Proteomic analysis of peach fruit mesocarp softening and chilling injury using difference gel electrophoresis (DIGE)

Background: Peach fruit undergoes a rapid softening process that involves a number of metabolic changes. Storing fruit at low temperatures has been widely used to extend its postharvest life. However, this leads to undesired changes, such as mealiness and browning, which affect the quality of the fruit. In this study, a 2-D DIGE approach was designed to screen for differentially accumulated proteins in peach fruit during normal softening as well as under conditions that led to fruit chilling injury. Results:The analysis allowed us to identify 43 spots -representing about 18% of the total number analyzed- that show statistically significant changes. Thirty-nine of the proteins could be identified by mass spectrometry. Some of the proteins that changed during postharvest had been related to peach fruit ripening and cold stress in the past. However, we identified other proteins that had not been linked to these processes. A graphical display of the relationship between the differentially accumulated proteins was obtained using pairwise average-linkage cluster analysis and principal component analysis. Proteins such as endopolygalacturonase, catalase, NADP-dependent isocitrate dehydrogenase, pectin methylesterase and dehydrins were found to be very important for distinguishing between healthy and chill injured fruit. A categorization of the differentially accumulated proteins was performed using Gene Ontology annotation. The results showed that the 'response to stress', 'cellular homeostasis', 'metabolism of carbohydrates' and 'amino acid metabolism' biological processes were affected the most during the postharvest. Conclusions: Using a comparative proteomic approach with 2-D DIGE allowed us to identify proteins that showed stage-specific changes in their accumulation pattern. Several proteins that are related to response to stress, cellular homeostasis, cellular component organization and carbohydrate metabolism were detected as being differentially accumulated. Finally, a significant proportion of the proteins identified had not been associated with softening, cold storage or chilling injury-altered fruit before; thus, comparative proteomics has proven to be a valuable tool for understanding fruit softening and postharvest.

On the Structural Difference between the Evolutionary Approach of Young and that of Kandori, Mailath, and Rob

We provide robust examples of symmetric two-player coordination games in normal form that reveal that equilibrium selection by the evolutionary model of Young (1993) is essentially different from equilibrium selection by the evolutionary model of Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993).

One person in the battlefield is not a warrior: Self-construal, perceived ability to make a difference, and socially responsible behavior

We suggest that cultivating an individual's connectedness to others promotes sociallyresponsible behavior both directly and indirectly through increased perceived abilityto make a difference. Individuals whose interdependent self is more prominent feel theyhave more of an impact on larger scale societal outcomes and, therefore, engage more insocially responsible behaviors than do individuals whose independent self is moreprominent. We test these hypotheses in two experiments in which participants makefinancial contributions or exert an effort for a social cause. In a survey, we find thatperceived effectiveness mediates the effect of self-construal on socially responsibleconsumption.

Finite sample nonparametric tests for linear regressions

We introduce several exact nonparametric tests for finite sample multivariatelinear regressions, and compare their powers. This fills an important gap inthe literature where the only known nonparametric tests are either asymptotic,or assume one covariate only.

Scaled and adjusted restricted tests in multi-sample analysis of moment structures

We extend to score, Wald and difference test statistics the scaled and adjusted corrections to goodness-of-fit test statistics developed in Satorra and Bentler (1988a,b). The theory is framed in the general context of multisample analysis of moment structures, under general conditions on the distribution of observable variables. Computational issues, as well as the relation of the scaled and corrected statistics to the asymptotic robust ones, is discussed. A Monte Carlo study illustrates thecomparative performance in finite samples of corrected score test statistics.

Bringing game theory to hypothesis testing: Establishing finite sample bounds on inference

Small sample properties are of fundamental interest when only limited data is avail-able. Exact inference is limited by constraints imposed by speci.c nonrandomizedtests and of course also by lack of more data. These e¤ects can be separated as we propose to evaluate a test by comparing its type II error to the minimal type II error among all tests for the given sample. Game theory is used to establish this minimal type II error, the associated randomized test is characterized as part of a Nash equilibrium of a .ctitious game against nature.We use this method to investigate sequential tests for the di¤erence between twomeans when outcomes are constrained to belong to a given bounded set. Tests ofinequality and of noninferiority are included. We .nd that inference in terms oftype II error based on a balanced sample cannot be improved by sequential sampling or even by observing counter factual evidence providing there is a reasonable gap between the hypotheses.

On equilibria in duopolies with finite strategy spaces

We will call a game a reachable (pure strategy) equilibria game if startingfrom any strategy by any player, by a sequence of best-response moves weare able to reach a (pure strategy) equilibrium. We give a characterizationof all finite strategy space duopolies with reachable equilibria. Wedescribe some applications of the sufficient conditions of the characterization.

Finite horizon bargaining and the consistent field

This paper explores the relationships between noncooperative bargaining games and the consistent value for non-transferable utility (NTU) cooperative games. A dynamic approach to the consistent value for NTU games is introduced: the consistent vector field. The main contribution of the paper is to show that the consistent field is intimately related to the concept of subgame perfection for finite horizon noncooperative bargaining games, as the horizon goes to infinity and the cost of delay goes to zero. The solutions of the dynamic system associated to the consistent field characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs of the noncooperative bargaining games. We show that for transferable utility, hyperplane and pure bargaining games, the dynamics of the consistent fields converge globally to the unique consistent value. However, in the general NTU case, the dynamics of the consistent field can be complex. An example is constructed where the consistent field has cyclic solutions; moreover, the finite horizon subgame perfect equilibria do not approach the consistent value.

