Some Notes and Comments on the Efficient use of Information in Repeated Games with Poisson Signals

In the present paper we characterize the optimal use of Poisson signals to establish incentives in the "bad" and "good" news models of Abreu et al. [1]. In the former, for small time intervals the signals' quality is high and we observe a "selective" use of information; otherwise there is a "mass" use. In the latter, for small time intervals the signals' quality is low and we observe a "fine" use of information; otherwise there is a "non-selective" use. JEL: C73, D82, D86. KEYWORDS: Repeated Games, Frequent Monitoring, Public Monitoring, Infor- mation Characteristics.

Repensando la formación inicial del profesorado para abordar el tratamiento a la diversidad cultural y lingüística en el aula = Rethinking initial teacher education for linguistic and cvltural diversity in the classroom

In recent decades, European educational systems are facing many challenges related to the treatment of cultural and linguistic diversity. The need to address this diversity requires new approaches to education; this in turn requires changes in the way we prepare teachers for the new reality they face in their classrooms. In this article we highlight some of the major problems that initial teacher training has to address in order to enable teachers to deal effectively, respectfully, and fairly with students whose linguistic and cultural background is different from their own. We also present several models for teacher education from Europe and North America based on clearly identified teacher competences for linguistic and cultural diversity