Long-run selection and the work ethic

That individuals contribute in social dilemma interactions even when contributing is costly is a well-established observation in the experimental literature. Since a contributor is always strictly worse off than a non-contributor the question is raised if an intrinsic motivation to contribute can survive in an evolutionary setting. Using recent results on deterministic approximation of stochastic evolutionary dynamics we give conditions for equilibria with a positive number of contributors to be selected in the long run.

Principal curves and principal oriented points

Principal curves have been defined Hastie and Stuetzle (JASA, 1989) assmooth curves passing through the middle of a multidimensional dataset. They are nonlinear generalizations of the first principalcomponent, a characterization of which is the basis for the principalcurves definition.In this paper we propose an alternative approach based on a differentproperty of principal components. Consider a point in the space wherea multivariate normal is defined and, for each hyperplane containingthat point, compute the total variance of the normal distributionconditioned to belong to that hyperplane. Choose now the hyperplaneminimizing this conditional total variance and look for thecorresponding conditional mean. The first principal component of theoriginal distribution passes by this conditional mean and it isorthogonal to that hyperplane. This property is easily generalized todata sets with nonlinear structure. Repeating the search from differentstarting points, many points analogous to conditional means are found.We call them principal oriented points. When a one-dimensional curveruns the set of these special points it is called principal curve oforiented points. Successive principal curves are recursively definedfrom a generalization of the total variance.

The rise and decline of children's labour participation levels during the early stages of industrialisation. Catalonia (1850-1925)

This article aims to analyse the reasons for the intensive use of childlabour in the 19th century and its subsequent decline in the first thirdof the 20th century in the context of an economy with a highly flexiblelabour supply like that of Catalonia. During the second half of the 19thcentury,factors relating to family economies, such as numerous familiesand low wages for adults, along with the technologies of the time thatrequired manual labour resources, would appear to explain the intensiveuse of child labour to the detriment of schooling. The technologicalchanges that occurred during the first third of the 20th century, thedemographic transition and adult wage increase (for both men and women)explain the schooling of children up to the age of 15 and theconsequent practical abolition of child labour in that new era ofeconomic modernisation.

Forecasting and turning point predictions in a Bayesian panel VAR model

We provide methods for forecasting variables and predicting turning points in panel Bayesian VARs. We specify a flexible model which accounts for both interdependencies in the cross section and time variations in the parameters. Posterior distributions for the parameters are obtained for a particular type of diffuse, for Minnesota-type and for hierarchical priors. Formulas for multistep, multiunit point and average forecasts are provided. An application to the problem of forecasting the growth rate of output and of predicting turning points in the G-7 illustrates the approach. A comparison with alternative forecasting methods is also provided.

Assesing the political viability of labour market reform: The case of employment protection

We analyze the political support for employment protection legislation.Unlike my previous work on the same topic, this paper pays a lot ofattention to the role of obsolescence in the growth process.In voting in favour of employment protection, incumbent employeestrade off lower living standards (because employment protectionmaintains workers in less productive activities) against longer jobduration. The support for employment protection will then depend onthe value of the latter relative to the cost of the former. Wehighlight two key deeterminants of this trade-off: first, the workers'bargaining power, second, the economy's growth rate-more preciselyits rate of creative destruction.

Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: An experimental study

We perform an experiment on a pure coordination game with uncertaintyabout the payoffs. Our game is closely related to models that have beenused in many macroeconomic and financial applications to solve problemsof equilibrium indeterminacy. In our experiment each subject receives anoisy signal about the true payoffs. This game has a unique strategyprofile that survives the iterative deletion of strictly dominatedstrategies (thus a unique Nash equilibrium). The equilibrium outcomecoincides, on average, with the risk-dominant equilibrium outcome ofthe underlying coordination game. The behavior of the subjects convergesto the theoretical prediction after enough experience has been gained. The data (and the comments) suggest that subjects do not apply through"a priori" reasoning the iterated deletion of dominated strategies.Instead, they adapt to the responses of other players. Thus, the lengthof the learning phase clearly varies for the different signals. We alsotest behavior in a game without uncertainty as a benchmark case. The gamewith uncertainty is inspired by the "global" games of Carlsson and VanDamme (1993).

Implementing interactive computing in an object-oriented environment

Statistical computing when input/output is driven by a Graphical User Interface is considered. A proposal is made for automatic control ofcomputational flow to ensure that only strictly required computationsare actually carried on. The computational flow is modeled by a directed graph for implementation in any object-oriented programming language with symbolic manipulation capabilities. A complete implementation example is presented to compute and display frequency based piecewise linear density estimators such as histograms or frequency polygons.

Measurement and explanation of socioeconomic inequality in health with longitudinal data

This paper presents a method for the measurement of changes in health inequality and income-related health inequality over time in a population.For pure health inequality (as measured by the Gini coefficient) andincome-related health inequality (as measured by the concentration index),we show how measures derived from longitudinal data can be related tocross section Gini and concentration indices that have been typicallyreported in the literature to date, along with measures of health mobilityinspired by the literature on income mobility. We also show how thesemeasures of mobility can be usefully decomposed into the contributions ofdifferent covariates. We apply these methods to investigate the degree ofincome-related mobility in the GHQ measure of psychological well-being inthe first nine waves of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). Thisreveals that dynamics increase the absolute value of the concentrationindex of GHQ on income by 10%.

