach risk after the events of that day?Clearly, the world needs to protect itself from the acts of terrorists andother disturbed individuals. However, it is also important to address the root causes of such antisocial movements. It is, therefore, suggested thatprograms addressed at combatting ignorance, prejudice, and socialinequalities may be more effective premiums for reducing the risk ofterrosrtism than has been recognized to date.