Inter-group conflict and intra-group punishment in an experimental contest game

We study how conflict in a contest game is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our main motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The relevant theoretical prediction in our setting is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and independent of whether punishment is available or not. We find, first, that our results contradict the independence of group-size prediction: conflict expenditures of groups are substantially larger than those of individuals, and both are substantially above equilibrium. Towards the end of the experiment material losses in groups are 257% of the predicted level. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity in the investment behaviour of individual group members. Second, allowing group members to punish each other after individual contributions to the contest effort are revealed leads to even larger conflict expenditures. Now material losses are 869% of the equilibrium level and there is much less heterogeneity in individual group members' investments. These results contrast strongly with those from public goods experiments where punishment enhances efficiency and leads to higher material payoffs.

Redirecció de l'especificitat de les cél·lules T contra epítops del VIH restringit per la HLA-A2 mitjaçant transferència genética

Existeixen creixents evidències què la resposta dels limfòcits T CD8+ alpha beta citotòxics (CTLs) és un element fonamental en la infecció produïda pel VIH. Les CTLs VIH especifiques es consideren molt importants en la reducció de la càrrega viral i en la contenció de la infecció. Encara que la combinació dels antiretrovirals (HAART) ha suposat una millora considerable en la lluita contra el VIH induint una important reducció de la càrrega viral i augmentant el nombre de cèl•lules T CD4+, diverses complicacions han fet ressaltar la necessitat de noves alternatives terapèutiques. Les complicacions inclouen: manca de recuperació d’una resposta immune sòlida contra el VIH, toxicitat a llarg termini de la teràpia i el descobriment que les cèl•lules T CD4+ constitueixen un reservori pel virus. Les noves alternatives controlaran la replicació viral i reconstituiran la immunitat. L’eficàcia de la immunoteràpia cel•lular amb transferència adoptiva de CTLs virals específics s’ha provat en diferents infeccions virals humanes, incloent el VIH. Proposem una modificació de la immunoteràpia adoptiva redirigint l’especificitat de les cèl•lules T contra el VIH mitjançant la transfecció dels gens del TCR. En aquest assaig preclínic, ens aprofitarem de la tecnologia dels animals transgènics per les molècules de HLA, amb la finalitat de generar TCRs d’alta afinitat dirigits contra epitops del VIH restringits per la molècula HLA. Aquests TCRs seran induïts in vivo i seleccionats in vitro. Les cadenes alpha i beta dels TCRs VIH específics procedents de les CTLs seran clonades mitjançant tècniques de biologia molecular. Aquests TCRs VIH específics seran transferits a cèl•lules T CD8+ humanes i la seva especificitat i capacitat citolítica contra cèl•lules diana que presentin antígens de VIH-1 s’estudiaran mitjançant la combinació de diverses tècniques noves (FCC, transfecció mitjançant Nucleoefector). Finalment, una construcció retroviral adient per la seva transducció en cèl•lules T humanes s’establirà amb un TCR òptim seleccionat.

The Measurement of social polarization in a multi-group context

Polarization indices presented up to now have only focused their attention on the distribution of income/wealth. However, in many circumstances income is not the only relevant dimension that might be the cause of social conflict, so it is very important to have a social polarization index able to cope with alternative dimensions. In this paper we present an axiomatic characterization of one of such indices: it has been obtained as an extension of the (income) polarization measure introduced in Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004) to a wider domain. It turns out that the axiomatic structure introduced in that paper alone is not appropriate to obtain a fully satisfactory characterization of our measure, so additional axioms are proposed. As a byproduct, we present an alternative axiomatization of the aforementioned income polarization measure.

Tree automorphisms and quasi-isometries of Thompson's group F

We prove that automorphisms of the infinite binary rooted tree T2 do not yield quasi-isometries of Thompson's group F, except for the map which reverses orientation on the unit interval, a natural outer automorphism of F. This map, together with the identity map, forms a subgroup of Aut(T2) consisting of 2-adic automorphisms, following standard terminology used in the study of branch groups. However, for more general p, we show that the analgous groups of p-adic tree automorphisms do not give rise to quasiisometries of F(p).

