More than cheap talk? Euro-Mediterranean cooperation on human rights and democracy

Malgrat els esforços de la UE en la promoció de la democràcia i un compromís comú per la democràcia i els drets humans al EMP, no hi ha signes de convergència cap al model liberal democràtic propugnat per la UE. No obstant això, l'abast i la intensitat de la cooperació multilateral, transnacional i bilateral han augmentat constantment en tota la regió des de mitjans de 1990. La cooperació en el camp de la promoció de la democràcia es caracteritza per la forta dinàmica de normativa sectorial, i la diferenciació geogràfica, però està clarament situada en un marc regional i altament estandarditzat. Si bé la convergència política o la política sembla poc probable en el curt o mitjà termini, democràcia i drets humans estan fermament establerts en una agenda regional comú

EU's democracy promotion policy in the Mediterranean: Squaring the stability – democracy circle?

Why does the EU have an ambiguous and inconsistent democracy promotion (DP) policy towards the Mediterranean countries? This paper argues that the EU´s DP is determined by a crucial conflict of interests conceptualised as a stability – democracy dilemma. The EU has been attempting to promote democracy, but without risking the current stability and in connivance with incumbent autocratic regimes. In view of this dilemma, the four main characteristics of the EU´s DP promotion are explored, namely: gradualism, a strong notion of partnership-building, a narrow definition of civil society, and a strong belief in economic liberalisation. A fifth feature, relation of the EU with moderate Islamists, is analysed in the paper as it represents the most striking illustration of its contradictions. The paper concludes by arguing that the definition of a clear DP by the EU that considered engagement with moderate Islamists would represent a major step towards squaring its stability – democracy circle.

Corruption in representative democracy

A parliament with n members, distributed among two parties, decides whether to accept or reject a certain proposal. Each member of the parliament votes in favour or against. If there are at least t members in favour, the proposal is accepted; otherwise it is rejected. A non-member of the parliament, the briber, is interested in having the proposal accepted. To this end, he is willing to bribe members to induce them to vote in favour. It is compared a parliament with party discipline, where members vote according to the party line, and a parliament without party discipline, where members vote according to their own opinion. The paper determines, for given values of n and t , the average number of members that the briber has to bribe in each case (with the average taken with respect to all the possible allocations of members between parties and their votes, and also with respect to those allocations inducing the briber to bribe). The results show that a parliament with parties with party discipline is more costly for the briber to be bribed.

Membership and internal democracy. Immigrant organisations in the city of Oslo

Immigrant organisations in the City of Oslo receive support from the government for their daily operation. In order to receive such support, each organisation must be membership-based and have internal democratic procedures. This paper raises the question of how we can understand this combination of support for ethnic based organisations and requirements of membership and internal democracy. It explores the usefulness of two partly overlapping ways of understanding this policy and discusses their interrelationship. Firstly, within the context of the crisis of multiculturalism, the paper discusses whether this combination is based on the aim of strengthening the organisations’ procedural commitment to liberal-democratic principles. Secondly, the paper analyses whether requirements of membership and internal democracy can mainly be understood within the framework of the Nordic model of voluntary organisation. By comparing the policy at three empirical levels, the paper concludes that this combination can mainly be understood within the framework of the traditional historical Nordic model, but that there is an ambiguity in this policy related to minority rights.

Secession and liberal democracy. The case of the Basque country

The academic debate about the secession of a territory which is part of a liberal democracy state displays an initial contrast. On the one hand, practical secessionist movements usually legitimize their position using nationalist arguments linked to the principle of national self- determination. On the other hand, we find in academia few defenders of a normative principle of national self-determination. Philosophers, political scientists and jurists usually defend the status quo. And even when they do not defend it, most of them tend to leave the question of that question and secession unresolved or confused. Regarding this issue, liberal-democratic theories show a tendency to be “conservative” in relation to the political borders, regardless the historical and empirical processes of creation of current States. Probably, this feature is not far away to the fact that, since its beginning, political liberalism has not been a theory of the nation, but a theory of the state.

