110 resultados para Antimasonic Party.
Resumo:
Este proyecto consiste en el estudio previo que se tiene que llevar a cabo para implantar un ERP en una empresa. En este caso, la empresa se trata de una PYME del sector de la restauración/hostelería. El estudio que se ha realizado sobre los tres ERP's son productos que se encuentran en el mercado, concretamente se han estudiado los ERP's de Openbravo, SAP y Datisa. El motivo de porque estos tres se debe a que el primero es open source, el segundo consiste en un producto de una empresa líder en el sector de los ERP's y el tercero porque es una solución de hostelería realizada por una mediana empresa.
Resumo:
In this paper, I provide a formal justi cation for a well-established coattail effect, when a popular candidate at one branch of government attracts votes to candidates from the same political party for other branches of government. A political agency frame- work with moral hazard is applied to analyze coattails in simultaneous presidential and congressional elections. I show that coattail voting is a natural outcome of the optimal reelection scheme adopted by a representative voter to motivate politicians' efforts in a retrospective voting environment. I assume that an office-motivated politician (executive or congressman) prefers her counterpart to be affiliated with the same political party. This correlation of incentives leads the voter to adopt a joint performance evaluation rule, which is conditioned on the politicians belonging to the same party or different parties. The two-sided coattail effects then arise. On the one hand, the executive's suc- cess/failure props up/drags down her partisan ally in congressional election, which implies presidential coattails. On the other hand, the executive's reelection itself is affected by the congressman's performance, which results in reverse coattails. JEL classi fication: D72, D86. Keywords: Coattail voting; Presidential coattails; Reverse coattails; Simultaneous elections; Political Agency; Retrospective voting.
Resumo:
This paper studies a dynamic principal-monitor-agent relation where a strategic principal delegates the task of monitoring the effort of a strategic agent to a third party. The latter we call the monitor, whose type is initially unknown. Through repeated interaction the agent might learn his type. We show that this process damages the principal's payoffs. Compensation is assumed exogenous, limiting to a great extent the provision of incentives. We go around this difficulty by introducing costly replacement strategies, i.e. the principal replaces the monitor, thus disrupting the agent's learning. We found that even when replacement costs are null, if the revealed monitor is strictly preferred by both parties, there is a loss in efficiency due to the impossibility of bene…tting from it. Nonetheless, these strategies can partially recover the principal's losses. Additionally, we establish upper and lower bounds on the payoffs that the principal and the agent can achieve. Finally we characterize the equilibrium strategies under public and private monitoring (with communication) for different cost and impatience levels.
Resumo:
We present a formal model of intra-party politics to explain candidate selection within parties. We think of parties as heterogeneous groups of individuals who aim to implement a set of policies but who differ in their priorities. When party heterogeneity is too large, parties are in danger of splitting into smaller yet more homogeneous groups. In this context we argue that primaries can have a unifying role if the party elite cannot commit to policy concessions. Our model shows how alignment in the preferred policies of various factions within a party, the relative weight of each of these factions and the electoral system interact to create incentives for the adoption of primary elections. We discuss the existing empirical literature in the light of our theoretical predictions to provide a new, structured perspective on the adoption of primary elections.
Resumo:
We propose and analyze a new solution concept, the R solution, for three-person, transferable utility, cooperative games. In the spirit of the Nash Bargaining Solution, our concept is founded on the predicted outcomes of simultaneous, two-party negotiations that would be the alternative to the grand coalition. These possibly probabilistic predictions are based on consistent beliefs. We analyze the properties of the R solution and compare it with the Shapley value and other concepts. The R solution exists and is unique. It belongs to the bargaining set and to the core whenever the latter is not empty. In fact, when the grand coalition can simply execute one of the three possible bilateral trades, the R solution is the most egalitarian selection of the bargaining set. Finally, we discuss how the R solution changes important conclusions of several well known Industrial Organization models.
Resumo:
Songs were the means used by the Romanian Communist Party to ‘educate’ Romanians. Through them, Romanians were told what they had to appreciate, how grateful they were supposed to be to the regime, how great President Ceausescu was and how they had to work harder and harder so that they could be even better Communists. This paper comprises the translation of three songs composed, performed and broadcast in Communist Romania and their analysis from the point of view of communication. In translating the song, I have chosen to translate closest to the original possible meaning and meanwhile to respect to the best of my ability Low’s ‘pentathlon principle’: singability, rhyme, rhythm, naturalness and fidelity to the sense of the source text
Resumo:
This paper analyzes a spatial model of political competition between two policy- motivated parties in hard times of crisis. Hard times are modeled in terms of policy- making costs carried by a newly elected party. The results predict policy divergence in equilibrium. If the ideological preferences of parties are quite diverse and extreme, there is a unique equilibrium in which the parties announce symmetric platforms and each party wins with probability one half. If one party is extreme while the other is more moderate, there is a unique equilibrium in which the parties announce asymmetric platforms. If the preferred policies of the parties are not very distinct, there are two equilibria with asymmetric platforms. An important property of equilibrium with asymmetric platforms is that a winning party necessarily announces its most preferred policy as a platform. JEL classification: D72. Keywords: Spatial model; Political competition; Two-party system; Policy-motivated parties; Hard times; Crisis.
