La construcció del coneixement pràctic. Una anàlisi integrada des dels plans social i individual

La tesi doctoral aborda la relació entre coneixement i pràctica en l’àmbit de la pràctica professional dels mestres. Aquest problema s’aborda des de la psicologia històrico-cultural, la qual implica un trencament amb la “racionalitat tècnica” des de la que s’ha abordat el problema tradicionalment. Aquest nou abordatge de la problemàtica implica una considerable elaboració teòrica, que en la tesi es vehicula mitjançant dos constructes fonamentals: la situació i els conceptes pràctics. Les dades de la tesi consisteixen en les converses face-to-face i on-line entre un estudiant de Mestre en pràcticum i el seu tutor en el centre de pràctiques. L’estudi analitza dos casos d’uns quatre mesos de duració cadascun. L’anàlisi es porta a terme mitjançant anàlisi de discurs, utilitzant diverses unitats d’anàlisi i diverses dimensions, les quals fan possible una anàlisi integrada que permeti considerar de manera relacionada l’activitat conjunta (pla social) i l’ús individual de conceptes (pla individual). Els resultats preliminars suggereixen una especificitat estructural i genètica dels conceptes pràctics (en contrast amb els espontanis i científics), i l’existència de mecanismes d’activitat conjunta que potencien especialment el desenvolupament d’aquests conceptes.

Contextual effects on political behavior

In her post-doctoral research stay, Aina Gallego has conducted several research projects with the overarching theme of identifying the effects of contexts on political behavior. She has examined the effects of institutions, the economic situation, or local contexts on outcomes such as voter turnout, vote choice, and positions on salient issues. As detailed below, this work has been published in several journal articles in leading Political Science journals such as Comparative Political Studies, Political Behavior, and Electoral Studies (see attached documents). She has a forthcoming book with Cambridge University Press, the most prestigious book press in Political Science.She has also published book chapters and has several working papers. In addition to conducting her research, Aina has received extensive training in both substantive areas and research methods. She has participated fully in the Department’s academic life by attending seminars and engaging in research projects with other members of the Department.

A One-Shot Prisoners Dilemma with Procedural Utility

This article introduces a model of rationality that combines procedural utility over actions with consequential utility over payoffs. It applies the model to the Prisoners Dilemma and shows that empirically observed cooperative behaviors can be rationally explained by a procedural utility for cooperation. The model characterizes the situations in which cooperation emerges as a Nash equilibrium. When rational individuals are not solely concerned by the consequences of their behavior but also care for the process by which these consequences are obtained, there is no one single rational solution to a Prisoners Dilemma. Rational behavior depends on the payoffs at stake and on the procedural utility of individuals. In this manner, this model of procedural utility reflects how ethical considerations, social norms or emotions can transform a game of consequences.

Behavioral Assumptions and Management Ability: A Tentative Test

The paper explores the consequences that relying on different behavioral assumptions in training managers may have on their future performance. We argue that training with an emphasis on the standard assumptions used in economics (rationality and self-interest) leads future managers to rely excessively on rational and explicit safeguarding, crowding out instinctive contractual heuristics and signaling a 'bad' type to potential partners. In contrast, human assumptions used in management theories, because of their diverse, implicit and even contradictory nature, do not conflict with the innate set of cooperative tools and may provide a good training ground for such tools. We present tentative confirmatory evidence by examining how the weight given to behavioral assumptions in the core courses of the top 100 business schools influences the average salaries of their MBA graduates. Controlling for the average quality of their students and some other schools' characteristics, average salaries are significantly greater for those schools whose core MBA courses contain a higher proportion of management courses as opposed to courses based on economics or technical disciplines.

Additive utility with intransitive indifference and without independence: A homogeneous case

In the homogeneous case of one type of goods or objects, we prove theexistence of an additive utility function without assuming transitivityof indifference and independence. The representation reveals a positivefactor smaller than 1 that infuences rational choice beyond the utilityfunction and explains departures from these standard axioms of utilitytheory (factor equals to 1).

Associationism and electoral participation: A multilevel study of 2000 Spanish general election

This work presents an application of the multilevel analysis techniques tothe study of the abstention in the 2000 Spanish general election. Theinterest of the study is both, substantive and methodological. From thesubstantive point of view the article intends to explain the causes ofabstention and analyze the impact of associationism on it. From themethodological point of view it is intended to analyze the interaction betweenindividual and context with a modelisation that takes into account thehierarchical structure of data. The multilevel study of this paper validatesthe one level results obtained in previous analysis of the abstention andshows that only a fraction of the differences in abstention are explained bythe individual characteristics of the electors. Another important fraction ofthese differences is due to the political and social characteristics of thecontext. Relating to associationism, the data suggest that individualparticipation in associations decrease the probability of abstention. However,better indicators are needed in order to catch more properly the effect ofassociationism in electoral behaviour.

