Financial Repression in a Natural Experiment: Loan Allocation and the Change in the Usury Laws in 1714

If financial deepening aids economic growth, then financial repression should be harmful. We use a natural experiment – the change in the English usury laws in 1714 – to analyze the effects of interest rate restrictions. We use a sample of individual loan transactions to demonstrate how the reduction of the legal maximum rate of interest affected the supply and demand for credit. Average loan size and minimum loan size increased strongly, and access to credit worsened for those with little ‘social capital.’ While we have no direct evidence that loans were misallocated, the discontinuity in loan receipts makes this highly likely. We conclude that financial repression can undermine the positive effects of financial deepening.

Equilibrium asset prices and savings of heterogeneous agents in the presence of incomplete markets and portfolio constraints

We study the quantitative properties of a dynamic general equilibrium model in which agents face both idiosyncratic and aggregate income risk, state-dependent borrowing constraints that bind in some but not all periods and markets are incomplete. Optimal individual consumption-savings plans and equilibrium asset prices are computed under various assumptions about income uncertainty. Then we investigate whether our general equilibrium model with incomplete markets replicates two empirical observations: the high correlation between individual consumption and individual income, and the equity premium puzzle. We find that, when the driving processes are calibrated according to the data from wage income in different sectors of the US economy, the results move in the direction of explaining these observations, but the model falls short of explaining the observed correlations quantitatively. If the incomes of agents are assumed independent of each other, the observations can be explained quantitatively.

On the impact of leverage constraints on asset prices and trading volume

Researchers have used stylized facts on asset prices and trading volumein stock markets (in particular, the mean reversion of asset returnsand the correlations between trading volume, price changes and pricelevels) to support theories where agents are not rational expected utilitymaximizers. This paper shows that this empirical evidence is in factconsistent with a standard infite horizon perfect information expectedutility economy where some agents face leverage constraints similar tothose found in todays financial markets. In addition, and in sharpcontrast to the theories above, we explain some qualitative differencesthat are observed in the price-volume relation on stock and on futuresmarkets. We consider a continuous-time economy where agents maximize theintegral of their discounted utility from consumption under both budgetand leverage con-straints. Building on the work by Vila and Zariphopoulou(1997), we find a closed form solution, up to a negative constant, for theequilibrium prices and demands in the region of the state space where theconstraint is non-binding. We show that, at the equilibrium, stock holdingsvolatility as well as its ratio to stock price volatility are increasingfunctions of the stock price and interpret this finding in terms of theprice-volume relation.

Regional allocation of skills

This paper addresses three questions: (1) why does the share of skilledworkers in regional population tend to be higher in wealthier regions? (2)what determines changes in this share over time? and (3) why is it that internalmigration tends to raise average skill levels of the receiving regions relativeto that of the sending regions? I construct a two--region dynamic model withagglomeration and congestion to answer these questions. It is shown that,under certain relationship between wages and demand for land, unskilledworkers are discouraged more strongly from living in a wealthier region andare less mobile than skilled workers.

Solving non-linear stochastic models by parameterizing expectations: An application to asset pricing with production

A new algorithm called the parameterized expectations approach(PEA) for solving dynamic stochastic models under rational expectationsis developed and its advantages and disadvantages are discussed. Thisalgorithm can, in principle, approximate the true equilibrium arbitrarilywell. Also, this algorithm works from the Euler equations, so that theequilibrium does not have to be cast in the form of a planner's problem.Monte--Carlo integration and the absence of grids on the state variables,cause the computation costs not to go up exponentially when the numberof state variables or the exogenous shocks in the economy increase. \\As an application we analyze an asset pricing model with endogenousproduction. We analyze its implications for time dependence of volatilityof stock returns and the term structure of interest rates. We argue thatthis model can generate hump--shaped term structures.

A unifying approach to the empirical evaluation of asset pricing models

Two main approaches are commonly used to empirically evaluate linear factor pricingmodels: regression and SDF methods, with centred and uncentred versions of the latter.We show that unlike standard two-step or iterated GMM procedures, single-step estimatorssuch as continuously updated GMM yield numerically identical values for prices of risk,pricing errors, Jensen s alphas and overidentifying restrictions tests irrespective of the modelvalidity. Therefore, there is arguably a single approach regardless of the factors being tradedor not, or the use of excess or gross returns. We illustrate our results by revisiting Lustigand Verdelhan s (2007) empirical analysis of currency returns.

On certain greedoid polyhedra, partially indexable scheduling problems and extended restless bandit allocation indices

We present a polyhedral framework for establishing general structural properties on optimal solutions of stochastic scheduling problems, where multiple job classes vie for service resources: the existence of an optimal priority policy in a given family, characterized by a greedoid(whose feasible class subsets may receive higher priority), where optimal priorities are determined by class-ranking indices, under restricted linear performance objectives (partial indexability). This framework extends that of Bertsimas and Niño-Mora (1996), which explained the optimality of priority-index policies under all linear objectives (general indexability). We show that, if performance measures satisfy partial conservation laws (with respect to the greedoid), which extend previous generalized conservation laws, then theproblem admits a strong LP relaxation over a so-called extended greedoid polytope, which has strong structural and algorithmic properties. We present an adaptive-greedy algorithm (which extends Klimov's) taking as input the linear objective coefficients, which (1) determines whether the optimal LP solution is achievable by a policy in the given family; and (2) if so, computes a set of class-ranking indices that characterize optimal priority policies in the family. In the special case of project scheduling, we show that, under additional conditions, the optimal indices can be computed separately for each project (index decomposition). We further apply the framework to the important restless bandit model (two-action Markov decision chains), obtaining new index policies, that extend Whittle's (1988), and simple sufficient conditions for their validity. These results highlight the power of polyhedral methods (the so-called achievable region approach) in dynamic and stochastic optimization.

