Optimal law enforcement and criminal organization

In this paper, we take an organizational view of organized crime. In particular, we study the organizational consequences of product illegality attending at the following characteristics: (i) contracts are not enforceable in court, (ii) all participants are subject to the risk of being punished, (iii) employees present a major threat to the entrepreneur having the most detailed knowledge concerning participation, (iv) separation between ownership and management is difficult because record-keeping and auditing augments criminal evidence.

The choice of titling system in land

This paper analyzes the choice of the socially optimal titling systemassuming rational individual choices about recording, assurance andregistration decisions. It focuses on the enforcement of propertyrights on land under private titling and the two existing publictitling systems, recording and registration. When the reduction in theexpected costs of eviction compensates the higher cost of initialregistration, it is more efficient to introduce a registration systemrather than a recording system. The development of private "titleassurance" improves the standing of recording as compared toregistration. This improvement depends, however, on the efficiency ofthe assurance technology and, also, on corrective taxation that isneeded to align individual optimization, which disregards the transferelement in eviction, with social objectives.

Dynamic optimal law enforcement with learning

We incorporate the process of enforcement learning by assuming that the agency's current marginal cost is a decreasing function of its past experience of detecting and convicting. The agency accumulates data and information (on criminals, on opportunities of crime) enhancing the ability to apprehend in the future at a lower marginal cost.We focus on the impact of enforcement learning on optimal stationary compliance rules. In particular, we show that the optimal stationary fine could be less-than-maximal and the optimal stationary probability of detection could be higher-than-otherwise.

Optimal law enforcement under asymmetric information

In this paper, we focus on the problem created by asymmetric informationabout the enforcer's (agent's) costs associated to enforcement expenditure. This adverse selection problem affects optimal law enforcement because a low cost enforcer may conceal its information by imitating a high cost enforcer, and must then be given a compensation to be induced to reveal its true costs. The government faces a trade-off between minimizing the enforcer's compensation and maximizing the net surplus of harmful acts. As a consequence, the probability of apprehension and punishment is usually reduced leading to more offenses being committed. We show that asymmetry of information does not affect law enforcement as long as raising public funds is costless. The consideration of costly raising of public funds permits to establish the positive correlation between asymmetry of information between government and enforcers andthe crime rate.

Parallelizing remote sensing image geometric correction

Remote sensing spatial, spectral, and temporal resolutions of images, acquired over a reasonably sized image extent, result in imagery that can be processed to represent land cover over large areas with an amount of spatial detail that is very attractive for monitoring, management, and scienti c activities. With Moore's Law alive and well, more and more parallelism is introduced into all computing platforms, at all levels of integration and programming to achieve higher performance and energy e ciency. Being the geometric calibration process one of the most time consuming processes when using remote sensing images, the aim of this work is to accelerate this process by taking advantage of new computing architectures and technologies, specially focusing in exploiting computation over shared memory multi-threading hardware. A parallel implementation of the most time consuming process in the remote sensing geometric correction has been implemented using OpenMP directives. This work compares the performance of the original serial binary versus the parallelized implementation, using several multi-threaded modern CPU architectures, discussing about the approach to nd the optimum hardware for a cost-e ective execution.

Earth's Changing Land

Entre el 14 i el 18 de març de 1998 es va celebrar a Barcelona la conferència Earth’s Changing Land sota la tutela dels programes internacionals Global Change in Terrestrial Ecosystems (GCTE) i Land Use and Land Cover Change (LUCC). L’objectiu principal de la trobada era presentar les darreres aportacions científiques sobre els efectes presents i previsibles del canvi global sobre els ecosistemes terrestres i la societat. Al mateix temps, es volia afavorir l’establiment de ponts de diàleg entre els professionals implicats en el canvi global

The second law of thermodynamics and the global climate system : A review of the maximum entropy production principle

