Bargaining failures and merger policy

In this paper we study the optimal ex-ante merger policy in a model where merger proposals are the result of strategic bargaining among alternative candidates. We allow for firm asymmetries and, in particular, we emphasize the fact that potential synergies generated by a merger may vary substantially depending on the identity of the participating firms. The model demonstrates that, under some circumstances, relatively inefficient mergers may take place. That is, a particular merger may materialize despite the existence of an alternative merger capable of generating higher social surplus and even higher profits. Such bargaining failures have important implications for the ex-ante optimal merger policy. We show that a more stringent policy than the ex-post optimal reduces the scope of these bargaining failures and raises expected social surplus. We use a bargaining model that is flexible, in the sense that its strategic structure does not place any exogenous restriction on the endogenous likelihood of feasible mergers.

The Coherence of the European Foreign Policy: A Real Barrier or an Academic Term?

The purpose of the present study is to break down, in a general and summarised way, the concept of the coherence of the European Foreign Policy, in order to analyse its meaning, its scope and its implications. This focus on coherence will be specifically dealt with upon the analysis of the impact of this phenomenon on single institutional framework, as defined by the Treaty on European Union.

Rational Partisan Theory with fiscal policy and an independent central bank

The empirical evidence testing the validity of the rational partisan theory (RPT) has been mixed. In this article, we argue that the inclusion of other macroeconomic policies and the presence of an independent central bank can partly contribute to explain this inconclusiveness. This article expands Alesina s (1987) RPT model to include an extra policy and an independent central bank. With these extensions, the implications of RPT are altered signi ficantly. In particular, when the central bank is more concerned about output than public spending (an assumption made by many papers in this literature), then the direct relationship between in flation and output derived in Alesina (1987) never holds. Keywords: central bank, conservativeness, political uncertainty. JEL Classi fication: E58, E63.

Social Security in Theory and Practice (II): Efficiency Theories, Narrative Theories, and Implications for Reform

166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forces create and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999b) document several of the internationally and historically common features of social security programs, and explore "political" theories of Social Security. This paper discusses the "efficiency theories", which view creation of the SS program as a full of partial solution to some market failure. Efficiency explanations of social security include the "SS as welfare for the elderly" the "retirement increases productivity to optimally manage human capital externalities", "optimal retirement insurance", the "prodigal father problem", the "misguided Keynesian", the "optimal longevity insurance", the "government economizing transaction costs", and the "return on human capital investment". We also analyze four "narrative" theories of social security: the "chain letter theory", the "lump of labor theory", the "monopoly capitalism theory", and the "Sub-but-Nearly-Optimal policy response to private pensions theory". The political and efficiency explanations are compared with the international and historical facts and used to derive implications for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan. Most of the explanations suggest that forced savings does not increase welfare, and may decrease it.

Policy Making in Divided Government. A Pivotal Actors Model with Party Discipline.

This article presents a formal model of policy decision-making in an institutional framework of separation of powers in which the main actors are pivotal political parties with voting discipline. The basic model previously developed from pivotal politics theory for the analysis of the United States lawmaking is here modified to account for policy outcomes and institutional performances in other presidential regimes, especially in Latin America. Legislators' party indiscipline at voting and multi-partism appear as favorable conditions to reduce the size of the equilibrium set containing collectively inefficient outcomes, while a two-party system with strong party discipline is most prone to produce 'gridlock', that is, stability of socially inefficient policies. The article provides a framework for analysis which can induce significant revisions of empirical data, especially regarding the effects of situations of (newly defined) unified and divided government, different decision rules, the number of parties and their discipline. These implications should be testable and may inspire future analytical and empirical work.

Monetary policy rules and macroeconomic stability: Evidence and some theory

We estimate a forward-looking monetary policy reaction function for thepostwar United States economy, before and after Volcker's appointmentas Fed Chairman in 1979. Our results point to substantial differencesin the estimated rule across periods. In particular, interest ratepolicy in the Volcker-Greenspan period appears to have been much moresensitive to changes in expected inflation than in the pre-Volckerperiod. We then compare some of the implications of the estimated rulesfor the equilibrium properties of inflation and output, using a simplemacroeconomic model, and show that the Volcker-Greenspan rule is stabilizing.

Social security in theory and practice (II): Efficiency theories, narrative theories and implications for reform

166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forcescreate and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999b) document several of the internationally and historically common features of social security programs, and explore "political" theories of Social Security. This paper discusses the "efficiency theories", which view creation of the SS program as a full of partial solution to some market failure. Efficiency explanations of social security include the "SS as welfare for the elderly" the "retirement increases productivity to optimally manage human capital externalities", "optimal retirement insurance", the "prodigal father problem", the "misguided Keynesian", the "optimal longevity insurance", the "governmenteconomizing transaction costs", and the "return on human capital investment". We also analyze four "narrative" theories of social security: the "chain letter theory", the "lump of labor theory", the "monopoly capitalism theory", and the "Sub-but-Nearly-Optimal policy response to private pensions theory".The political and efficiency explanations are compared with the international and historical facts and used to derive implications for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan. Most of the explanations suggest that forced savings does not increase welfare, and may decrease it.

