Incorporant els actors i el conflicte violent a la literatura sobre la migració forçosa: un model de la decisió de retornar

El desplaçament de poblacions a causa de conflictes violents s’ha convertit en una de les principals preocupacions humanitàries de les últimes dècades. També s’ha convertit en un assumpte polític de gran rellevància, que és percebut com un llast (en termes econòmics i de seguretat), però també com a peça important en la transició cap a un intervencionisme més gran en el sistema internacional, tant des d’una base humanitària com de seguretat. La importància d’aquests aspectes ha desviat l’atenció de l’anàlisi de les interaccions entre els processos de desplaçament i els conflictes violents que els provoquen. La literatura sobre els conflictes violents ha obviat aquestes interaccions, degut principalment a que els processos de desplaçament són considerats com meres reaccions definides per condicions estructurals. Aquest article parteix de la premissa que l’individu reté la seva capacitat decisiva en aquests processos i que es tracta d’una capacitat que té conseqüències. Per tant, és necessari introduir en l’anàlisi una perspectiva a nivell micro. Partint d’aquesta premissa, el text presenta un model de la decisió de retorn a nivell individual i també a nivell agregat. A més, permet identificar interconnexions fonamentals d’aquestes dinàmiques amb els conflictes violents. Finalment, l’article ofereix algunes conclusions rellevants per al cas de Bòsnia-Herzegovina i sobre les implicacions de la politització del retorn.

Territorial autonomy and self-determination conflicts: opportunity and willingness cases from Bolivia, Niger, and Thailand

The paradox of autonomy is about whether self-rule accommodates or exacerbates armed conflict. This study attempts to unpack the puzzle examining the effectiveness of territorial autonomy as a state response to self-determination conflicts throughout the world. It challenges the conflict-inducing features of autonomy arguing that territorial autonomy can mitigate armed conflict by channeling group grievances into peaceful forms of protest. Thus, this study aims at arriving at a comprehensive theory that identifies which factors are responsible for violent escalation of conflicts grounded in self-determination demands. By using the concepts of opportunity structures and willingness dimension, this study shows that conflict escalation only takes place when minorities with greater bargaining power vis-à-vis the center, in contexts of high levels of economic inequality within dyad, are mobilized around autonomy and separatist demands.

Conflict, Peace and Security in Africa: an Assessment and New Questions After 50 Years of African Independence

Since the independence processes in the African continent, armed conflicts, peace and security have raised concern and attention both at the domestic level and at the international scale. In recent years, all aspects have undergone significant changes which have given rise to intense debate. The end of some historical conflicts has taken place in a context of slight decrease in the number of armed conflicts and the consolidation of post-conflict reconstruction processes. Moreover, African regional organizations have staged an increasingly more active internal shift in matters related to peace and security, encouraged by the idea of promoting “African solutions to African problems”. This new scenario, has been accompanied by new uncertainties at the security level and major challenges at the operational level, especially for the African Union. This article aims to ascertain the state of affairs on all these issues and raise some key questions to consider.

Ethnic and religious polarization and social conflict

In this paper we examine the link between ethnic and religious polarization and conflict using interpersonal distances for ethnic and religious attitudes obtained from the World Values Survey. We use the Duclos et al (2004) polarization index. We measure conflict by means on an index of social unrest, as well as by the standard conflict onset or incidence based on a threshold number of deaths. Our results show that taking distances into account significantly improves the quality of the fit. Our measure of polarization outperforms the measure used by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) and the fractionalization index. We also obtain that both ethnic and religious polarization are significant in explaining conflict. The results improve when we use an indicator of social unrest as the dependent variable.

An Instrumental analysis of the European Union´s capability to act in conflict response

Since its origins, the European Union has striven to be an actor on the International scene and a place in conflict Management. Yet the EU’s lack of activity cannot be justified by a mere lack of capacities. The EU counts with numerous political, economic, and, since 2003, civil and military instruments that should allow it to precede a comprehensive conflict response. This publication consists of a description of these instruments and an analysis of the final use that the Union makes of them in the different stages of a conflict. Examples will show us the EU’s main weakness in providing a comprehensive and timely response when a conflict breaks out.