Quotient spaces of boundedly rational types

By identifying types whose low-order beliefs up to level li about the state of nature coincide, weobtain quotient type spaces that are typically smaller than the original ones, preserve basic topologicalproperties, and allow standard equilibrium analysis even under bounded reasoning. Our Bayesian Nash(li; l-i)-equilibria capture players inability to distinguish types belonging to the same equivalence class.The case with uncertainty about the vector of levels (li; l-i) is also analyzed. Two examples illustratethe constructions.

Choice by sequential procedures

We propose a rule of decision-making, the sequential procedure guided byroutes, and show that three influential boundedly rational choice models can be equivalentlyunderstood as special cases of this rule. In addition, the sequential procedure guidedby routes is instrumental in showing that the three models are intimately related. We showthat choice with a status-quo bias is a refinement of rationalizability by game trees, which, inturn, is also a refinement of sequential rationalizability. Thus, we provide a sharp taxonomyof these choice models, and show that they all can be understood as choice by sequentialprocedures.

Are self-regarding subjects more rational?

Through an experiment, we investigate how the level of rationality relatesto concerns for equality and efficiency. Subjects perform dictator games anda guessing game. More rational subjects are not more frequently of the selfregardingtype. When performing a comparison within the same degree of rationality,self-regarding subjects show more strategic sophistication than othersubjects.

Consistent solutions in exchange economies: A characterization of the price mechanism

We characterize the Walrasian allocations correspondence by means offour axioms: consistency, replica invariance, individual rationality andPareto optimality. It is shown that for any given class of exchange economiesany solution that satisfies the axioms is a selection from the Walrasianallocations with slack. Preferences are assumed to be smooth, but may besatiated and non--convex. A class of economies is defined as all economieswhose agents' preferences belong to an arbitrary family (finite or infinite)of types. The result can be modified to characterize equal budget Walrasianallocations with slack by replacing individual rationality with individualrationality from equal division. The results are valid also for classes ofeconomies in which core--Walras equivalence does not hold.

Is the person trade-off a valid method for allocating health care resources? Some caveats

The Person Trade-Off (PTO) is a methodology aimed at measuring thesocial value of health states. The rest of methodologies would measure individualutility and would be less appropriate for taking resource allocation decisions.However few studies have been conducted to test the validity of the method.We present a pilot study with this objective. The study is based on theresult of interviews to 30 undergraduate students in Economics. We judgethe validity of PTO answers by their adequacy to three hypothesis of rationality.First, we show that, given certain rationality assumptions, PTO answersshould be predicted from answers to Standard Gamble questions. This firsthypothesis is not verified. The second hypothesis is that PTO answersshould not vary with different frames of equivalent PTO questions. Thissecond hypothesis is also not verified. Our third hypothesis is that PTOvalues should predict social preferences for allocating resources betweenpatients. This hypothesis is verified. The evidence on the validity of themethod is then conflicting.

Simple models for multi-attribute choice with many alternatives: When it does and does not pay to face tradeoffs with binary attributes

Working Paper no longer available. Please contact the author.

The effect of intergroup competition on group coordination: An experimental study

We report an experiment on the effect of intergroup competition on group coordination in the minimal-effort game (Van Huyck et al., 1990). The competition was between two 7-person groups. Each player in each group independently chose an integer from 1 to 7. The group with the higher minimum won the competition and each of its members was paid according to the game s original payoff matrix. Members of the losing group were paid nothing. In case of a tie, each player was paid half the payoff in the original matrix. This treatment was contrasted with two control treatments where each of the two groups played an independent coordination game, either with or without information about the minimum chosen by the outgroup. Although the intergroup competition does not change the set of strict equilibria, we found that it improved collective rationality by moving group members in the direction of higher-payoff equilibria. Merely providing group members with information about the minimal-effort level in the other group was not sufficient to generate this effect.

One, two, (three), infinity: Newspaper and lab beauty-contest experiments

"Beauty-contest" is a game in which participants have to choose, typically, a number in [0,100], the winner being the person whose number is closest to a proportion of the average of all chosen numbers. We describe and analyze Beauty-contest experiments run in newspapers in UK, Spain, and Germany and find stable patterns of behavior across them, despite the uncontrollability of these experiments. These results are then compared with lab experiments involving undergraduates and game theorists as subjects, in what must be one of the largest empirical corroborations of interactive behavior ever tried. We claim that all observed behavior, across a wide variety of treatments and subject pools, can be interpretedas iterative reasoning. Level-1 reasoning, Level-2 reasoning and Level-3 reasoning are commonly observed in all the samples, while the equilibrium choice (Level-Maximum reasoning) is only prominently chosen by newspaper readers and theorists. The results show the empirical power of experiments run with large subject-pools, and open the door for more experimental work performed on the rich platform offered by newspapers and magazines.

Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty

This paper introduces a new solution concept, a minimax regret equilibrium, which allows for the possibility that players are uncertain about the rationality and conjectures of their opponents. We provide several applications of our concept. In particular, we consider pricesetting environments and show that optimal pricing policy follows a non-degenerate distribution. The induced price dispersion is consistent with experimental and empirical observations (Baye and Morgan (2004)).