A note on robust detection

We introduce a simple new hypothesis testing procedure, which,based on an independent sample drawn from a certain density, detects which of $k$ nominal densities is the true density is closest to, under the total variation (L_{1}) distance. Weobtain a density-free uniform exponential bound for the probability of false detection.

A theory of international conflict management and sanctioning

In this paper we analyze sanctioning policies in international law. We develop a model of international military conflict where the conflicting countries can be a target of international sanctions. These sanctions constitute an equilibrium outcome of an international political market for sanctions, where different countries trade political influence. We show that the level of sanctions in equilibrium is strictly positive but limited, in the sense that higher sanctions would exacerbate the military conflict, not reduce it. We then propose an alternative interpretation to the perceived lack of effectiveness of international sanctions, by showing that the problem might not be one of undersanctioning but of oversanctioning.

Business cycles, unemployment insurance and the calibration of matching models

This paper theoretically and empirically documents a puzzle that arises when an RBC economy with a job matching function is used to model unemployment. The standard model can generate sufficiently large cyclical fluctuations in unemployment, or a sufficiently small response of unemployment to labor market policies, but it cannot do both. Variable search and separation, finite UI benefit duration, efficiency wages, and capital all fail to resolve this puzzle. However, either sticky wages or match-specific productivity shocks can improve the model's performance by making the firm's flow of surplus more procyclical, which makes hiring more procyclical too.

Ignorance promotes competition: An auction model with endogenous private valuations

We study a situation in which an auctioneer wishes to sell an object toone of N risk-neutral bidders with heterogeneous preferences. Theauctioneer does not know bidders preferences but has private informationabout the characteristics of the ob ject, and must decide how muchinformation to reveal prior to the auction. We show that the auctioneerhas incentives to release less information than would be efficient andthat the amount of information released increases with the level ofcompetition (as measured by the number of bidders). Furthermore, in aperfectly competitive market the auctioneer would provide the efficientlevel of information.

Multi-period vendor managed inventory systems

In this paper we develop two models for an inventory system in which the distributormanages the inventory at the retailers location. These type of systems correspondto the Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) systems described ib the literature. Thesesystems are very common in many different types of industries, such as retailingand manufacturing, although assuming different characteristics.The objective of our model is to minimize total inventory cost for the distributorin a multi-period multi-retailer setting. The inventory system includes holdingand stock-out costs and we study the case whre an additional fixed setup cost ischarged per delivery.We construct a numerical experiment to analyze the model bahavior and observe theimpact of the characteristics of the model on the solutions.

Pay-as-you-go social security and the distribution of bequests

This paper studies the impact of an unfunded social security system on the distribution of bequests in a framework where savings are due both by life cycle and by random altruistic motivations. We show that the impact of social security on the distribution of bequests depends crucially on the importance of the bequest motive in explaining savings behavior. If the bequest motive is strong, then an increase in the social security tax raises the bequests left by altruistic parents. On the other hand, when the importance of bequests in motivating savings is sufficiently low, theincrease in the social security tax could result in a reduction of the bequests left by altruistic parents under some conditions on the attitude of individuals toward risk and on the relative returns associated with private saving and social security. Some implications concerning the transitional effects of introducing an unfunded social security scheme are also discussed.

Ambiguity in election games

We construct a model in which the ambiguity of candidates allows them toincrease the number of voters to whom they appeal when voters have intense preferences for one of the alternatives available. An ambiguous candidate may offer voters with different preferences the hope that their most preferred alternative will be implemented. We find conditions under which ambiguous strategies are chosen in equilibrium. These conditions include the case in which there is an outcome that is a majority winner against all other outcomes but is not the most preferred outcome for a majority of voters. It is shown that if the number of candidates or parties increases, ambiguity will not be possible in equilibrium, but a larger set of possible policies increases the chance that at least one candidate will choose to be ambiguous in equilibrium.

Forecasting with missing data: Application to a real case

This paper presents a comparative analysis of linear and mixed modelsfor short term forecasting of a real data series with a high percentage of missing data. Data are the series of significant wave heights registered at regular periods of three hours by a buoy placed in the Bay of Biscay.The series is interpolated with a linear predictor which minimizes theforecast mean square error. The linear models are seasonal ARIMA models and themixed models have a linear component and a non linear seasonal component.The non linear component is estimated by a non parametric regression of dataversus time. Short term forecasts, no more than two days ahead, are of interestbecause they can be used by the port authorities to notice the fleet.Several models are fitted and compared by their forecasting behavior.

