Desenvolupament d'un joc per torns parametritzable amb possibilitat multijugador i I.A.

Els jocs són una de les indústries de software més gran del món de la informàtica. Des dels primers jocs en blanc i negre que simulaven raquetes i una pilota, fins avui en dia, en que el desenvolupament d’un joc porta darrere un equip de professionals tant o més gran que el major dels projectes informàtics del món de les indústries, els jocs han evolucionat més que la majoria de programes. La possibilitat d’elaborar un joc és, a part d’una proposta temptadora (ja que difereix enormement de qualsevol pràctica feta durant la carrera), un repte de caire personal per algú que sempre ha estat en contacte amb videojocs i que, després d’adquirir una sèrie de coneixements indispensables, s’ha proposat d’intentar desenvolupar-ne un des de l’arrel. L’objectiu d’aquest treball és doncs això, aprendre com neix un joc partint de res, i veure totes les complicacions que sorgeixen a l’hora de desenvolupar-lo. Els resultats delt projecte mostren generosament el gran nombre de problemes que sorgeixen en un procés com aquest, però com a conclusions importants cal destacar la satisfacció envers els resultats obtinguts, així com els coneixements que s’han guanyat mitjançant el desenvolupament del programa.

Vertical Syndication-Proof Competitive Prices in Multilateral Markets

[eng] A multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game (Tejada, to appear) is a model for a multilateral market with a finite number of perfectly complementary indivisible commodities owned by different sellers, and inflexible demand and support functions. We show that for each such market game there is a unique vector of competitive prices for the commodities that is vertical syndication-proof, in the sense that, at those prices, syndication of sellers each owning a different commodity is neither beneficial nor detrimental for the buyers. Since, moreover, the benefits obtained by the agents at those prices correspond to the nucleolus of the market game, we provide a syndication-based foundation for the nucleolus as an appropriate solution concept for market games. For different solution concepts a syndicate can be disadvantageous and there is no escape to Aumman’s paradox (Aumann, 1973). We further show that vertical syndicationproofness and horizontal syndication-proofness – in which sellers of the same commodity collude – are incompatible requirements under some mild assumptions. Our results build on a self-interesting link between multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and bankruptcy games (O’Neill, 1982). We identify a particular subset of Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and we show that it is isomorphic to the whole class of bankruptcy games. This isomorphism enables us to show the uniqueness of the vector of vertical syndication-proof prices for the whole class of Böhm-Bawerk assignment market using well-known results of bankruptcy problems.

The assignment game: core bounds for mixed-pair coalitions

In the assignment game framework, we try to identify those assignment matrices in which no entry can be increased without changing the coreof the game. These games will be called buyer¿seller exact games and satisfy the condition that each mixed¿pair coalition attains the corresponding matrix entry in the core of the game. For a given assignment game, a unique buyerseller exact assignment game with the same core is proved to exist. In order to identify this matrix and to provide a characterization of those assignment games which are buyer¿seller exact in terms of the assignment matrix, attainable upper and lower core bounds for the mixed¿pair coalitions are found. As a consequence, an open question posed in Quint (1991) regarding a canonical representation of a ¿45o¿lattice¿ by means of the core of an assignment game can now be answered

Sequential decisions in allocation problems

[eng] In the context of cooperative TU-games, and given an order of players, we consider the problem of distributing the worth of the grand coalition as a sequentia decision problem. In each step of process, upper and lower bounds for the payoff of the players are required related to successive reduced games. Sequentially compatible payoffs are defined as those allocation vectors that meet these recursive bounds. The core of the game is reinterpreted as a set of sequentally compatible payoffs when the Davis-Maschler reduced game is considered (Th.1). Independently of the reduction, the core turns out to be the intersections of the family of the sets of sequentially compatible payoffs corresponding to the different possible orderings (Th.2), so it is in some sense order-independent. Finally, we analyze advantagenous properties for the first player