Autonomía comunitaria y caciquismo: identidad étnica, control social y violencia en una comunidad mixe de Oaxaca

La etnografía de la comunidad mixe de Salto de la Tuxpana y del grave conflicto que se produjo entre 2005 y 2007 es el punto de partida del presente artículo. La investigación realizada arrojó como resultado más destacado el descubrimiento de un violento cacicazgo, legitimado ideológicamente en la autonomía comunitaria, la identidad étnica y el reclamo de una jurisdicción propia, y asentado firmemente sobre tres mecanismos de control social: protección a través de la Policía Comunitaria Armada, acceso a la tierra y acceso a los programas de «desarrollo». El caciquismo se define como el régimen político personalista, basado en estructuras clientelares, que monopoliza y controla recursos y votos. También se propone la hipótesis de que la mayor parte de la violencia desplegada por los caciques es el resultado del proceso de reproducción social del mismo sistema político, cuando se genera una faccionalización simétrica de la comunidad, después de un periodo de estabilidad complementaria.

Companies in Conflict Situations: Advancing the Research Agenda. Seminar proceedings. Barcelona, october 2011

Seminar proceedings about the Seminar “Companies in Confict Situations”, organized by ICIP, with the aim of reflecting on the causes, the dynamics and the consequences of the participation of companies in armed conflicts. Over thirty international experts will be participating in the conferences to analyze the role and responsibilities of companies in connection with the international arms market (especially regarding small arms, light weapons and conventional weapons), the provision of military and security services, and the exploitation of, and trade in, natural resources.

Influencia social y uso del preservativo en la prevención de la transmisión heterosexual del VIH = Social influence and condom use for VIH heterosexual transmission prevention

Se revisan diferentes formas en que la influencia social puede incidir sobre los comportamientosheterosexuales de prevención de la transmisión del VIH de los jóvenes y se presentanlos resultados de algunos trabajos de las autoras, así como de otros investigadores, en que seanalizan dichas relaciones. Se concluye resaltando: 1) la utilidad clínica de la evaluación de lasexpectativas de autoeficacia para poder intervenir específicamente en aquellas áreas en que losjóvenes se perciban con menores capacidades para ser preventivos, 2) la relación observadaentre el uso de preservativo autoinformado y la creencia en su aceptación por parte de los referentessociales más cercanos y 3) la conveniencia de que los jóvenes posean suficientes habilidadesde comunicación que les permitan negociar con éxito el uso del preservativo y les ayudena compensar posibles influencias sociales en contra de su empleo

Ethnic Polarization, Potential Conflict, and Civil Wars

This paper analyzes the relationship between ethnic fractionalization, polarization, and conflict. In recent years many authors have found empirical evidence that ethnic fractionalization has a negative effect on growth. One mechanism that can explain this nexus is the effect of ethnic heterogeneity on rent-seeking activities and the increase in potential conflict, which is negative for investment. However the empirical evidence supporting the effect of ethnic fractionalization on the incidence of civil conflicts is very weak. Although ethnic fractionalization may be important for growth, we argue that the channel is not through an increase in potential ethnic conflict. We discuss the appropriateness of indices of polarization to capture conflictive dimensions. We develop a new measure of ethnic heterogeneity that satisfies the basic properties associated with the concept of polarization. The empirical section shows that this index of ethnic polarization is a significant variable in the explanation of the incidence of civil wars. This result is robust to the presence of other indicators of ethnic heterogeneity, other sources of data for the construction of the index, and other data structures.

Transitory Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict

I examine whether civil conflict is triggered by transitory negative economic shocks. My approach follows Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti (2004) in using rainfall as an exogenous source of economic shocks in Sub-Saharan African countries. The main difference is that my empirical specifications take into account that rainfall shocks are transitory. Failure to do so may, for example, lead to the conclusion that civil conflict is more likely to break out following negative rainfall shocks when conflict is most probable following years with exceptionally high rainfall levels.

