Research joint ventures in an international economy

D'Aspremont and Jacquemin's (1988) model is extended to studyalternative configurations of research agreements in a two--country integratedworld economy. Under unambiguous conditions on spillovers we show that:1) Allowing national firms to cooperate in R\&D confers them an advantageover foreign rivals, an effect similar to R\&D subsidies. 2) In a policygame, each government would allow national cooperative agreements. 3) Contraryto other trade policies which lead to a ``prisoners' dilemma'' result,welfare in both countries increases when they both allow R\&D cooperation.4) Welfare is even higher if a generalized (international) coalition isformed.

Temporary help agencies and workers' occupational mobility

This paper focuses on the occupational mobility of temporary helpagency workers by studying their job-to-job upgrading chances as opposedto those who have not been hired through these intermediaries. A screeningapproach to the role of those labor brokers suggests that agency workersmay expect greater chances of upgrading from one occupation to another.Results obtained with a sample of Spanish workers show that workingthrough those intermediaries comparatively offers stronger prospects ofoccupational upgrading for workers of a medium qualification level. Thisbasic result is reinforced when the existence of self-selection into thistype of intermediated work is appropriately taken into account.

Research joint ventures and optimal R&D policy with asymmetric information

When to allow Research Joint Ventures (RJVs) or not is an importantinstrument in the development of an optimal R&D policy. Theregulator, however, is unlikely to know all the relevant informationto regulate R&D optimally. The extent to which there existappropriability problems between the firms is one such variable thatis private information to the firms in the industry. In a duopolysetting we analyze the characteristics of a second-best R&D policywhere the government can either allow RJVs or not and give lump-sumsubsidies to the parties involved. The second-best R&D policy withoutsubsidies will either block some welfare improving RJVs or allow somewelfare reducing ones. With lump-sum subsidies, the second-best policytrades off the expected subsidy cost with allowing welfare decreasingRJVs or blocking welfare increasing ones.

Building an honest microfinance organization: Embezzlement and the optimality of rigid repayment schedules and joint liability

We consider the agency problem of a staff member managing microfinancing programs, who can abuse his discretion to embezzle borrowers' repayments. The fact that most borrowers of microfinancing programs are illiterate and live in rural areas where transportation costs are very high make staff's embezzlement particularly relevant as is documented by Mknelly and Kevane (2002). We study the trade-off between the optimal rigid lending contract and the optimal discretionary one and find that a rigid contract is optimal when the audit cost is larger than gains from insurance. Our analysis explains rigid repayment schedules used by the Grameen bank as an optimal response to the bank staff's agency problem. Joint liability reduces borrowers' burden of respecting the rigid repayment schedules by providing them with partial insurance. However, the same insurance can be provided byborrowers themselves under individual liability through a side-contract.

From correspondence analysis to multiple and joint correspondence analysis

The generalization of simple (two-variable) correspondence analysis to more than two categorical variables, commonly referred to as multiple correspondence analysis, is neither obvious nor well-defined. We present two alternative ways of generalizing correspondence analysis, one based on the quantification of the variables and intercorrelation relationships, and the other based on the geometric ideas of simple correspondence analysis. We propose a version of multiple correspondence analysis, with adjusted principal inertias, as the method of choice for the geometric definition, since it contains simple correspondence analysis as an exact special case, which is not the situation of the standard generalizations. We also clarify the issue of supplementary point representation and the properties of joint correspondence analysis, a method that visualizes all two-way relationships between the variables. The methodology is illustrated using data on attitudes to science from the International Social Survey Program on Environment in 1993.

Conglomeration with bankruptcy costs: Separate or joint financing?

The paper analyzes the determinants of the optimal scope of incorporation in the presenceof bankruptcy costs. Bankruptcy costs alone generate a non-trivial tradeoff between thebenefit of coinsurance and the cost of risk contamination associated to joint financing corporate projects through debt. This tradeoff is characterized for projects with binary returns,depending on the distributional characteristics of returns (mean, variability, skewness, heterogeneity, correlation, and number of projects), the bankruptcy recovery rate, and the taxrate advantage of debt relative to equity. Our testable predictions are broadly consistentwith existing empirical evidence on conglomerate mergers, spin-offs, project finance, andsecuritization.

