Uncertainty, electoral Incentives and political myopia

In this paper, we study the determinants of political myopia in a rational model of electoral accountability where the key elements are informational frictions and uncertainty. We build a framework where political ability is ex-ante unknown and policy choices are not perfectly observable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politicians invest too little in costly policies with future returns in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reelection probability. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, uncertainty reduces political myopia and may, under some conditions, increase social welfare. We use the model to study how political rewards can be set so as to maximise social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limit to governments. The predictions of our theory are consistent with a number of stylised facts and with a new empirical observation documented in this paper: aggregate uncertainty, measured by economic volatility, is associated to better ...scal discipline in a panel of 20 OECD countries.

Airport Congestion and Airline Network Structure

This paper provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of the relationship between airport congestion and airline network structure. We find that the development of hub-and-spoke (HS) networks may have detrimental effects on social welfare in presence of airport congestion. The theoretical analysis shows that, although airline pro ts are typically higher under HS networks, congestion could create incentives for airlines to adopt fully-connected (FC) networks. However, the welfare analysis leads to the conclusion that airlines may have an inefficient bias towards HS networks. In line with the theoretical analysis, our empirical results show that network airlines are weakly infl uenced by congestion in their choice of frequencies from/to their hub airports. Consistently with this result, we con firm that delays are higher in hub airports controlling for concentration and airport size. Keywords: airlines; airport congestion; fully-connected networks, hub-and-spoke net- works; network efficiency JEL Classifi cation Numbers: L13; L2; L93

The role of role uncertainty in modified dictator games

We compare behavior in modified dictator games with and without role uncertainty. Subjectschoose between a selfish action, a costly surplus creating action (altruistic behavior) and acostly surplus destroying action (spiteful behavior). While costly surplus creating actions are themost frequent under role uncertainty (64%), selfish actions become the most frequent withoutrole uncertainty (69%). Also, the frequency of surplus destroying choices is negligible with roleuncertainty (1%) but not so without it (11%). A classification of subjects into four differenttypes of interdependent preferences (Selfish, Social Welfare maximizing, Inequity Averse andCompetitive) shows that the use of role uncertainty overestimates the prevalence of SocialWelfare maximizing preferences in the subject population (from 74% with role uncertainty to21% without it) and underestimates Selfish and Inequity Averse preferences. An additionaltreatment, in which subjects undertake an understanding test before participating in theexperiment with role uncertainty, shows that the vast majority of subjects (93%) correctlyunderstand the payoff mechanism with role uncertainty, but yet surplus creating actions weremost frequent. Our results warn against the use of role uncertainty in experiments that aim tomeasure the prevalence of interdependent preferences.

The political cost of reforms

This paper formalizes in a fully-rational model the popular idea that politiciansperceive an electoral cost in adopting costly reforms with future benefits and reconciles it with the evidence that reformist governments are not punished by voters.To do so, it proposes a model of elections where political ability is ex-ante unknownand investment in reforms is unobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politiciansmake too little reforms in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reappointment probability. Although in a rational expectation equilibrium voters cannotbe fooled and hence reelection does not depend on reforms, the strategy of underinvesting in reforms is nonetheless sustained by out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Contrary tothe conventional wisdom, uncertainty makes reforms more politically viable and may,under some conditions, increase social welfare. The model is then used to study howpolitical rewards can be set so as to maximize social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limit to governments. The predictions of this theory are consistentwith a number of empirical regularities on the determinants of reforms and reelection.They are also consistent with a new stylized fact documented in this paper: economicuncertainty is associated to more reforms in a panel of 20 OECD countries.

Bundling electronic journals and competition among publishers

Site licensing of e-journals has been revolutionizing the way academicinformation is distributed. However, many librarians are concerned aboutthe possibility that publishers might abuse site licensing by practicingbundling. In this paper, we analyze the private and social incentives forthe publishers to use bundling in the context of STM electronic journalmarket. In the short run in which the number of journals is exogenouslygiven, we find a strong conflict between the two incentives: each publisherfinds bundling optimal and bundling increases the industry profit butreduces social welfare. However, in the long run we find that publishersmight have higher incentives to introduce new journals under bundlingthan without bundling and, in this case, bundling can reduce the industryprofit while increasing social welfare. Finally, we examine publishers incentive to provide links to the websites of the rival publishers underbundling and show that even asymmetric publishers have incentive tointerconnect.