Sequential decisions in allocation problems

[eng] In the context of cooperative TU-games, and given an order of players, we consider the problem of distributing the worth of the grand coalition as a sequentia decision problem. In each step of process, upper and lower bounds for the payoff of the players are required related to successive reduced games. Sequentially compatible payoffs are defined as those allocation vectors that meet these recursive bounds. The core of the game is reinterpreted as a set of sequentally compatible payoffs when the Davis-Maschler reduced game is considered (Th.1). Independently of the reduction, the core turns out to be the intersections of the family of the sets of sequentially compatible payoffs corresponding to the different possible orderings (Th.2), so it is in some sense order-independent. Finally, we analyze advantagenous properties for the first player

Vertical Syndication-Proof Competitive Prices in Multilateral Markets

[eng] A multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game (Tejada, to appear) is a model for a multilateral market with a finite number of perfectly complementary indivisible commodities owned by different sellers, and inflexible demand and support functions. We show that for each such market game there is a unique vector of competitive prices for the commodities that is vertical syndication-proof, in the sense that, at those prices, syndication of sellers each owning a different commodity is neither beneficial nor detrimental for the buyers. Since, moreover, the benefits obtained by the agents at those prices correspond to the nucleolus of the market game, we provide a syndication-based foundation for the nucleolus as an appropriate solution concept for market games. For different solution concepts a syndicate can be disadvantageous and there is no escape to Aumman’s paradox (Aumann, 1973). We further show that vertical syndicationproofness and horizontal syndication-proofness – in which sellers of the same commodity collude – are incompatible requirements under some mild assumptions. Our results build on a self-interesting link between multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and bankruptcy games (O’Neill, 1982). We identify a particular subset of Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and we show that it is isomorphic to the whole class of bankruptcy games. This isomorphism enables us to show the uniqueness of the vector of vertical syndication-proof prices for the whole class of Böhm-Bawerk assignment market using well-known results of bankruptcy problems.

The assignment game: core bounds for mixed-pair coalitions

In the assignment game framework, we try to identify those assignment matrices in which no entry can be increased without changing the coreof the game. These games will be called buyer¿seller exact games and satisfy the condition that each mixed¿pair coalition attains the corresponding matrix entry in the core of the game. For a given assignment game, a unique buyerseller exact assignment game with the same core is proved to exist. In order to identify this matrix and to provide a characterization of those assignment games which are buyer¿seller exact in terms of the assignment matrix, attainable upper and lower core bounds for the mixed¿pair coalitions are found. As a consequence, an open question posed in Quint (1991) regarding a canonical representation of a ¿45o¿lattice¿ by means of the core of an assignment game can now be answered

Videojuegos como un entorno de aprendizaje: el caso de "Monturiol el joc"

Video games in a learning environ-ment and their application to the educational world has become a common study between researchers because the use of videogames in the classroom is coherent with a compe-tence-based education theory. A social science approach to video-games allows an exhaustive under-standing of the video games and of the game experience in the classroom. When a video game gives to the user a high level of immersion, all his interest and energy is focused in the game, this fact together with the motivation in the video game is the basis of interest for educators and researchers in the potentiality of the video games as learning environ-ments. In this presentation, we will show and analyze the importance of the video games in an educational context, using a case study: the video game "Monturiol el joc". In the paper, we describe the video game structure, the instructional function, the practice application and the future work. Also, we discuss the impor-tance of the video games as a learning immersive environment, and we conclude our report with a brief analysis of the importance of the study of video games.