Civil conflict and human capital accumulation: The long-term effects of political violence in Perú

This paper provides empirical evidence of the persistent effect of exposure to political violence on humancapital accumulation. I exploit the variation in conflict location and birth cohorts to identify the longandshort-term effects of the civil war on educational attainment. Conditional on being exposed toviolence, the average person accumulates 0.31 less years of education as an adult. In the short-term,the effects are stronger than in the long-run; these results hold when comparing children within thesame household. Further, exposure to violence during early childhood leads to permanent losses. I alsoexplore the potential causal mechanisms.

Estimating the effect of transitory economic shocks on civil conflict

This note tries to clarify some remaining issues in the debate on the effect of income shocks oncivil conflict. Section 1 discusses the discrepant findings on the effect of rainfall shocks oncivil conflict in Miguel and Satyanath (2010, 2011) and Ciccone (2011). Section 2 develops aninstrumental variables approach to estimate the effect of transitory (rainfall-driven) incomeshocks on civil conflict and contrasts the conclusions with those of Miguel, Satyanath, andSergenti (2004) and Miguel and Satyanath (2010, 2011). Throughout, the note uses the data ofMiguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti to focus on the methodological issues at the core of the debate(for results using the latest data see Ciccone, 2011).

State capacity and military conflict

In 1500, Europe was composed of hundreds of statelets and principalities, with weak central authority,no monopoly over the legitimate use of violence, and overlapping jurisdictions. By 1800, only ahandful of powerful, centralized nation states remained. We build a model that explains both the emergenceof capable states and growing divergence between European powers. We argue that the impactof war was crucial for state building, and depended on: i) the financial cost of war, and ii) a country sinitial level of domestic political fragmentation. We emphasize the role of the "Military Revolution",which raised the cost of war. Initially, this caused more cohesive states to invest in state capacity, whilemore divided states rationally dropped out of the competition, causing divergence between Europeanstates. As the cost of war escalated further, all states engaged in a "race to the top" towards greater statebuilding.

Why ethnic fractionalization? Polarization, ethnic conflict and growth

This paper ia an attempt to clarify the relationship between fractionalization,polarization and conflict. The literature on the measurement of ethnic diversityhas taken as given that the proper measure for heterogeneity can be calculatedby using the fractionalization index. This index is widely used in industrialeconomics and, for empirical purposes, the ethnolinguistic fragmentation isready available for regression exercises. Nevertheless the adequacy of asynthetic index of hetergeneity depends on the intrinsic characteristicsof the heterogeneous dimension to be measured. In the case of ethnicdiversity there is a very strong conflictive dimension. For this reasonwe argue that the measure of heterogeneity should be one of the class ofpolarization measures. In fact the intuition of the relationship betweenconflict and fractionalization do not hold for more than two groups. Incontrast with the usual problem of polarization indices, which are ofdifficult empirical implementation without making some arbitrary choiceof parameters, we show that the RQ index, proposed by Reynal-Querol (2002),is the only discrete polarization measure that satisfies the basic propertiesof polarization. Additionally we present a derivation of the RQ index froma simple rent seeking model. In the empirical section we show that whileethnic polarization has a positive effect on civil wars and, indirectly ongrowth, this effect is not present when we use ethnic fractionalization.

A theory of international conflict management and sanctioning

In this paper we analyze sanctioning policies in international law. We develop a model of international military conflict where the conflicting countries can be a target of international sanctions. These sanctions constitute an equilibrium outcome of an international political market for sanctions, where different countries trade political influence. We show that the level of sanctions in equilibrium is strictly positive but limited, in the sense that higher sanctions would exacerbate the military conflict, not reduce it. We then propose an alternative interpretation to the perceived lack of effectiveness of international sanctions, by showing that the problem might not be one of undersanctioning but of oversanctioning.