The adverse effects of environmental policy in green markets

We model green markets in which purchasers, either firms orconsumers, have higher willingness-to-pay for lesspolluting goods. The effectiveness of pollution reductionpolicies is examined in a duopoly setting. We show thatduopolists' strategic behaviour may increase pollutionlevels. Maximum emission standards, commonly used in greenmarkets, improve the environmental features of products.Nonetheless, overall pollution levels will rise becausegovernment regulation also affects market shares and bootsfirms' sales. Consequently, social welfare may be reduced.We also explore the effects of technological subsidies andproduct charges, including differentiation of charges.

The impact of Economics on health policy and management in Spain

BackgroundDespite the intrinsic value of scientific disciplines, such as Economics, it is appropriate to gauge the impact of its applications on social welfare, or at least Health Economics (HE) case- its influence on health policy and management.MethodsThe three relevant features of knowledge (production, diffusion and application) are analyzed, more from an emic perspective the one used in Anthropology relying on the experience of the members of a culture- than from an etic approach seated on material descriptions and dubious statistics.ResultsThe soundness of the principles and results of HE depends on its disciplinary foundations,whereas its relevance than does not imply translation into practice- is more linked with the problems studied. Important contributions from Economics to the health sphere are recorded.HE in Spain ranks seventh in the world despite the relatively minor HE contents of its clinical and health services research journals.HE has in Spain more presence than influence, having failed to impregnate sufficiently thedaily events.ConclusionsHE knowledge required by a politician, a health manager or a clinician is rather limited; the main impact of HE could be to develop their intuition and awareness.

The pricing of academic journals: A two-sided market perspective

More and more academic journals adopt an open-access policy, by which articlesare accessible free of charge, while publication costs are recovered through authorfees. We study the consequences of this open access policy on a journal s qualitystandard. If the journal s objective was to maximize social welfare, open accesswould be optimal as long as the positive externalities generated by its diffusionexceed the marginal cost of distribution. However, we show that if an open accessjournal has a different objective (such as maximizing readers payoffs, the impactof the journal or its profit), it tends to choose a quality standard below the sociallyefficient level.

Will EMU increase eurosclerosis?

In this paper we study the relationship between labor market institutions and monetary policy. We use a simple macroeconomic framework to show how optimal monetary policy rules depend on labor institutions (labor adjustment costs, and nominal and real wage rigitidy) and social preferences regarding inflation, employment, and real wages. We also calibrate our model tocompute how the change in social welfare brought about by giving up monetary policy as a result of joining the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) depends on institutions and preferences. We then use the calibrated model to analyze how EMU affects the incentives for labor market reform, both for reformsthat increase the economy's adjustment potential and for those that affect the long-run unemployment rate.

Uncertainty, electoral incentives and political myopia

We study the determinants of political myopia in a rational model of electoral accountability where the key elements are informational frictions and uncertainty. We build aframework where political ability is ex-ante unknown and policy choices are not perfectlyobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politicians invest too little in costly policies withfuture returns in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reelection probability.Contrary to the conventional wisdom, uncertainty reduces political myopia and may, undersome conditions, increase social welfare. We use the model to study how political rewardscan be set so as to maximise social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limitto governments. The predictions of our theory are consistent with a number of stylised factsand with a new empirical observation documented in this paper: aggregate uncertainty, measured by economic volatility, is associated to better fiscal discipline in a panel of 20 OECDcountries.