Towards a digital body: the virtual arm illusion

The integration of the human brain with computers is an interesting new area of applied neuroscience, where one application is replacement of a person"s real body by a virtual representation. Here we demonstrate that a virtual limb can be made to feel part of your body if appropriate multisensory correlations are provided. We report an illusion that is invoked through tactile stimulation on a person"s hidden real right hand with synchronous virtual visual stimulation on an aligned 3D stereo virtual arm projecting horizontally out of their shoulder. An experiment with 21 male participants showed displacement of ownership towards the virtual hand, as illustrated by questionnaire responses and proprioceptive drift. A control experiment with asynchronous tapping was carried out with a different set of 20 male participants who did not experience the illusion. After 5 min of stimulation the virtual arm rotated. Evidence suggests that the extent of the illusion was also correlated with the degree of muscle activity onset in the right arm as measured by EMG during this period that the arm was rotating, for the synchronous but not the asynchronous condition. A completely virtual object can therefore be experienced as part of one"s self, which opens up the possibility that an entire virtual body could be felt as one"s own in future virtual reality applications or online games, and be an invaluable tool for the understanding of the brain mechanisms underlying body ownership.

Los espectaculos de la tradición romano-pagana en la obra de Paulino de Nola

In this paper we study the presence of elements related to Roman games in the work of the bishop Paulinus of Nola (355-431 AD). References to shows in his work are not as abundant as they occurs among his contemporaries. Nevertheless, many of these references possess a great importance for us. Certainly, they are similar to other allusions made by his contemporaries; however they express the opinion of one of the most famous and prestigious bishops of the Late Antiquity about these popular exhibitions. In his writings we can see his criticism of the waste of wealth in the organization of the Roman games, and also the use of a metaphorical language with ludical reminiscences whose origins go back to Paul of Tarsu

Desenvolupament d'un joc per torns parametritzable amb possibilitat multijugador i I.A.

Els jocs són una de les indústries de software més gran del món de la informàtica. Des dels primers jocs en blanc i negre que simulaven raquetes i una pilota, fins avui en dia, en que el desenvolupament d’un joc porta darrere un equip de professionals tant o més gran que el major dels projectes informàtics del món de les indústries, els jocs han evolucionat més que la majoria de programes. La possibilitat d’elaborar un joc és, a part d’una proposta temptadora (ja que difereix enormement de qualsevol pràctica feta durant la carrera), un repte de caire personal per algú que sempre ha estat en contacte amb videojocs i que, després d’adquirir una sèrie de coneixements indispensables, s’ha proposat d’intentar desenvolupar-ne un des de l’arrel. L’objectiu d’aquest treball és doncs això, aprendre com neix un joc partint de res, i veure totes les complicacions que sorgeixen a l’hora de desenvolupar-lo. Els resultats delt projecte mostren generosament el gran nombre de problemes que sorgeixen en un procés com aquest, però com a conclusions importants cal destacar la satisfacció envers els resultats obtinguts, així com els coneixements que s’han guanyat mitjançant el desenvolupament del programa.

Frames and games

Decision-makers are sometimes influenced by the way in which choice situations are presented to them or "framed" This can be seen as an important challenge to the social sciences, since strong and pervasive framing effects would make it difficult to study human behavior in a synthetic or theoretic manner. We present results from experiments with dilemma games designed to shed light on the effects of several frame variations. We study, among others, the particular public bad frame used by Andreoni (1995) and two more naturalistic frames involving stories. Our results show that none of the frame manipulations have a significant effect on average behavior, but we do find some effects on extreme behavior. We also find that incentives do matter where frames do not matter.

Communication, cultural identities and the Olympic Games: the Barcelona’92 experience

This document includes the results of the research undertaken by the author on the media planning and coverage of the Barcelona'92 and its cultural implications.

Symbol and logo of Barcelona’92 Olympic Games

This text has been published in the book Jocs Olímpics, comunicació i intercanvis culturals: l’experiència dels últims quatre Jocs Olímpics d’estiu, gathering the communications presented in the international Symposium that was celebrated in Barcelona from 3 to 5 april of 1991.

Dividends and weighted values in games with externalities

We consider cooperative environments with externalities (games in partition function form) and provide a recursive definition of dividends for each coalition and any partition of the players it belongs to. We show that with this definition and equal sharing of these dividends the averaged sum of dividends for each player, over all the coalitions that contain the player, coincides with the corresponding average value of the player. We then construct weighted Shapley values by departing from equal division of dividends and finally, for each such value, provide a bidding mechanism implementing it.