150 resultados para Generalized Legendre Functions
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A family of nonempty closed convex sets is built by using the data of the Generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP). The sets are selected iteratively such that the intersection of the selected sets contains solutions of the GNEP. The algorithm introduced by Iusem-Sosa (2003) is adapted to obtain solutions of the GNEP. Finally some numerical experiments are given to illustrate the numerical behavior of the algorithm.
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We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. This class is strictly larger than the set of generalized median voter schemes (the class of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences characterized by Moulin (1980)) since, under the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences, generalized median voter schemes can be disturbed by discontinuity points and remain strategy-proof on the smaller domain. Our result identifies the specific nature of these discontinuities which allow to design non-onto social choice functions to deal with feasibility constraints.
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We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assignment game: Set-wise stability and Core. We first establish that the Set-wise stable set is contained in the Core and it contains the non-empty set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. We then state and prove three limit results for replicated markets. First, the sequence of Cores of replicated markets converges to the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs when the number of replicas tends to infinity. Second, the Set-wise stable set of a two-fold replicated market already coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. Third, for any number of replicas there is a market with a Core payoff that is not a competitive equilibrium payoff.
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El departament d'Economia i Organització d'Empreses, de la Facultat d'Economia i Empresa de la Universitat de Barcelona, sempre ha mostrat una preocupació perquè els alumnes siguin capaços d'entendre i, sobretot, de veure aplicables a la vida laboral els conceptes de les diverses assignatures de la nostra àrea -organització i direcció d'empreses-. Donada la falta d'experiència laboral que tenen, sovint entenen els conceptes d'una manera superficial i teòrica ja que els queden una mica lluny de la seva vida diària. A més, la falta d'assistència, el baix rendiment acadèmic i la falta de motivació dels estudiants són temes habituals entre el col·lectiu de professors. Per tot això sorgeix la necessitat de millorar el rendiment dels estudiants, en el marc de l'Espai d'Educació Europeu Superior, amb una metodologia docent generalizable a la resta d'assignatures que aconsegueixi motivar-les tant per estudiar com per assistir a classe. La finalitat principal del projecte és millorar el rendiment acadèmic dels estudiants mitjançant una metodologia docent basada en l'anàlisi de casos audiovisuals. En concret es volen arribar a aconseguir els objectius formatius fonamentals de l'àrea d'Organització d'Empreses així com també es pretén que els alumnes adquireixin capacitats desitjables per dur a terme les funcions administratives. La durada del projecte ha estat d'un any. Concretament des de novembre de 2007 a octubre de 2008.
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We analyze how a contest organizer chooses optimally the winner when the contestants' efforts are already exerted and commitment to the use of a given contest success function is not possible. We de…ne the notion of rationalizability in mixed-strategies to capture such a situation. Our approach allows to derive different contest success functions depending on the aims and attitudes of the decider. We derive contest success functions which are closely related to commonly used functions providing new support for them. By taking into account social welfare considerations our approach bridges the contest literature and the recent literature on political economy. Keywords: Endogenous Contests, Contest Success Function, Mixed-Strategies. JEL Classi…cation: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D72 (Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections), D74 (Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances)
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We define different concepts of group strategy-proofness for social choice functions. We discuss the connections between the defined concepts under different assumptions on their domains of definition. We characterize the social choice functions that satisfy each one of them and whose ranges consist of two alternatives, in terms of two types of basic properties.
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If A is a unital quasidiagonal C*-algebra, we construct a generalized inductive limit BA which is simple, unital and inherits many structural properties from A. If A is the unitization of a non-simple purely infinite algebra (e.g., the cone over a Cuntz algebra), then BA is tracially AF which, among other things, lends support to a conjecture of Toms.
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Descriptive set theory is mainly concerned with studying subsets of the space of all countable binary sequences. In this paper we study the generalization where countable is replaced by uncountable. We explore properties of generalized Baire and Cantor spaces, equivalence relations and their Borel reducibility. The study shows that the descriptive set theory looks very different in this generalized setting compared to the classical, countable case. We also draw the connection between the stability theoretic complexity of first-order theories and the descriptive set theoretic complexity of their isomorphism relations. Our results suggest that Borel reducibility on uncountable structures is a model theoretically natural way to compare the complexity of isomorphism relations.
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The Lempert function for a set of poles in a domain of Cn at a point z is obtained by taking a certain infimum over all analytic disks going through the poles and the point z, and majorizes the corresponding multi-pole pluricomplex Green function. Coman proved that both coincide in the case of sets of two poles in the unit ball. We give an example of a set of three poles in the unit ball where this equality fails.
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