Transferència d’electrò i protó als intermediaris de reacció de les hemo-catalases

Projecte de recerca elaborat a partir d’una estada a l’University of Pennsylvania, EUA, entre els mesos d’agosta a desembre del 2006. Les hemo-catalases són enzims que protegeixen les cèl•lules dels efectes tòxics del peròxid d'hidrogen. Aquesta reacció té lloc en dues etapes, via l'intermediari Compost I (Cpd I). Tanmateix, el Compost I pot seguir una reacció secundària, a través de l'intermediari Compost II. Hi ha dos tipus d'hemo-catalases: les hemo-b (com la d'Helicobacter pylori, HPC) i les hemo-d catalases (com la de Penicillium vitale, PVC). Experimentalment s'observa que les hemo-b catalases formen Cpd II més fàcilment que les hemo-d. La formació del Cpd II consta de dos processos: la reducció del catió radical porfirínic i la protonació del grup oxoferril. Durant l'estada, es va estudiar el procès de transferència electrònica a la porfirina utilitzant una metodologia desenvolupada recentment. Els resultats mostren que per PVC la reducció és més fàcil que per HPC. Posteriorment hem realitzat una sèrie de optimitzacions de geometria CPMD QM/MM al llarg del camí per la transferència de protó (PT) de la histidina distal a l'oxoferril. Mentre que per HPC aquesta PT és espontània, per PVC l'isòmer hidroxoferrílic és menys estable que el catió imidazoli.

Decentralization and the Gains from Monitoring

This paper analyzes the delegation of contracting capacity in a moral hazard environment with sequential production in a project which involves a principal and two agents. The agent in charge of the …nal production can obtain soft information about the other agent's effort choice by investing in monitoring. I investigate the circumstances under which it is optimal for the principal to use a centralized organization in which she designs the contracts with both agents or to use a decentralized organization in which she contracts only one agent, and delegates the power to contract the other agent. It is shown that in this setting a decentralized organization can be superior to a centralized organization. This is because the principal is better off under monitoring and the incentives for an agent to invest in monitoring can be higher in a decentralized organization. The circumstances under which this is true are related to the monitoring costs and the importance of each agent for production. The results explain the recent application of the design-build method in public procurement. Journal of Economic Literature Classi…cation Numbers: D23, D82, L14, L22. Keywords: Decentralization of Contracting, Monitoring, Moral Hazard.

Information Dispersion and Equilibrium Multiplicity

This paper studies the implications of correlation of private signals about the liquidation value of a risky asset in a variation of a standard noisy rational expectations model in which traders receive endowment shocks which are private information and have a common component. We …nd that a necessary condition to generate multiple linear partially revealing rational expectations equilibria is the existence of several sources of information dispersion. In this context equilibrium multiplicity tends to occur when information is more dispersed. A necessary condition to have strategic complementarity in information acquisition is to have mul- tiple equilibria. When the equilibrium is unique there is strategic substi- tutability in information acquisition, corroborating the result obtained in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). JEL Classi…cation: D82, D83, G14 Keywords: Multiplicity of equilibria, strategic complementarity, asym- metric information.

Sincere Lobby Formation

This paper analyzes endogenous lobbying over a unidimensional policy issue. Individuals differ in policy preferences and decide either to join one of two opposite interest lobbies or not to take part in lobbying activities. Once formed, lobbies make contributions to the incumbent government in exchange for a policy favor as in a common-agency model. A "sincere-lobby-formation" condition for equilibrium is introduced: an individual joins a lobby if their gain from the policy change that this lobby might achieve exceeds a contribution fee. Thus, an equilibrium occurs only if no lobby member would prefer their lobby to cease to exist. I show the existence of an equilibrium with two organized lobbies. Individuals with more extreme preferences are more likely to join lobbying activities. I fi…nd that lobbying somewhat moderates the government's preferences, i.e., it shifts the …final policy in favor of individuals who are initially disadvantaged by the government's pro- or anti-policy preferred position. Under a utilitarian government, however, lobbying does not affect the fi…nal policy, and political competition results in a socially optimal outcome. JEL classi…cation: D72. Keywords: Sincere lobby formation; common agency; endogenous lobbying.

A Political Agency Model of Coattail Voting

In this paper, I provide a formal justi…cation for a well-established coattail effect, when a popular candidate at one branch of government attracts votes to candidates from the same political party for other branches of government. A political agency frame- work with moral hazard is applied to analyze coattails in simultaneous presidential and congressional elections. I show that coattail voting is a natural outcome of the optimal reelection scheme adopted by a representative voter to motivate politicians' efforts in a retrospective voting environment. I assume that an office-motivated politician (executive or congressman) prefers her counterpart to be affiliated with the same political party. This correlation of incentives leads the voter to adopt a joint performance evaluation rule, which is conditioned on the politicians belonging to the same party or different parties. The two-sided coattail effects then arise. On the one hand, the executive's suc- cess/failure props up/drags down her partisan ally in congressional election, which implies presidential coattails. On the other hand, the executive's reelection itself is affected by the congressman's performance, which results in reverse coattails. JEL classi…fication: D72, D86. Keywords: Coattail voting; Presidential coattails; Reverse coattails; Simultaneous elections; Political Agency; Retrospective voting.