Population based resource allocation: The use of hybrid risk adjustment

The emphasis on integrated care implies new incentives that promote coordinationbetween levels of care. Considering a population as a whole, the resource allocation systemhas to adapt to this environment. This research is aimed to design a model that allows formorbidity related prospective and concurrent capitation payment. The model can be applied inpublicly funded health systems and managed competition settings.Methods: We analyze the application of hybrid risk adjustment versus either prospective orconcurrent risk adjustment formulae in the context of funding total health expenditures for thepopulation of an integrated healthcare delivery organization in Catalonia during years 2004 and2005.Results: The hybrid model reimburses integrated care organizations avoiding excessive risktransfer and maximizing incentives for efficiency in the provision. At the same time, it eliminatesincentives for risk selection for a specific set of high risk individuals through the use ofconcurrent reimbursement in order to assure a proper classification of patients.Conclusion: Prospective Risk Adjustment is used to transfer the financial risk to the healthprovider and therefore provide incentives for efficiency. Within the context of a National HealthSystem, such transfer of financial risk is illusory, and the government has to cover the deficits.Hybrid risk adjustment is useful to provide the right combination of incentive for efficiency andappropriate level of risk transfer for integrated care organizations.

Probabilistic maximal covering location-allocation models with constrained waiting time or queue length for congested systems

When dealing with the design of service networks, such as healthand EMS services, banking or distributed ticket selling services, thelocation of service centers has a strong influence on the congestion ateach of them, and consequently, on the quality of service. In this paper,several models are presented to consider service congestion. The firstmodel addresses the issue of the location of the least number of single--servercenters such that all the population is served within a standard distance,and nobody stands in line for a time longer than a given time--limit, or withmore than a predetermined number of other clients. We then formulateseveral maximal coverage models, with one or more servers per service center.A new heuristic is developed to solve the models and tested in a 30--nodesnetwork.

Contractual allocation of decision rights and incentives: The case of automobile distribution

We analyze empirically the allocation of rights and monetary incentives in automobile franchise contracts. These contracts substantially restrict the decision rights of dealers and grant manufacturers extensive contractual completion and enforcement powers, converting the manufacturers, de facto, in a sort of quasi-judiciary instance. Variation in the allocation of decision rights andincentive intensity is explained by the incidence of moral hazard in the relation. In particular, when the cost of dealer moral hazard is higher and the risk of manufactureropportunism is lower, manufacturers enjoy more discretion in determining the performance required from their dealers and in using mechanisms such as monitoring, termination and monetary incentives to ensure such performance is provided. We also explore the existence of interdependencies between the different elements of the system. and find some complementarities between completion and termination rights, and between monitoring rights and the intensity of incentives.

Money, fame and the allocation of talent: Brain drain and the institution of science

The earning structure in science is known to be flat relative to the one in theprivate sector, which could cause a brain drain toward the private sector. In thispaper, we assume that agents value both money and fame and study the role ofthe institution of science in the allocation of talent between the science sector andthe private sector. Following works on the Sociology of Science, we model theinstitution of science as a mechanism distributing fame (i.e. peer recognition). Weshow that since the intrinsic performance is less noisy signal of talent in the sciencesector than in the private sector, a good institution of science can mitigate thebrain drain. We also find that providing extra monetary incentives through themarket might undermine the incentives provided by the institution and therebyworsen the brain drain. Finally, we study the optimal balance between monetaryand non-monetary incentives in science.

Keeping up with the Joneses: An international asset pricing model

We derive an international asset pricing model that assumes local investorshave preferences of the type "keeping up with the Joneses." In aninternational setting investors compare their current wealth with that oftheir peers who live in the same country. In the process of inferring thecountry's average wealth, investors incorporate information from the domesticmarket portfolio. In equilibrium, this gives rise to a multifactor CAPMwhere, together with the world market price of risk, there existscountry-speciffic prices of risk associated with deviations from thecountry's average wealth level. The model performs signifficantly better, interms of explaining cross-section of returns, than the international CAPM.Moreover, the results are robust, both for conditional and unconditionaltests, to the inclusion of currency risk, macroeconomic sources of risk andthe Fama and French HML factor.

Interest rate restrictions in a natural experiment: loan allocation and the change in the usury laws in 1714

This article studies the effects of interest rate restrictions on loan allocation. The British governmenttightened the usury laws in 1714, reducing the maximum permissible interest rate from 6% to5%. A sample of individual loan transactions reveals that average loan size and minimum loan sizeincreased strongly, while access to credit worsened for those with little social capital. Collateralisedcredits, which had accounted for a declining share of total lending, returned to their former role ofprominence. Our results suggest that the usury laws distorted credit markets significantly; we findno evidence that they offered a form of Pareto-improving social insurance.