Interbank Competition with Costly Screening

We analyse credit market equilibrium when banks screen loan applicants. When banks have a convex cost function of screening, a pure strategy equilibrium exists where banks optimally set interest rates at the same level as their competitors. This result complements Broecker s (1990) analysis, where he demonstrates that no pure strategy equilibrium exists when banks have zero screening costs. In our set up we show that interest rate on loans are largely independent of marginal costs, a feature consistent with the extant empirical evidence. In equilibrium, banks make positive profits in our model in spite of the threat of entry by inactive banks. Moreover, an increase in the number of active banks increases credit risk and so does not improve credit market effciency: this point has important regulatory implications. Finally, we extend our analysis to the case where banks have differing screening abilities.

Crises and growth: A re-evaluation

We address the question of whether growth and welfare can be higher in crisis prone economies. First, we show that there is a robust empirical link between per-capita GDP growth and negative skewness of credit growth across countries with active financial markets. That is, countries that have experienced occasional crises have grown on average faster than countries with smooth credit conditions. We then present a two-sector endogenous growth model in which financial crises can occur, and analyze the relationship between financial fragility and growth. The underlying credit market imperfections generateborrowing constraints, bottlenecks and low growth. We show that under certain conditions endogenous real exchange rate risk arises and firms find it optimal to take on credit risk in the form of currency mismatch. Along such a risky path average growth is higher, but self-fulfilling crises occur occasionally. Furthermore, we establish conditions under which the adoption of credit risk is welfare improving and brings the allocation nearer to the Pareto optimal level. The design of the model is motivated by several features of recent crises: credit risk in the form of foreign currency denominated debt; costly crises that generate firesales and widespread bankruptcies; and asymmetric sectorial responses, wherethe nontradables sector falls more than the tradables sector in the wake of crises.

Interbank comptetition with costly screening

We analyse credit market equilibrium when banks screen loan applicants. When banks have a convex cost function of screening, a pure strategy equilibrium exists where banks optimally set interest rates at the same level as their competitors. This result complements Broecker s (1990) analysis, where he demonstrates that no pure strategy equilibrium exists when banks have zero screening costs. In our set up we show that interest rate on loansare largely independent of marginal costs, a feature consistent with the extant empirical evidence. In equilibrium, banks make positive profits in our model in spite of the threat of entry by inactive banks. Moreover, an increase in the number of active banks increases credit risk and so does not improve credit market effciency: this point has important regulatory implications. Finally, we extend our analysis to the case where banks havediffering screening abilities.

The Impact of Monetary Union on EU-15 Sovereign Debt Yield Spreads

With European Monetary Union (EMU), there was an increase in the adjusted spreads (corrected from the foreign exchange risk) of euro participating countries' sovereign securities over Germany and a decrease in those of non-euro countries. The objective of this paper is to study the reasons for this result, and in particular, whether the change in the price assigned by markets was due to domestic factors such as credit risk and/or market liquidity, or to international risk factors. The empirical evidence suggests that market size scale economies have increased since EMU for all European markets, so the effect of the various risk factors, even though it differs between euro and non-euro countries, is always dependent on the size of the market.

Un modelo de riesgo de crédito basado en opciones compuestas con barrera. Aplicación al mercado continuo español

In this work the valuation methodology of compound option written on a downand-out call option, developed by Ericsson and Reneby (2003), has been applied to deduce a credit risk model. It is supposed that the firm has a debt structure with two maturity dates and that the credit event takes place when the assets firm value falls under a determined level called barrier. An empirical application of the model for 105 firms of Spanish continuous market is carried out. For each one of them its value in the date of analysis, the volatility and the critical value are obtained and from these, the default probability to short and long-term and the implicit probability in the two previous probabilities are deduced. The results are compared with the ones obtained from the Geskemodel (1977).

Monetary integration and the cost of borrowing

With the beginning of the European Monetary Union (EMU), euro-area sovereign securities¿ adjusted spreads over Germany (corrected from the foreign exchange risk) experienced an increase that caused a lower than expected decline in borrowing costs. The objective of this paper is to study what explains that rising. In particular, if it took place a change in the price assigned by markets to domestic (credit risk and/or market liquidity) or to international risk factors. The empirical evidence supports the idea that a change in the market value of liquidity occurred with the EMU. International and default risk play a smaller role

Un modelo de riesgo de crédito basado en opciones compuestas con barrera. Aplicación al mercado continuo español

In this work the valuation methodology of compound option written on a downand-out call option, developed by Ericsson and Reneby (2003), has been applied to deduce a credit risk model. It is supposed that the firm has a debt structure with two maturity dates and that the credit event takes place when the assets firm value falls under a determined level called barrier. An empirical application of the model for 105 firms of Spanish continuous market is carried out. For each one of them its value in the date of analysis, the volatility and the critical value are obtained and from these, the default probability to short and long-term and the implicit probability in the two previous probabilities are deduced. The results are compared with the ones obtained from the Geskemodel (1977).

Monetary integration and the cost of borrowing

With the beginning of the European Monetary Union (EMU), euro-area sovereign securities¿ adjusted spreads over Germany (corrected from the foreign exchange risk) experienced an increase that caused a lower than expected decline in borrowing costs. The objective of this paper is to study what explains that rising. In particular, if it took place a change in the price assigned by markets to domestic (credit risk and/or market liquidity) or to international risk factors. The empirical evidence supports the idea that a change in the market value of liquidity occurred with the EMU. International and default risk play a smaller role

The Impact of Monetary Union on EU-15 Sovereign Debt Yield Spreads

With European Monetary Union (EMU), there was an increase in the adjusted spreads (corrected from the foreign exchange risk) of euro participating countries' sovereign securities over Germany and a decrease in those of non-euro countries. The objective of this paper is to study the reasons for this result, and in particular, whether the change in the price assigned by markets was due to domestic factors such as credit risk and/or market liquidity, or to international risk factors. The empirical evidence suggests that market size scale economies have increased since EMU for all European markets, so the effect of the various risk factors, even though it differs between euro and non-euro countries, is always dependent on the size of the market.