A Model of Party Discipline in a Congress

This paper studies party discipline in a congress within a political agency framework with retrospective voting. Party discipline serves as an incentive device to induce office- motivated congress members to perform in line with the party leadership's objective of controlling both the executive and the legislative branches of government. I show fi…rst that the same party is more likely to control both branches of government (i.e., uni…ed government) the stronger the party discipline in the congress is. Second, the leader of the governing party imposes more party discipline under uni…ed government than does the opposition leader under divided government. Moreover, the incumbents' aggregate performance increases with party discipline, so a representative voter becomes better off. JEL classi…cation: D72. Keywords: Party discipline; Political agency; Retrospective voting; Office-motivated politicians.

Cronyism in Business, Public Sector and Politics

This paper contrasts the incentives for cronyism in business, the public sector and politics within an agency problem model with moral hazard. The analysis is focused on the institutional differences between private, public and political organizations. In business, when facing a residual claimant contract, a chief manager ends up with a relatively moderate …rst-best level of cronyism within a …firm. The institutional framework of the public sector does not allow explicit contracting, which leads to a more severe cronyism problem within public organizations. Finally, it is shown that the nature of political appointments (such that the subordinate's reappointment is conditioned on the chief's re-election) together with implicit contracting makes political cronyism the most extreme case. JEL classifi…cation: D72, D73, D86. Keywords: Cronyism; Meritocracy; Manager; Bureaucrat; Politician.

A New open economy macroeconomic model with endogenous portfolio diversification and firms entry

This paper provides a new benchmark for the analysis of the international diversi…cation puzzle in a tractable new open economy macroeconomic model. Building on Cole and Obstfeld (1991) and Heathcote and Perri (2009), this model speci…es an equilibrium model of perfect risk sharing in incomplete markets, with endogenous portfolios and number of varieties. Equity home bias may not be a puzzle but a perfectly optimal allocation for hedging risk. In contrast to previous work, the model shows that: (i) optimal international portfolio diversi…cation is driven by home bias in capital goods, independently of home bias in consumption, and by the share of income accruing to labour. The model explains reasonably well the recent patterns of portfolio allocations in developed economies; and (ii) optimal portfolio shares are independent of market dynamics.

Staffing strategies in SME's: determinants of external recruitment and internal promotion

The purpose of this paper is to examine the determinants of use internal or external labour market to fill a firm vacancy in SME’s taking into account the differences existing among blue and white collar jobs. Following different theories we can identify three main reasons for use internal candidates rather than external ones‐ firm specific knowledge, adverse selection problems and motivation‐. However, there are others factors that might affect this choice but the last theories don’t take into account. In this paper we try to shed some light on what are these other factors that may affect firm decision to use internal or external labour market. Particularly we analyses the relationship among new technologies, innovation activity and firm location on the staffing strategy. The results shows difference behaviour on the decision to fill a vacancy using internal or external labour markets between manufacturing and service firms, and this decision depends not only on firm internal characteristics, like technological complexity or innovation activity, but also on firm location. The results also support the hypothesis of ports of entry especially in the manufacturing sector.

A Proportional Approach to Bankruptcy Problems with a guaranteed minimum

In a distribution problem, and specfii cally in bankruptcy issues, the Proportional (P) and the Egalitarian (EA) divisions are two of the most popular ways to resolve the conflict. The Constrained Equal Awards rule (CEA) is introduced in bankruptcy literature to ensure that no agent receives more than her claim, a problem that can arise when using the egalitarian division. We propose an alternative modi cation, by using a convex combination of P and EA. The recursive application of this new rule finishes at the CEA rule. Our solution concept ensures a minimum amount to each agent, and distributes the remaining estate in a proportional way. Keywords: Bankruptcy problems, Proportional rule, Equal Awards, Convex combination of rules, Lorenz dominance. JEL classi fication: C71, D63, D71.

Eye tracking for on-screen reading

A medida que avanza la tecnolog a, cada vez son m as comunes los libros digitales. Por eso, existen varias formas de mejorar la experiencia de lectura del usuario, como mostrar la de nici on de una palabra que resulte dif cil, o resaltar lo importante del texto cuando se pasa la vista por encima. En este proyecto, se ha investigado la base de esto con la ayuda de un Eye Tracker. Se ha implementado una clasi caci on en palabras f aciles y dif ciles dependiendo de c omo una persona lee, y una forma de saber si se est a leyendo el texto o pasando la vista por encima.