The long-term mean properties of the global climate system and those of turbulent fluid systems are reviewed from a thermodynamic viewpoint. Two general expressions are derived for a rate of entropy production due to thermal and viscous dissipation (turbulent dissipation) in a fluid system. It is shown with these expressions that maximum entropy production in the Earth s climate system suggested by Paltridge, as well as maximum transport properties of heat or momentum in a turbulent system suggested by Malkus and Busse, correspond to a state in which the rate of entropy production due to the turbulent dissipation is at a maximum. Entropy production due to absorption of solar radiation in the climate system is found to be irrelevant to the maximized properties associated with turbulence. The hypothesis of maximum entropy production also seems to be applicable to the planetary atmospheres of Mars and Titan and perhaps to mantle convection. Lorenz s conjecture on maximum generation of available potential energy is shown to be akin to this hypothesis with a few minor approximations. A possible mechanism by which turbulent fluid systems adjust themselves to the states of maximum entropy production is presented as a selffeedback mechanism for the generation of available potential energy. These results tend to support the hypothesis of maximum entropy production that underlies a wide variety of nonlinear fluid systems, including our planet as well as other planets and stars

Recursos governatius. Doctrina de la Direcció General de Dret i Entitats Jurídiques IV

Comentaris a les Resolucions de la Direcció General de Dret i Entitats Jurídiques 22 de gener 2007, de 24 de gener 2007, de 15 de febrer 2007, de 16 de febrer 200 i de 19 de febrer 2007.

Recursos governatius. Doctrina de la Direcció General de Dret i Entitats Jurídiques (maig 2007-febrer 2008)

Comentaris a les Resolucions de la Direcció General de Dret i Entitats Jurídiques de 2 de maig 2007, de 10 de juliol 2007, d'11 de juliol 2007, de 16 de juliol 2007, de 17 de juliol 2007, de 22 d'octubre 2007, de 21 de desembre 2007 i 4 de febrer 2008.

Recursos governatius. Doctrina de la Direcció General de Dret i Entitats Jurídiques (febrer-abril 2008).

Comentaris a les Resolucions de la Direcció General de Dret i Entitats Jurídiques de 6 de febrer 2008, 8 de febrer 2008, 20 de febrer 2008, 2 d'abril 2008 i 18 d¿abril 2008.

Recursos governatius. Doctrina de la Direcció General de Dret i Entitats Jurídiques V

Comentaris a les Resolucions de la Direcció General de Dret i Entitats Jurídiques de 20 de març 2007, de 26 d'abril 2007, de 27 d'abril 2007 i de 30 d'abril 2007

Lobbying, political competition, and local land supply: recent evidence from Spain

We analyze whether local land supply is influenced by the degree of political competition, and interpret the findings as being indicative of the influence wielded by land development lobbies. We use a new database including both political and land supply data for more than 2,000 Spanish municipalities for the period 2003-2007. In Spain, land use policies are largely a local responsibility with municipalities having periodically to pass compre- hensive land use plans. The main policy variable in these plans, and the one analyzed here, is the amount of land classified for potential development. We measure local political competition as the margin of victory of the incumbent government. We instrument this variable using the number of votes obtained by parties represented in local government when standing at the first national legislative elections following the re-establishment of democracy, and the number of votes they actually obtained regionally at the national legislative elections. The results indicate that stiffer political competition does indeed reduce the amount of new land designated for development. This effect is found to be most marked in suburbs, in towns with a high percent of commuters and homeowners, and in municipalities governed by the left.

Lobbying, political competition, and local land supply: recent evidence from Spain

We analyze whether local land supply is influenced by the degree of political competition, and interpret the findings as being indicative of the influence wielded by land development lobbies. We use a new database including both political and land supply data for more than 2,000 Spanish municipalities for the period 2003-2007. In Spain, land use policies are largely a local responsibility with municipalities having periodically to pass compre- hensive land use plans. The main policy variable in these plans, and the one analyzed here, is the amount of land classified for potential development. We measure local political competition as the margin of victory of the incumbent government. We instrument this variable using the number of votes obtained by parties represented in local government when standing at the first national legislative elections following the re-establishment of democracy, and the number of votes they actually obtained regionally at the national legislative elections. The results indicate that stiffer political competition does indeed reduce the amount of new land designated for development. This effect is found to be most marked in suburbs, in towns with a high percent of commuters and homeowners, and in municipalities governed by the left.