Optimal contracts, adverse selection and social preferences: An experiment

It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly refuted by numerous experiments, and we feel that it may be useful to consider nonpecuniary utility in mechanism design and contract theory. Accordingly, we devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in an adverse-selection context. A principal proposes one of three contract menus, each of which offers a choice of two incentive-compatible contracts, to two agents whose types are unknown to the principal. The agents know the set of possible menus, and choose to either accept one of the two contracts offered in the proposed menu or to reject the menu altogether; a rejection by either agent leads to lower (and equal) reservation payoffs for all parties. While all three possible menus favor the principal, they do so to varying degrees. We observe numerous rejections of the more lopsided menus, and approach an equilibrium where one of the more equitable contract menus (which one depends on the reservation payoffs) is proposed and agents accept a contract, selecting actions according to their types. Behavior is largely consistent with all recent models of social preferences, strongly suggesting there is value in considering nonpecuniary utility in agency theory.

Ambiguity seeking as a result of the status quo bias

Several factors affect attitudes toward ambiguity. What happens, however, when peopleare asked to exchange an ambiguous alternative in their possession for an unambiguousone? We present three experiments in which individuals preferred to retain the former.This status quo bias emerged both within- and between-subjects, with and withoutincentives, with different outcome distributions, and with endowments determined byboth the experimenter and the participants themselves. Findings emphasize the need toaccount for the frames of reference under which evaluations of probabilistic informationtake place as well as modifications that should be incorporated into descriptive modelsof decision making.

Trade credit: Suppliers as debt collectors and insurance providers

There are two fundamental puzzles about trade credit: why does it appearto be so expensive,and why do input suppliers engage in the business oflending money? This paper addresses and answers both questions analysingthe interaction between the financial and the industrial aspects of thesupplier-customer relationship. It examines how, in a context of limitedenforceability of contracts, suppliers may have a comparative advantageover banks in lending to their customers because they hold the extrathreat of stopping the supply of intermediate goods. Suppliers may alsoact as lenders of last resort, providing insurance against liquidityshocks that may endanger the survival of their customers. The relativelyhigh implicit interest rates of trade credit result from the existenceof default and insurance premia. The implications of the model areexamined empirically using parametric and nonparametric techniques on apanel of UK firms.

Assessing an intuitive condition for stability under a range of traffic conditions via a generalised Lu-Kumar network

We argue the importance both of developing simple sufficientconditions for the stability of general multiclass queueing networks and also of assessing such conditions under a range of assumptions on the weight of the traffic flowing between service stations. To achieve the former, we review a peak-rate stability condition and extend its range of application and for the latter, we introduce a generalisation of the Lu-Kumar network on which the stability condition may be tested for a range of traffic configurations. The peak-rate condition is close to exact when the between-station traffic is light, but degrades as this traffic increases.

Long term debt with hidden borrowing

We consider borrowers with the opportunity to raise funds from a competitive baking sector,that shares information about borrowers, and an alternative hidden lender. We highlight thatthe presence of the hidden lender restricts the contracts that can be obtained from the banking sector and that in equilibrium some borrowers obtain funds from both the banking sector and the (inefficient) hidden lender simultaneously. We further show that as the inefficiency of the hidden lender increases, total welfare decreases. By extending the model to examine a partially hidden lender, we further highlight the key role of information.

Optimal bail out policy, conditionality and constructive ambiguity

This paper addresses the issue of the optimal behaviour of the Lender of Last Resort (LOLR) in its microeconomic role regarding individual financial institutions in distress. It has been argued that the LOLR should not intervene at the microeconomic level and let any defaulting institution face the market discipline, as it will be confronted with the consequences of the risks it has taken. By considering a simple costbenefit analysis we show that this position may lack a sufficient foundation. We establish that, instead, uder reasonable assumptions, the optimal policy has to be conditional on the amount of uninsured debt issued by the defaulting bank. Yet in equilibrium, because the rescue policy is costly, the LOLR will not rescue all the banks that fulfill the uninsured debt requirement condition, but will follow a mixed strategy. This we interpret as the confirmation of the "creative ambiguity" principle, perfectly in line with the central bankers claim that it is efficient for them to have discretion in lending to individual institutions. Alternatively, in other cases, when the social cost of a bank's bankruptcy is too high, it is optimal for the LOLR to bail out the insititution, and this gives support to the "too big to fail" policy.

Biased quantitative measurement of interval ordered homothetic preferences

We represent interval ordered homothetic preferences with a quantitative homothetic utility function and a multiplicative bias. When preferences are weakly ordered (i.e. when indifference is transitive), such a bias equals 1. When indifference is intransitive, the biasing factor is a positive function smaller than 1 and measures a threshold of indifference. We show that the bias is constant if and only if preferences are semiordered, and we identify conditions ensuring a linear utility function. We illustrate our approach with indifference sets on a two dimensional commodity space.