Interest rate restrictions in a natural experiment: loan allocation and the change in the usury laws in 1714

This article studies the effects of interest rate restrictions on loan allocation. The British governmenttightened the usury laws in 1714, reducing the maximum permissible interest rate from 6% to5%. A sample of individual loan transactions reveals that average loan size and minimum loan sizeincreased strongly, while access to credit worsened for those with little social capital. Collateralisedcredits, which had accounted for a declining share of total lending, returned to their former role ofprominence. Our results suggest that the usury laws distorted credit markets significantly; we findno evidence that they offered a form of Pareto-improving social insurance.

An attempt to go beyond conventional financial accounting information

Conventional financial accounting informationis slanted in favour of certain economic interests. This paper argues in favour ofaccounting information capturing and showingrelevant aspects of the economic-social situation,and of decision-making based on it allowingfor decisions to be taken with economic-social,and not purely economic-weighted, awareness.

Competition and cost overruns in procurement

Most cases of cost overruns in public procurement are related to important changes in theinitial project design. This paper deals with the problem of design speciffication in public procurement and provides a rationale for design misspeciffication. We propose a model in which the sponsor decides how much to invest in design speciffication and awards competitively the project to a contractor. After the project has been awarded the sponsor engages in bilateral renegotiation with the contractor, in order to accommodate changes in the initial project's design that new information makes desirable. When procurement takes place in the presence of horizontally differentiated contractors, the design's speciffication level is seen to affect the resulting degree of competition. The paper highlights this interaction between market competition and design speciffication and shows that the sponsor's optimal strategy, when facing an imperfectly competitive market supply, is to underinvest in design speciffication so as to make signifficant cost overrunslikely. Since no such misspeciffication occurs in a perfectly competitive market, cost overruns are seen to arise as a consequence of lack of competition in the procurement market.

Cost-containment in health care: The case of Spain from the eighties up to 1997

The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the evolutionof health care expenditure in Spain during the period 1980-1997, andhenceforth to comment on the cost containment measures put forwardto control its growth. The paper is divided into three separatesections. The first offers a brief description of the Spanish HealthCare System, with emphasis placed on the issue of expenditure controland health planning targets. The second part outlines a set of costcontainment measures that has accompanied the process of extendinguniversal health care coverage which occurred during the mentionedperiod and which has helped keep public expenditure under control.Finally, the third part describes some of the more recent proposalsfor reform of the Spanish Health Care Sector.

Interactive local bandwidth choice

A tool for user choice of the local bandwidth function for a kernel density estimate is developed using KDE, a graphical object-oriented package for interactive kernel density estimation written in LISP-STAT. The bandwidth function is a cubic spline, whose knots are manipulated by the user in one window, while the resulting estimate appears in another window. A real data illustration of this method raises concerns, because an extremely large family of estimates is available.

Cost efficiency in primary care contracting: A stochastic frontier cost function approach

The principal aim of this paper is to estimate a stochastic frontier costfunction and an inefficiency effects model in the analysis of the primaryhealth care services purchased by the public authority and supplied by 180providers in 1996 in Catalonia. The evidence from our sample does not supportthe premise that contracting out has helped improve purchasing costefficiency in primary care. Inefficient purchasing cost was observed in thecomponent of this purchasing cost explicitly included in the contract betweenpurchaser and provider. There are no observable incentives for thecontracted-out primary health care teams to minimise prescription costs, whichare not explicitly included in the present contracting system.

Causes of subcontracting: Evidence from panel data on construction firms

This paper examines factors explaining subcontracting decisions in the construction industry. Rather than the more common cross-sectional analyses, we use panel data to evaluate the influence of all relevant variables. We design and use a new index of the closeness to small numbers situations to estimate the extent of hold-up problems. Results show that as specificity grows, firms tend to subcontract less. The opposite happens when output heterogeneity and the use of intangible assets and capabilities increase. Neither temporary shortage of capacity nor geographical dispersion of activities seem to affect the extent of subcontracting. Finally, proxies for uncertainty do not show any clear effect.