A finite-population revenue management model and a risk-ratio procedure for the joint estimation of population size and parameters

Many dynamic revenue management models divide the sale period into a finite number of periods T and assume, invoking a fine-enough grid of time, that each period sees at most one booking request. These Poisson-type assumptions restrict the variability of the demand in the model, but researchers and practitioners were willing to overlook this for the benefit of tractability of the models. In this paper, we criticize this model from another angle. Estimating the discrete finite-period model poses problems of indeterminacy and non-robustness: Arbitrarily fixing T leads to arbitrary control values and on the other hand estimating T from data adds an additional layer of indeterminacy. To counter this, we first propose an alternate finite-population model that avoids this problem of fixing T and allows a wider range of demand distributions, while retaining the useful marginal-value properties of the finite-period model. The finite-population model still requires jointly estimating market size and the parameters of the customer purchase model without observing no-purchases. Estimation of market-size when no-purchases are unobservable has rarely been attempted in the marketing or revenue management literature. Indeed, we point out that it is akin to the classical statistical problem of estimating the parameters of a binomial distribution with unknown population size and success probability, and hence likely to be challenging. However, when the purchase probabilities are given by a functional form such as a multinomial-logit model, we propose an estimation heuristic that exploits the specification of the functional form, the variety of the offer sets in a typical RM setting, and qualitative knowledge of arrival rates. Finally we perform simulations to show that the estimator is very promising in obtaining unbiased estimates of population size and the model parameters.

Foreign direct investments and spillovers through workers' mobility

We analyze a model where a multinational firm can use its superiortechnology in a foreign subsidiary only after appropriate trainingof local managers. Technological spillovers from foreign directinvestment arise when such managers are later hired by a localfirm. Benefits for the host economy may also take the form of therent that trained managers receive by the foreign affiliate toprevent them from moving to local competitors. We study conditionsunder which technological spillovers occur. We also show that undercertain circumstances the multinational firm might find it optimalto resort to export instead of foreign direct investment, to avoiddissipation of its intangible assets.

A positive theory of geographic mobility and social insurance

This paper presents a tractable dynamic general equilibrium model thatcan explain cross-country empirical regularities in geographical mobility,unemployment and labor market institutions. Rational agents vote overunemployment insurance (UI), taking the dynamic distortionary effects ofinsurance on the performance of the labor market into consideration.Agents with higher cost of moving, i.e., more attached to their currentlocation, prefer more generous UI. The key assumption is that an agent'sattachment to a location increases the longer she has resided there. UIreduces the incentive for labor mobility and increases, therefore, thefraction of attached agents and the political support for UI. The mainresult is that this self-reinforcing mechanism can give rise to multiplesteady-states-one 'European' steady-state featuring high unemployment,low geographical mobility and high unemployment insurance, and one'American' steady-state featuring low unemployment, high mobility andlow unemployment insurance.

Informe del seminari Library and Information Science Education in Europe: "Issues in joint curriculum development and Bologna perspectives" (Copenhaguen, Dinamarca, 11-12 d'agost de 2005)

Els dies 11 i 12 d'agost va tenir lloc a Copenhaguen, Dinamarca, el seminari de treball Library and Information Science Education in Europe: ¿Issues in joint curriculum development and Bologna perspectives¿. Aquest seminari, que va estar coordinat per la Royal School of Library and Information Science de Dinamarca, amb la col·laboració de l'European Association for Library and Information Education and Research (EUCLID), es va organitzar en el marc d'un projecte europeu subvencionat pel programa Sòcrates. La Facultat de Biblioteconomia i Documentació de la Universitat de Barcelona, present entre 2001 i 2005 en la Junta de Govern de l'EUCLID, va participar-hi com a soci del projecte. L'objectiu del seminari era aplegar una cinquantena d'experts europeus de l'àrea de Biblioteconomia i Documentació ¿tots ells professors d'escoles i de facultats d'universitats europees¿ per discutir qüestions relacionades amb els plans d'estudis dels ensenyaments des de la perspectiva del procés de Bolonya. El seminari consistí en dues conferències i en les reunions de treball de dotze grups formats per experts que examinaren dotze grans temes ¿prèviament acordats pels organitzadors de l'esdeveniment¿ relacionats amb els plans d'estudis d'aquells ensenyaments.

Are commuting and residential mobility decisions simultaneous? : the case of Catalonia (Spain)

In this paper we study the commuting and moving decisions of workers in Catalonia (Spain) and its evolution in the 1986-1996 period. Using a microdata sample from the 1991 Spanish Population Census, we estimate a simultaneous, discrete choice model of commuting and moves, thus indirectly addressing the home and job location decisions. The econometrical framework is a simultaneous, binary probit model with a commute equation and a move equation