Federalism and democracy. The case of minority nations: a federalist deficit

In this chapter, after pointing out the different logics that lie behind the familiar ideas of democracy and federalism, I have dealt with the case of plurinational federal democracies. Having put forward a double criterion of an empirical nature with which to differentiate between the existence of minority nations within plurinational democracies (section 2), I suggest three theoretical criteria for the political accommodation of these democracies. In the following section, I show the agonistic nature of the normative discussion of the political accommodation of this kind of democracies, which bring monist and pluralist versions of the demos of the polity into conflict (section 3.1), as well as a number of conclusions which are the result of a comparative study of 19 federal and regional democracies using four analytical axes: the uninational/plurinational axis; the unitarianism-federalism axis; the centralisation-decentralisation axis; and the symmetry-asymmetry axis (section 3.2). This analysis reveals shortcomings in the constitutional recognition of national pluralism in federal and regional cases with a large number of federated units/regions with political autonomy; a lower degree of constitutional federalism and a greater asymmetry in the federated entities or regions of plurinational democracies. It also reveals difficulties to establish clear formulas in these democracies in order to encourage a “federalism of trust” based on the participation and protection of national minorities in the shared government of plurinational federations/regional states. Actually, there is a federal deficit in this kind polities according to normative liberal-democratic patterns and to what comparative analysis show. Finally, this chapter advocates the need for a greater normative and institutional refinement in plurinational federal democracies. In order to achieve this, it is necessary to introduce a deeper form of “ethical” pluralism -which displays normative agonistic trends, as well as a more “confederal/asymmetrical” perspective, congruent with the national pluralism of these kind of polities.

Growth, Democracy, and Civil War

Does economic growth affect the likelihood of civil war? Answering this question requires dealing with reverse causation. Our approach exploits that international commodity prices have a significant effect on the income growth of Sub-Saharan African countries. We show that lower income growth makes civil war more likely in non-democracies. This effect is significantly weaker in democracies; as a result, we find no link between growth and civil war in these countries. Our reducedform results also indicate that lower international commodity price growth has no effect on civil war in democracies, but raises the likelihood of civil war incidence and onset in nondemocracies.

Oil price shocks, income and democracy

We examine the effect of oil price fluctuations ondemocratic institutions over the 1960-2007 period. We also exploitthe very persistent response of income to oil price fluctuations tostudy the effect of persistent (oil price-driven) income shocks ondemocracy. Our results indicate that countries with greater net oilexports over GDP see improvements in democratic institutionsfollowing upturns in international oil prices. We estimate that a 1percentage point increase in per capita GDP growth due to apositive oil price shock increases the Polity democracy score byaround 0.2 percentage points on impact and by around 2 percentagepoints in the long run. The effect on the probability of a democratictransition is around 0.4 percentage points.

Does direct democracy reduce the size of government? New evidence from historical data, 1890-2000

Using historical data for all Swiss cantons from 1890 to 2000, we estimate the causal effect of direct democracy on government spending. The main innovation in this paper is that we use fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity and instrumental variables to address the potential endogeneity of institutions. We find that the budget referendum and lower costs to launch a voter initiative are effective tools in reducing canton level spending. However, we find no evidence that the budget referendum results in more decentralized government or a larger local government. Our instrumental variable estimates suggest that a mandatory budget referendum reduces the size of canton spending between 13 and 19 percent. A 1 percent lower signature requirement for the initiative reduces canton spending by up to 2 percent.

Social security and democracy

Many political economic theories use and emphasize the process of votingin their explanation of the growth of Social Security, governmentspending, and other public policies. But is there an empirical connectionbetween democracy and Social Security program size or design? Using somenew international data sets to produce both country-panel econometricestimates as well as case studies of South American and southern Europeancountries, we find that Social Security policy varies according toeconomic and demographic factors, but that very different politicalhistories can result in the same Social Security policy. We find littlepartial effect of democracy on the size of Social Security budgets, onhow those budgets are allocated, or how economic and demographic factorsaffect Social Security. If there is any observed difference, democraciesspend a little less of their GDP on Social Security, grow their budgetsa bit more slowly, and cap their payroll tax more often, than doeconomically and demographically similar nondemocracies. Democracies andnondemocracies are equally likely to have benefit formulas inducingretirement and, conditional on GDP per capita, equally likely to induceretirement with a retirement test vs. an earnings test.