Una aproximación a la manipulación de los resultados en las PYMES españolas

[spa] Esta comunicación investiga la manipulación de resultados en las pymes españolas en el período 2000-2008. Se trabaja con dos muestras de empresas (solventes e insolventes) y el proceso seguido ha consistido en recoger datos contables de los cinco años previos antes del concurso de acreedores y emparejarlas con otras de similares características en el año de la declaración. A partir de estas muestras se han aplicado los modelos que más frecuentemente se utilizan para estudiar la manipulación, los basados en variables de devengo y en ingresos. Los resultados ponen de relieve lo poco adecuados que resultan en general por los bajos resultados obtenidos y la superioridad de los basados en ingresos sobre los basados en el devengo. El siguiente paso ha consistido en aplicar indicadores de posible manipulación y reestimar los modelos antes citados de acuerdo con estas variables. Los resultados no han sido mejores y la aplicación del mejor modelo para detectar a las empresas que probablemente podían ser manipuladoras, reafirman su poca capacidad explicativa.

Una aproximación a la manipulación de los resultados en las PYMES españolas

[spa] Esta comunicación investiga la manipulación de resultados en las pymes españolas en el período 2000-2008. Se trabaja con dos muestras de empresas (solventes e insolventes) y el proceso seguido ha consistido en recoger datos contables de los cinco años previos antes del concurso de acreedores y emparejarlas con otras de similares características en el año de la declaración. A partir de estas muestras se han aplicado los modelos que más frecuentemente se utilizan para estudiar la manipulación, los basados en variables de devengo y en ingresos. Los resultados ponen de relieve lo poco adecuados que resultan en general por los bajos resultados obtenidos y la superioridad de los basados en ingresos sobre los basados en el devengo. El siguiente paso ha consistido en aplicar indicadores de posible manipulación y reestimar los modelos antes citados de acuerdo con estas variables. Los resultados no han sido mejores y la aplicación del mejor modelo para detectar a las empresas que probablemente podían ser manipuladoras, reafirman su poca capacidad explicativa.

Modalidades alternativas de reaseguro basados en la ordenación de riesgos

En este trabajo se estudian tres modalidades de reaseguro basadas en el número de siniestros: Reaseguro de los siniestros más grandes. Modalidad por la cual el reasegurador se hace cargo de los siniestros más grandes. Reaseguro de exceso del número de siniestros. En este caso la compañía cedente retiene los siniestros más pequeños, cediendo el resto al reaseguro. Reaseguro de exceso del número de siniestros, hasta un tope de siniestralidad. En esta modalidad de reaseguro, la compañía cedente retiene los siniestros más pequeños pero condicionados a que su cuantía no exceda un determinado pleno fijado por ella. De esta manera se consigue limitar la pérdida de la compañía cedente hasta un mkimo conocido. Esta última modalidad de reaseguro puede ser una buena alternativa al reaseguro Stop-loss ya que al igual que éste, elimina la probabilidad de ruina de la cedente. El estudio de estas modalidades de reasegwo pasa por tratar previamente la problemática actuarial de la ordenación de riesgos.

Haar wavelets-based approach for quantifying credit portfolio losses

This paper proposes a new methodology to compute Value at Risk (VaR) for quantifying losses in credit portfolios. We approximate the cumulative distribution of the loss function by a finite combination of Haar wavelet basis functions and calculate the coefficients of the approximation by inverting its Laplace transform. The Wavelet Approximation (WA) method is specially suitable for non-smooth distributions, often arising in small or concentrated portfolios, when the hypothesis of the Basel II formulas are violated. To test the methodology we consider the Vasicek one-factor portfolio credit loss model as our model framework. WA is an accurate, robust and fast method, allowing to estimate VaR much more quickly than with a Monte Carlo (MC) method at the same level of accuracy and reliability.

Credit Constraints, Firms' Precautionary Investment, and the Business Cycle

This paper studies the macroeconomic implications of firms' precautionary investment behavior in response to the anticipation of future financing constraints. Firms increase their demand for liquid and safe investments in order to alleviate future borrowing constraints and decrease the probability of having to forego future profitable investment opportunities. This results in an increase in the share of short-term projects that produces a temporary increase in output, at the expense of lower long-run investment and future output. I show in a calibrated model that this behavior is at the source of a novel and powerful channel of shock transmission of productivity shocks that produces short-run dampening and long-run propagation. Furthermore, it can account for the observed business cycle patterns of the aggregate and firm-level composition of investment.

Systemic risk, interbank relations and liquidity provision by the Central Bank

We model systemic risk in an interbank market. Banks face liquidityneeds as consumers are uncertain about where they need to consume. Interbank credit lines allow to cope with these liquidity shocks while reducing the cost of maintaining reserves. However, the interbank market exposes the system to a coordination failure(gridlock equilibrium) even if all banks are solvent. When one bankis insolvent, the stability of the banking system is affected in various ways depending on the patterns of payments across locations. We investigate the ability of the banking industry to withstand the insolvency of one bank and whether the closure ofone bank generates a chain reaction on the rest of the system. Weanalyze the coordinating role of the Central Bank in preventing payments systemic repercussions and we examine the justification ofthe Too-big-to-fail-policy.