Estudi del comportament de materials nanoestructurats en el tractament d'aigües contaminades amb arsènic

El SPION (Super Paramagnetic Iron Oxide Nanoparticles) ha estat estudiat com un nou adsorbent per eliminar l’arsènic d’aigües contaminades. Les condicions òptimes de treball es van assolir per un pH de 3,6 i per concentracions inferiors als 100ppm. No es van trobar interferències significatives produïdes pels cations Cu, Ni i Zn en l’adsorció de l’As, sent el fosfat l’anió que més interfereix. Una esponja de cel·lulosa s’ha utilitzat com a suport del SPION, per disminuir les agregacions de les nanopartícules en suspensió i per proporcionar una material adequat per l’adsorció en continu, experiment amb columnes. Així, es va obtenir un augment de la capacitat d’adsorció del SPION per l’As(V), mentre que per l’As(III) continua sent baixa, per tant s’augmenta la selectivitat per l’As(V). Les interferències aniòniques afecten d’igual manera a l’adsorció de l’As(III) i l’As(V) quan l’adsorció és en continu o en discontinu. Els cations metàl·lics no interfereixen en l’adsorció de l’arsènic, a excepció del coure que és adsorbit i porta a la disminució de l’adsorció d’arsènic.

Airport Congestion and Airline Network Structure

This paper provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of the relationship between airport congestion and airline network structure. We find that the development of hub-and-spoke (HS) networks may have detrimental effects on social welfare in presence of airport congestion. The theoretical analysis shows that, although airline pro ts are typically higher under HS networks, congestion could create incentives for airlines to adopt fully-connected (FC) networks. However, the welfare analysis leads to the conclusion that airlines may have an inefficient bias towards HS networks. In line with the theoretical analysis, our empirical results show that network airlines are weakly infl uenced by congestion in their choice of frequencies from/to their hub airports. Consistently with this result, we con firm that delays are higher in hub airports controlling for concentration and airport size. Keywords: airlines; airport congestion; fully-connected networks, hub-and-spoke net- works; network efficiency JEL Classifi cation Numbers: L13; L2; L93

Domestic and International Research Joint Ventures: The Effect of Collusion

We analyze the effect of research joint ventures (RJVs) on consumer welfare in an international context when collusion can occur. The main novelty of our analysis is to study the differentiated effect of domestic and international RJVs. The recent literature shows that RJVs with collusion harm consumers. However, our results introduce a qualifi cation to this statement: international RJVs with collusion might be bene ficial for consumers when internationalization costs are high. The EU and US competition policy advises against RJVs that facilitate collusion on the grounds of their expected negative effects. Our results suggest that antitrust authorities should distinguish between domestic and international RJVs and, in certain cases, be more benevolent with international RJVs. Keywords: collusion; domestic research joint venture; international research joint venture JEL Classi fication Numbers: K21, L24, L44, O32

Temporal diffeomorphic free-form deformation: application to motion and strain estimation from 3D echocardiography

This paper presents a new registration algorithm, called Temporal Di eomorphic Free Form Deformation (TDFFD), and its application to motion and strain quanti cation from a sequence of 3D ultrasound (US) images. The originality of our approach resides in enforcing time consistency by representing the 4D velocity eld as the sum of continuous spatiotemporal B-Spline kernels. The spatiotemporal displacement eld is then recovered through forward Eulerian integration of the non-stationary velocity eld. The strain tensor iscomputed locally using the spatial derivatives of the reconstructed displacement eld. The energy functional considered in this paper weighs two terms: the image similarity and a regularization term. The image similarity metric is the sum of squared di erences between the intensities of each frame and a reference one. Any frame in the sequence can be chosen as reference. The regularization term is based on theincompressibility of myocardial tissue. TDFFD was compared to pairwise 3D FFD and 3D+t FFD, bothon displacement and velocity elds, on a set of synthetic 3D US images with di erent noise levels. TDFFDshowed increased robustness to noise compared to these two state-of-the-art algorithms. TDFFD also proved to be more resistant to a reduced temporal resolution when decimating this synthetic sequence. Finally, this synthetic dataset was used to determine optimal settings of the TDFFD algorithm. Subsequently, TDFFDwas applied to a database of cardiac 3D US images of the left ventricle acquired from 9 healthy volunteers and 13 patients treated by Cardiac Resynchronization Therapy (CRT). On healthy cases, uniform strain patterns were observed over all myocardial segments, as physiologically expected. On all CRT patients, theimprovement in synchrony of regional longitudinal strain correlated with CRT clinical outcome as quanti ed by the reduction of end-systolic left ventricular volume at follow-up (6 and 12 months), showing the potential of the proposed algorithm for the assessment of CRT.