Resumo:
El objetivo de este proyecto es el de crear una plataforma para conectar a empresas con la necesidad de cubrir puestos de trabajo muy concretos con los mejores candidatos. Más allá del proyecto descrito en este documento, se pretende crear una empresa integradora de servicios de terceros tanto para empresas como para candidatos. Este proyecto se centra en el desarrollo de una plataforma Web basada en programario libre. La plataforma gira entorno a un portal que integra servicios de búsqueda de candidatos, reclutamiento y selección de personal. El portal utilizará la Web 2.0 y las redes sociales para llevar a cabo su cometido. El portal está disponible en http://www.sntalent.com.
Resumo:
Amb aquest treball s'intenta fer explícita la nova societat, el nou ordre, com els agradava dir als ideòlegs del nazisme, que Hitler i el seu partit van crear a Alemanya durant el seu mandat, i que volien estendre a l'Europa que havien conquerit.
Resumo:
Esta memoria parte del estudio de la teoría de las Relaciones Internacionales, seguido de un análisis del regionalismo en el Este asiático, así como del multilateralismo y del minilateralismo como modus operandi en las relaciones internacionales y su desarrollo específico en el Noreste asiático, o Asia oriental. Todo ello se ha examinado con el fin de poder aprehender la dinámica internacional de la segunda crisis nuclear con Corea del Norte, así como proveer con un mayor entendimiento sobre las conversaciones a seis bandas (6PT), como ejemplo de foro de negociación minilateral creado ad hoc con el fin de buscar una solución al problema norcoreano. Hemos procedido al examen del pensamiento estratégico de los diferentes países que conforman las 6PT, así como al estudio de los intereses, acuerdos y desacuerdos de cada uno de ellos en la mesa de negociaciones con el objetivo de intentar comprender el porqué de su aparente fracaso a la hora de solucionar dicha crisis nuclear. Finalmente, hemos procedido a un estudio de la comunidad del Noreste asiático y del marco de seguridad existente en la región, así como de las perspectivas para la institucionalización de las conversaciones a seis bandas para poder comprender si, desarrollado como organización multilateral, este foro podría favorecer la estabilidad en la región, la cooperación regional y con ello una mayor integración.
Resumo:
Aquest treball té com a objectiu determinar l'existència de restriccions en el finançament de projectes empresarials de recerca i desenvolupament (R+D) i analitzar-ne les causes. Els resultats de la investigació mostren els fets següents: en primer lloc, hi ha restriccions financeres per a la realització d'inversions en R+D i es manifesten en la necessitat de les empreses de recórrer a recursos interns i a fons aliens a curt termini; en segon lloc, les restriccions esmentades fonamentalment sorgeixen a causa de dos factors, el desequilibri entre les característiques econòmiques de les inversions d'R+D i el comportament dels agents finançadors en els mercats de capitals, i l'existència d'asimetries d'informació entre agents gestors i finançadors; finalment, en tercer lloc, la formulació per part de les empreses de més informació comptable sobre l'R+D desenvolupada comporta la millora de la valoració de l'empresa en els mercats financers i, per tant, l'assignació de fons als processos d'innovació.
Resumo:
A credible analysis or proposal to solve the problem of the treatment of violence in divided societies has to based in a good understanding of the micro-foundations of the political mobilization in these societies. Much of the engineering models seem to have been based on rather strong simplifications of the electoral behaviour of the citizens. This paper aims to contribute to the understanding of the underlying political competition in divided societies with a neo-downsian model of party competition that is based on the interpretation of Tsebelis (1991) of the consociationalism.
Resumo:
La investigación analiza si, con el horizonte del Libro Sexto del Código Civil de Cataluña relativo a las obligaciones y los contratos, el legislador catalán tiene que mantener el modelo tradicional de la rescisión por lesión ultradimidium, o bien tiene que integrar esta institución en el marco de la protección de la parte débil del contrato, en la línea de las modernas propuestas de derecho europeo.
Resumo:
This article examines the relationship between political parties and regional presidents in Italy and Spain, adopting a comparative case study approach based on extensive archival analysis and in-depth interviews with regional politicians. The findings confirm a strong pattern of growing presidentialism at regional level, regardless of whether there are formal mechanisms for direct election, and regardless of the partisan composition of regional government. Regional presidents tend to exert their growing power through a personalised control of regional party organisations, rather than governing past parties in a direct appeal to the electorate. Nevertheless, parties can still present a significant constraint on regional presidents, so successful regional presidents tend to maintain a mediating form of leadership and fully exploit the opportunities for party patronage to build up their support and smooth governing tensions. An autonomist drive helps presidents hold together disparate coalitions or loose parties at regional level, but their lack of internal coherence presents major problems when it comes to political succession.
Resumo:
El punt de partida d'aquesta investigació és una retòrica molt utilitzada que la UE és un actor global. En vista d'això, la no proliferació de la política comunitària al sud de la Mediterrània s'examina. L'estudi es realitza sobre la base de la conceptualització de la UE "actorness" ia través d'alguns criteris (context extern, l'evolució de l'aparell de política exterior de la UE, la Unió Europea l'auto-presentació i la percepció de tercers, la consistència i la disponibilitat d'instruments de política i accions concretes) que involucren tant factors ideacionals i materials, d'acord amb el "pluralisme metodològic". Aquest marc conceptual va ajudar a avaluar la no proliferació de la política comunitària en aquesta regió en particular on la UE té interessos i bones raons per actuar. Cada un dels criteris de manifest els avantatges i desavantatges de la UE "actorness" en aquest camp seleccionat i la caixa. Aquest document sosté que la no proliferació "actorness" de la UE a la regió del sud de la Mediterrània ha estat limitat a causa d'una varietat de raons.