The causal relationship between Individual’s choice behavior and self-reported satisfaction: the case of residential mobility in the EU

One of the most persistent and lasting debates in economic research refers to whether the answers to subjective questions can be used to explain individuals’ economic behavior. Using panel data for twelve EU countries, in the present study we analyze the causal relationship between self-reported housing satisfaction and residential mobility. Our results indicate that: i) households unsatisfied with their current housing situation are more likely to move; ii) housing satisfaction raises after a move, and; iii) housing satisfaction increases with the transition from being a renter to becoming a homeowner. Some interesting cross-country differences are observed. Our findings provide evidence in favor of use of subjective indicators of satisfaction with certain life domains in the analysis of individuals’ economic conduct.

Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?

A social choice function is group strategy-proof on a domain if no group of agents can manipulate its final outcome to their own benefit by declaring false preferences on that domain. Group strategy-proofness is a very attractive requirement of incentive compatibility. But in many cases it is hard or impossible to find nontrivial social choice functions satisfying even the weakest condition of individual strategy-proofness. However, there are a number of economically significant domains where interesting rules satisfying individual strategy-proofness can be defined, and for some of them, all these rules turn out to also satisfy the stronger requirement of group strategy-proofness. This is the case, for example, when preferences are single-peaked or single-dipped. In other cases, this equivalence does not hold. We provide sufficient conditions defining domains of preferences guaranteeing that individual and group strategy-proofness are equivalent for all rules defined on the

Dynamics in Thompson's group F

We describe an explicit relationship between strand diagrams and piecewise-linear functions for elements of Thompson’s group F. Using this correspondence, we investigate the dynamics of elements of F, and we show that conjugacy of one-bump functions can be described by a Mather-type invariant.

Free Mobility and Taste-Homogeneity of Jurisdiction Structures

We consider a population of agents distributed on the unit interval. Agents form jurisdictions in order to provide a public facility and share its costs equally. This creates an incentive to form large entities. Individuals also incur a transportation cost depending on their location and that of the facility which makes small jurisdictions advantageous. We consider a fairly general class of distributions of agents and generalize previous versions of this model by allowing for non-linear transportation costs. We show that, in general, jurisdictions are not necessarily homogeneous. However, they are if facilities are always intraterritory and transportation costs are superadditive. Superadditivity can be weakened to strictly increasing and strictly concave when agents are uniformly distributed. Keywords: Consecutiveness, stratification, local public goods, coalition formation, country formation. JEL Classification: C71 (Cooperative Games), D71 (Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations), H73 (Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects).

Measuring intergenerational earnings mobility in Spain: a selection-bias-free approach

This paper analyses intergenerational earnings mobility in Spain correcting for different selection biases. We address the co-residence selection problem by combining information from two samples and using the two-sample two-stage least square estimator. We find a small decrease in elasticity when we move to younger cohorts. Furthermore, we find a higher correlation in the case of daughters than in the case of sons; however, when we consider the employment selection in the case of daughters, by adopting a Heckman-type correction method, the diference between sons and daughters disappears. By decomposing the sources of earnings elasticity across generations, we find that the correlation between child's and father's occupation is the most important component. Finally, quantile regressions estimates show that the influence of the father's earnings is greater when we move to the lower tail of the offspring's earnings distribution, especially in the case of daughters' earnings.

The loop group and the cobar construction

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."

Singular integrals on Ahlfors-David regular subsets of the Heisenberg group

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."

Mobility and Housing Satisfaction: An Empirical Analysis for Twelve EU Countries

Using panel data for twelve EU countries, we analyze the relationship between selfreported housing satisfaction and residential mobility. Our results indicate the existence of a positive link between the two variables and that housing satisfaction exerts a mediating effect between residential characteristics and dwellers' mobility propensities. Some interesting cross-country differences regarding the effect of other variables on mobility are also observed. Our results can be used in defining, implementing and evaluating housing and neighbourhood policies. Residential satisfaction is put forward as one of the most appropriate indicators of the success or failure of such policies. Keywords: Housing satisfaction, residential mobility JEL classification: R21, D19

Agents mòbils en situacions d'emergència: mobilitat d'etiquetes de triatge

En les actuacions de rescat en emergències amb un gran nombre de víctimes, una de les primeres tasques a realitzar pels serveis sanitaris és la de triar-les en funció del seu estat i la urgència amb que han de ser tractades. En el grup SeNDA es treballa en un sistema d’agents mòbils que automatitza el mecanisme manual de triatge, fent ús de dispositius electrònics i una xarxa MANET com a canal de comunicació. En aquest projecte es proposa un sistema de gestió de mobilitat pels agents que transporten dades de víctimes fins al centre de coordinació, juntament amb un mecanisme de control d’aquests agents totalment transparent a l’usuari.