Gender gaps in policy making: Evidence from direct democracy in Switzerland

In spite of increasing representation of women in politics, little is known about their impact onpolicies. Comparing outcomes of parliaments with different shares of female members does not identifytheir causal impact because of possible differences in the underlying electorate. This paper usesa unique data set on voting decisions to sheds new light on gender gaps in policy making. Ouranalysis focuses on Switzerland, where all citizens can directly decide on a broad range of policiesin referendums and initiatives. We show that there are large gender gaps in the areas of health,environmental protection, defense spending and welfare policy which typically persist even conditionalon socio-economic characteristics. We also find that female policy makers have a substantial effect onthe composition of public spending, but a small effect on the overall size of government.

Fiscal decentralization in Spain: An asymmetric transition to democracy

Asymmetric fiscal decentralization, by which we mean different fiscal arrangements between the central government and different groups of, or individual, lower-level governments, may be justified from an economic efficiency perspective. As argued by Tiebout (1956), Oates (1972) and others, a decentralized system of regional and local governments is better able to accommodate differences in tastes for public goods and services. This efficiency argument calls for decentralization of fiscal authority to regional and local governments, but not necessarily asymmetric decentralization. However, when the differences in tastes for public goods and services arise out of differences in history, culture and language across regions of a country, asymmetric treatment may be justified. History, culture and language may influence how a group of people (a region) views autonomy, independence and fiscal authority. Some regions may have had experience with autonomous government in the past, they may have a culture that is strongly reliant upon (or leery of) the central government, or they may be fearful of losing their separate languages if they do not have special arrangements. To accommodate differences in taste for independence, autonomy, and fiscal authority, it may be necessary to have different fiscal arrangements between the central government and the different regions comprising the country.

Analysis of the present (and impact) of women in business organizations in contemporany Spanish democracy. The impact of Spanish law of equality reviewed

Since its approval, in 2007, the Spanish Law of Equality (LO 3/2007) has been the target of many scholars on gender issues. Those analyses (and those previous to the first observable results of the Spanish Law of Equality), have largely prioritized political representative institutions and political parties as the main arenas to assess the impact of the new regulation. Nevertheless, to make a comprehensive analysis of the increase and impact of the presence of women in contemporary democracies one cannot exclude the existence of many other crucial actors in our pluralist systems, such as business organizations.In this line, in order to widen the knowledge on the presence of women in Spanish contemporary democracy, as well as to further assess the impact of Spanish Law of Equality on the presence of women in economic and political life, our paper will look at the gender bias of the executive committees in the Spanish Chambers of Commerce and business associations during the period 20010-2012. By placing those actors at the front sight, we aim to contribute with new empirical insights to the current debate on this topic.

The First Privatization Policy in a Democracy: Selling State-Owned Enterprises in 1948-1950, Puerto Rico

In the 1940s, when the Governor of Puerto Rico was appointed by the US President and the Puerto Rican government was answerable only to the US Federal government, a large state-owned enterprise (SOE) sector was established on the island. Public services such as water, transportation and energy were nationalized, and several new manufacturing SOEs were created to produce cement, glass, shoes, paper and chalkboard, and clay products. These enterprises were created and managed by government-owned corporations. Later on, between 1948 and 1950, under the island’s first elected Governor, the government sold these SOEs to private groups. This paper documents both the creation and the privatization of the SOE sector in Puerto Rico, and analyzes the role played by ideology, political interests, and economic concerns in the decision to privatize them. Whereas ideological factors might have played a significant role in the building of the SOE sector, we find that privatization was driven basically by economic factors, such as the superior efficiency of private firms in the sectors where the SOEs operated, and by the desire to attract private industrial investment to the Puerto Rican economy.

The republican case for workplace democracy

The republican case for workplace democracy (WD) is presented and defended from two alternative means of ensuring freedom from arbitrary interference in the firmnamely, (a) the right to freely exit the firm and (b) workplace regulation. This paper shows, respectively, that costless exit is neither possible nor desirable in either perfect or imperfect labor markets, and that managerial discretion is both desirable and inevitable due to the incompleteness of employment contracts and labor legislation. The paper then shows that WD is necessary, from a republican standpoint, if workers" interests are to be adequately tracked in the exercise of managerial authority. Three important objections are finally addressed (i) that WD is redundant, (ii) that it is unnecessary provided that litigation and unionism can produce similar outcomes, and (iii) that it falls short of ensuring republican freedom compared to self-employment.