A scaled difference chi-square test statistic for moment structure analysis

A family of scaling corrections aimed to improve the chi-square approximation of goodness-of-fit test statistics in small samples, large models, and nonnormal data was proposed in Satorra and Bentler (1994). For structural equations models, Satorra-Bentler's (SB) scaling corrections are available in standard computer software. Often, however, the interest is not on the overall fit of a model, but on a test of the restrictions that a null model say ${\cal M}_0$ implies on a less restricted one ${\cal M}_1$. If $T_0$ and $T_1$ denote the goodness-of-fit test statistics associated to ${\cal M}_0$ and ${\cal M}_1$, respectively, then typically the difference $T_d = T_0 - T_1$ is used as a chi-square test statistic with degrees of freedom equal to the difference on the number of independent parameters estimated under the models ${\cal M}_0$ and ${\cal M}_1$. As in the case of the goodness-of-fit test, it is of interest to scale the statistic $T_d$ in order to improve its chi-square approximation in realistic, i.e., nonasymptotic and nonnormal, applications. In a recent paper, Satorra (1999) shows that the difference between two Satorra-Bentler scaled test statistics for overall model fit does not yield the correct SB scaled difference test statistic. Satorra developed an expression that permits scaling the difference test statistic, but his formula has some practical limitations, since it requires heavy computations that are notavailable in standard computer software. The purpose of the present paper is to provide an easy way to compute the scaled difference chi-square statistic from the scaled goodness-of-fit test statistics of models ${\cal M}_0$ and ${\cal M}_1$. A Monte Carlo study is provided to illustrate the performance of the competing statistics.

Causal assessment in finite extensive-form games

Two finite extensive-form games are empirically equivalent when theempirical distribution on action profiles generated by every behaviorstrategy in one can also be generated by an appropriately chosen behaviorstrategy in the other. This paper provides a characterization ofempirical equivalence. The central idea is to relate a game's informationstructure to the conditional independencies in the empirical distributionsit generates. We present a new analytical device, the influence opportunitydiagram of a game, describe how such a diagram is constructed for a givenextensive-form game, and demonstrate that it provides a complete summaryof the information needed to test empirical equivalence between two games.

A finite-population revenue management model and a risk-ratio procedure for the joint estimation of population size and parameters

Many dynamic revenue management models divide the sale period into a finite number of periods T and assume, invoking a fine-enough grid of time, that each period sees at most one booking request. These Poisson-type assumptions restrict the variability of the demand in the model, but researchers and practitioners were willing to overlook this for the benefit of tractability of the models. In this paper, we criticize this model from another angle. Estimating the discrete finite-period model poses problems of indeterminacy and non-robustness: Arbitrarily fixing T leads to arbitrary control values and on the other hand estimating T from data adds an additional layer of indeterminacy. To counter this, we first propose an alternate finite-population model that avoids this problem of fixing T and allows a wider range of demand distributions, while retaining the useful marginal-value properties of the finite-period model. The finite-population model still requires jointly estimating market size and the parameters of the customer purchase model without observing no-purchases. Estimation of market-size when no-purchases are unobservable has rarely been attempted in the marketing or revenue management literature. Indeed, we point out that it is akin to the classical statistical problem of estimating the parameters of a binomial distribution with unknown population size and success probability, and hence likely to be challenging. However, when the purchase probabilities are given by a functional form such as a multinomial-logit model, we propose an estimation heuristic that exploits the specification of the functional form, the variety of the offer sets in a typical RM setting, and qualitative knowledge of arrival rates. Finally we perform simulations to show that the estimator is very promising in obtaining unbiased estimates of population size and the model parameters.

On the structural difference between the evolutionary approach of Young and that of Kandori, Mailath and Rob

We provide robust examples of symmetric two-player coordination games in normal form that reveal that equilibrium selection bythe evolutionary model of Young (1993) is essentially different from equilibrium selection by the evolutionary model of Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993).

Non-constant discounting in finite horizon: The free terminal time case

This paper derives the HJB (Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman) equation for sophisticated agents in a finite horizon dynamic optimization problem with non-constant discounting in a continuous setting, by using a dynamic programming approach. A simple example is used in order to illustrate the applicability of this HJB equation, by suggesting a method for constructing the subgame perfect equilibrium solution to the problem.Conditions for the observational equivalence with an associated problem with constantdiscounting are analyzed. Special attention is paid to the case of free terminal time. Strotz¿s model (an eating cake problem of a nonrenewable resource with non-constant discounting) is revisited.

Continuum bound states as surface states of a finite periodic system

We discuss the relation between continuum bound states (CBSs) localized on a defect, and surface states of a finite periodic system. We model an experiment of Capasso et al. [F. Capasso, C. Sirtori, J. Faist, D. L. Sivco, S-N. G. Chu, and A. Y. Cho, Nature (London) 358, 565 (1992)] using the transfer-matrix method. We compute the rate for intrasubband transitions from the ground state to the CBS and derive a sum rule. Finally we show how to improve the confinement of a CBS while keeping the energy fixed.