Repeated Interaction and the Revelation of the Monitor's Type: A Principal-Monitor-Agent Problem

This paper studies a dynamic principal-monitor-agent relation where a strategic principal delegates the task of monitoring the effort of a strategic agent to a third party. The latter we call the monitor, whose type is initially unknown. Through repeated interaction the agent might learn his type. We show that this process damages the principal's payoffs. Compensation is assumed exogenous, limiting to a great extent the provision of incentives. We go around this difficulty by introducing costly replacement strategies, i.e. the principal replaces the monitor, thus disrupting the agent's learning. We found that even when replacement costs are null, if the revealed monitor is strictly preferred by both parties, there is a loss in efficiency due to the impossibility of bene…tting from it. Nonetheless, these strategies can partially recover the principal's losses. Additionally, we establish upper and lower bounds on the payoffs that the principal and the agent can achieve. Finally we characterize the equilibrium strategies under public and private monitoring (with communication) for different cost and impatience levels.

A Folk Theorem for Games when Frequent Monitoring Decreases Noise

This paper studies frequent monitoring in an infinitely repeated game with imperfect public information and discounting, where players observe the state of a continuous time Brownian process at moments in time of length _. It shows that a limit folk theorem can be achieved with imperfect public monitoring when players monitor each other at the highest frequency, i.e., _. The approach assumes that the expected joint output depends exclusively on the action profile simultaneously and privately decided by the players at the beginning of each period of the game, but not on _. The strong decreasing effect on the expected immediate gains from deviation when the interval between actions shrinks, and the associated increase precision of the public signals, make the result possible in the limit. JEL: C72/73, D82, L20. KEYWORDS: Repeated Games, Frequent Monitoring, Public Monitoring, Brownian Motion.

Public Monitoring with Uncertainty in the Time Repetitions

This paper study repeated games where the time repetitions of the stage game are not known or controlled by the players. We call this feature random monitoring. Kawamori's (2004) shows that perfect random monitoring is always better than the canonical case. Surprisingly, when the monitoring is public, the result is less clear-cut and does not generalize in a straightforward way. Unless the public signals are sufficiently informative about player's actions and/or players are patient enough. In addition to a discount effect, that tends to consistently favor the provision of incentives, we found an information effect, associated with the time uncertainty on the distribution of public signals. Whether payoff improvements are or not possible, depends crucially on the direction and strength of these effects. JEL: C73, D82, D86. KEYWORDS: Repeated Games, Frequent Monitoring, Random Public Monitoring, Moral Hazard, Stochastic Processes.

Information systems for water resources management improvement in developing countries

Water resources management, as also water service provision projects in developing countries have difficulties to take adequate decisions due to scarce reliable information, and a lack of proper information managing. Some appropriate tools need to be developed in order to improve decision making to improve water management and access of the poorest, through the design of Decision Support Systems (DSS). On the one side, a DSS for developing co-operation projects on water access improvement has been developed. Such a tool has specific context constrains (structure of the system, software requirements) and needs (Logical Framework Approach monitoring, organizational-learning, accountability and evaluation) that shall be considered for its design. Key aspects for its successful implementation have appeared to be a participatory design of the system and support of the managerial positions at the inception phase. A case study in Tanzania was conducted, together with the Spanish NGO ONGAWA – Ingeniería para el Desarrollo. On the other side, DSS are required also to improve decision making on water management resources in order to achieve a sustainable development that not only improves the living conditions of the population in developing countries, but that also does not hinder opportunities of the poorest on those context. A DSS made to fulfil these requirements shall be using information from water resources modelling, as also on the environment and the social context. Through the research, a case study has been conducted in the Central Rift Valley of Ethiopia, an endhorreic basin 160 km south of Addis Ababa. There, water has been modelled using ArcSWAT, a physically based model which can assess the impact of land management practices on large complex watersheds with varying soils, land use and management conditions over long periods of time. Moreover, governance on water and environment as also the socioeconomic context have been studied.