Labor markets and monetary policy: A new-Keynesian model with unemployement

We construct a utility-based model of fluctuations, with nominal rigidities andunemployment, and draw its implications for the unemployment-inflation trade-off and for the conduct of monetary policy.We proceed in two steps. We first leave nominal rigidities aside. We show that,under a standard utility specification, productivity shocks have no effect onunemployment in the constrained efficient allocation. We then focus on theimplications of alternative real wage setting mechanisms for fluctuations in un-employment. We show the role of labor market frictions and real wage rigiditiesin determining the effects of productivity shocks on unemployment.We then introduce nominal rigidities in the form of staggered price setting byfirms. We derive the relation between inflation and unemployment and discusshow it is influenced by the presence of labor market frictions and real wagerigidities. We show the nature of the tradeoff between inflation and unemployment stabilization, and its dependence on labor market characteristics. We draw the implications for optimal monetary policy.

Policy making in divided government. A pivotal actors model with party discipline

This article presents a formal model of policy decision-making in an institutional framework of separation of powers in which the main actors are pivotal political parties with voting discipline. The basic model previously developed from pivotal politics theory for the analysis of the United States lawmaking is here modified to account for policy outcomes and institutional performances in other presidential regimes, especially in Latin America. Legislators' party indiscipline at voting and multi-partism appear as favorable conditions to reduce the size of the equilibrium set containing collectively inefficient outcomes, while a two-party system with strong party discipline is most prone to produce 'gridlock', that is, stability of socially inefficient policies. The article provides a framework for analysis which can induce significant revisions of empirical data, especially regarding the effects of situations of (newly defined) unified and divided government, different decision rules, the number of parties and their discipline. These implications should be testable and may inspire future analytical and empirical work.

Optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a currency union

We lay out a tractable model for fiscal and monetary policy analysis in a currency union, and study its implications for the optimal design of such policies. Monetary policy is conducted by a common central bank, which sets the interest rate for the union as a whole. Fiscal policy is implemented at the countrylevel, through the choice of government spending. The model incorporates country-specific shocks and nominal rigidities. Under our assumptions, the optimal cooperative policy arrangement requires that inflation be stabilized at the union level by the common central bank, while fiscal policy is used by each country for stabilization purposes. By contrast, when the fiscal authorities act in a non-coordinated way, their joint actions lead to a suboptimal outcome, and make the common central bank face a trade-off between inflation and output gap stabilization at the union level.

Monetary policy and exchange rate volatility in a small open economy

We lay out a small open economy version of the Calvo sticky price model, and show how the equilibrium dynamics can be reduced to simple representation in domestic inflation and the output gap. We use the resulting framework to analyze the macroeconomic implications of three alternative rule-based policy regimes for the small open economy: domestic inflation and CPI-based Taylor rules, and an exchange rate peg. We show that a key difference amongthese regimes lies in the relative amount of exchange rate volatility that they entail. We also discuss a special case for which domestic inflation targeting constitutes the optimal policy, and where a simple second order approximation to the utility of the representative consumer can be derived and used to evaluate the welfare losses associated with the suboptimal rules.

Macroeconomic modeling for monetary policy evaluation

We describe some of the main features of the recent vintage macroeconomic models used for monetary policy evaluation. We point to some of the key differences with respect to the earlier generation ofmacro models, and highlight the insights for policy that these new frameworks have to offer. Our discussion emphasizes two key aspects of the new models: the significant role of expectations of future policy actions in the monetary transmission mechanism, and the importance for the central bank of tracking of the flexible price equilibrium values of the natural levels of output and the real interest rate. We argue that both features have important implications for the conduct of monetary policy.

The science of monetary policy: A new Keynesian perspective

This paper reviews the recent literature on monetary policy rules. We exposit the monetary policy design problem within a simple baselinetheoretical framework. We then consider the implications of adding various real world complications. Among other things, we show that the optimal policy implicitly incorporates inflation targeting. Wealso characterize the gains from making credible commitments to fightinflation. In contrast to conventional wisdom, we show that gains from commitment may emerge even in the central bank is not trying toinadvisedly push output above its natural level. We also consider theimplications of frictions such as imperfect information.

Bank liquidity, interbank markets and monetary policy

A major lesson of the recent financial crisis is that the interbank lending marketis crucial for banks facing large uncertainty regarding their liquidity needs. Thispaper studies the efficiency of the interbank lending market in allocating funds. Weconsider two different types of liquidity shocks leading to different implications foroptimal policy by the central bank. We show that, when confronted with a distributional liquidity-shock crisis that causes a large disparity in the liquidity held amongbanks, the central bank should lower the interbank rate. This view implies that thetraditional tenet prescribing the separation between prudential regulation and monetary policy should be abandoned. In addition, we show that, during an aggregateliquidity crisis, central banks should manage the aggregate volume of liquidity. Twodifferent instruments, interest rates and liquidity injection, are therefore required tocope with the two different types of liquidity shocks. Finally, we show that failureto cut interest rates during a crisis erodes financial stability by increasing the riskof bank runs.

Monetary policy and unemployment

Much recent research has focused on the development and analysisof extensions of the New Keynesian framework that model labor marketfrictions and unemployment explicitly. The present paper describessome of the essential ingredients and properties of those models, andtheir implications for monetary policy.