Els Itineraris educatius dels joves extutelats a Europa

Dins del 7è Programa marc de la Unió Europea, s'ha endegat un estudi, que va del 2008 al 2010 a cinc països –Regne Unit, Dinamarca, Hongria, Suècia i Espanya (centrat a Catalunya)– que té per objectiu explorar els factors que afavoreixen i ajuden els joves tutelats i extutelats a continuar els seus estudis després de l'escolaritat obligatòria. Cada equip de recerca esta duent a terme un estudi de casos que consisteixen a fer, d'una banda, entrevistes amb responsables de serveis socials i de protecció a la infància, i, d'altra banda, entrevistes en profunditat amb joves d'entre 19 i 21 anys que han estat tutelats almenys un any de la seva vida i que ho estaven a l'edat de 16 anys, i, finalment, entrevistes amb educadors, acollidors o persones que han estat claus a les seves vides. Els joves seleccionats seran entrevistats de nou un any més tard per veure en quina mesura s'han pogut fer els seus plans. L'objectiu del present article és doble: d'una banda, aportar algunes de les dades que s'han obtingut de la primera fase ja conclosa sobre revisió dels estudis existents en aquest àmbit i, de l'altra, obrir un debat, poc present encara al nostre país, que pot culminar el proper març del 2010 amb motiu d'unes jornades a Catalunya on es podran presentar, compartir i debatre els primers resultats de la investigació

Caracterización de las almazaras cooperativas catalanas, análisis interno de la fase industrial o de transformación

En el presente artículo hemos tratado de analizar las características de las almazaras cooperativas catalanas con la finalidad de destacar no solamente sus elementos más importantes de gestión sino también sus principales debilidades.Las cooperativas se consideran instrumentos útiles para acometer políticas de desarrollo económico y bienestar social. A pesar de ello hay un gran debate abierto acerca de la eficiencia de estas organizaciones, que plantean el interrogante de si están en condiciones de competir con éxito en una economía cada vez más abierta, liberalizada y global. A través de las encuestas que hemos realizado al conjunto de las cooperativas oleícolas de Catalunya, hemos podido averiguar sus características distintivas, así como las principales desventajas y problemas a los que se enfrentan. Creemos puede ser de interés analizar las características de estas organizaciones, que tanto desde el punto de vista organizativo como de recursos humanos, como financiero, las hace diferentes de otro tipo de organizaciones pero que sin embargo, han de hacer frente a un mercado cada día más exigente y competitivo.

Prevalencia de la discapacidad en España por comunidades autónomas: el papel de los factores individuales y del entorno geográfico en su variabilidad

Fundamento: La prevalencia de discapacidad en la población general presenta una gran variabilidad geográfica, de manera que identificar aquellos factores que pudieran explicarla será importante para la planificación de políticas sociales. En este trabajo se analiza la variabilidad de la discapacidad por comunidades autónomas desde una doble vertiente, los factores individuales y del entorno. Métodos: Los datos proceden principalmente de la Encuesta de Discapacidad, Deficiencias y Estado de Salud de 1999 y del Inebase, ambas del Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE). Se calculó la prevalencia de discapacidad simple y ajustada por edad de las CCAA. Se analizan los factores individuales asociados a la discapacidad mediante una regresión logística y los factores individuales y de la comunidad autónoma conjuntamente con una regresión logística de dos niveles. Resultados: La prevalencia de discapacidad muestra una diferencia máxima de 5,75 puntos entre las comunidades autónomas. En la regresión logística la comunidad de residencia fue estadísticamente significativa (OR: 3,35 en la de mayor prevalencia respecto a la de menor) junto con otras variables individuales: edad (OR de 40-64= 1,78 OR de 65-79= 1,87 y OR de >79= 3,34), sexo (OR mujer= 0,66), situación laboral (OR sin trabajo=2,25 OR amas casa/estudiante=1,39 y OR otros=2,03), estado de salud (OR regular= 1,69 OR malo/muy malo= 2,05) y enfermedades crónicas (OR 1-3=1,56 OR4-6=1,82 OR>6=2,59). En la regresión de dos niveles las variables individuales explican poca varianza (s=0,261) y ninguna de las variables relativas a las CCAA mejora el modelo. Conclusiones: Las características individuales no explican suficientemente la variabilidad de la discapacidad entre CCAA y no se han identificado variables del entorno que sean significativas.

Privatization and Regulation of Toll Motorways in Europe

The private sector plays an increasing and relevant role in highway funding and management. For that reason, the regulation designed and enforced by public authorities becomes even more important for the social welfare results generated by this process. In this study, we analyze the current trends in highway funding and management paying special attention on the recent process of privatization and its motivations. Since public ownership and regulation are substitutes for government intervention, we check the hypothesis that highways privatization induces more strict regulation. Indeed, we observe that as the private sector increases its size, toll regulation becomes more detailed.