Competition and cost overruns. Optimal misspecification of procurement contracts

Most cases of cost overruns in public procurement are related to important changes in the initial project design. This paper deals with the problem of design specification in public procurement and provides a rationale for design misspecification. We propose a model in which the sponsor decides how much to invest in design specification and awards competitively the project to a contractor. After the project has been awarded the sponsor engages in bilateral renegotiation with the contractor, in order to accommodate changes in the initial project s design that new information makes desirable. When procurement takes place in the presence of horizontally differentiated contractors, the design s specification level is seen to affect the resulting degree of competition. The paper highlights this interaction between market competition and design specification and shows that the sponsor s optimal strategy, when facing an imperfectly competitive market supply, is to underinvest in design specification so as to make significant cost overruns likely. Since no such misspecification occurs in a perfectly competitive market, cost overruns are seen to arise as a consequence of lack of competition in the procurement market.

Contractual allocation of decision rights and incentives: The case of automobile distribution

We analyze empirically the allocation of rights and monetary incentives in automobile franchise contracts. These contracts substantially restrict the decision rights of dealers and grant manufacturers extensive contractual completion and enforcement powers, converting the manufacturers, de facto, in a sort of quasi-judiciary instance. Variation in the allocation of decision rights andincentive intensity is explained by the incidence of moral hazard in the relation. In particular, when the cost of dealer moral hazard is higher and the risk of manufactureropportunism is lower, manufacturers enjoy more discretion in determining the performance required from their dealers and in using mechanisms such as monitoring, termination and monetary incentives to ensure such performance is provided. We also explore the existence of interdependencies between the different elements of the system. and find some complementarities between completion and termination rights, and between monitoring rights and the intensity of incentives.

Competition and cost overruns in procurement

Most cases of cost overruns in public procurement are related to important changes in theinitial project design. This paper deals with the problem of design speciffication in public procurement and provides a rationale for design misspeciffication. We propose a model in which the sponsor decides how much to invest in design speciffication and awards competitively the project to a contractor. After the project has been awarded the sponsor engages in bilateral renegotiation with the contractor, in order to accommodate changes in the initial project's design that new information makes desirable. When procurement takes place in the presence of horizontally differentiated contractors, the design's speciffication level is seen to affect the resulting degree of competition. The paper highlights this interaction between market competition and design speciffication and shows that the sponsor's optimal strategy, when facing an imperfectly competitive market supply, is to underinvest in design speciffication so as to make signifficant cost overrunslikely. Since no such misspeciffication occurs in a perfectly competitive market, cost overruns are seen to arise as a consequence of lack of competition in the procurement market.

Wild bids. Gambling for resurrection in procurement contracts

This paper analyzes the problem of abnormally low tenders in theprocurement process. Limited liability causes firms in a bad financialsituation to bid more aggressively than good firms in the procurementauction. Therefore, it is more likely that the winning firm is a firm infinancial difficulties with a high risk of bankruptcy. The paper analyzesthe different regulatory practices to face this problem with a specialemphasis on surety bonds used e.g. in the US. We characterize the optimalsurety bond and show that it does not coincide with the current USregulation. In particular we show that under a natural assumption the USregulation is too expensive and provides overinsurance to the problem ofabnormally low tenders.

The impact of gender composition on team performance and decision-making: Evidence from the field

We investigate whether the gender composition of teams affect theireconomic performance. We study a large business game, played in groups ofthree, where each group takes the role of a general manager. There are twoparallel competitions, one involving undergraduates and the other involvingMBAs. Our analysis shows that teams formed by three women aresignificantly outperformed by any other gender combination, both at theundergraduate and MBA levels. Looking across the performancedistribution, we find that for undergraduates, three women teams areoutperformed throughout, but by as much as 10pp at the bottom and by only1pp at the top. For MBAs, at the top, the best performing group is two menand one woman. The differences in performance are explained bydifferences in decision-making. We observe that three women teams are lessaggressive in their pricing strategies, invest less in R&D, and invest more insocial sustainability initiatives, than any other gender combination teams.Finally, we find support for the hypothesis that it is poor work dynamicsamong the three women teams that drives the results.

Social value orientation as a moral intuition: Decision-making in the dictator game

We studied the decision making process in the Dictator Game and showed that decisions are the result of a two-step process. In a first step, decision makers generate an automatic, intuitive proposal. Given sufficient motivation and cognitive resources, they adjust this in a second, more deliberated phase. In line with the social intuitionist model, we show that one s Social Value Orientation determines intuitive choice tendencies in the first step, and that this effect is mediated by the dictator s perceived interpersonal closeness with the receiver. Self-interested concerns subsequently leadto a reduction of donation size in step 2. Finally, we show that increasing interpersonal closeness can promote pro-social decision-making.

Corruption and competition in procurement

We consider a procurement problem in which the procurement agent is supposed to allocate the realization of a project according to a competitive mechanism that values bids in terms of the proposed price and quality. Potential bidders have private information about their production costs. Since the procurement agent is also in charge of verifying delivered quality, in exchange for a bribe, he can allow an arbitrary firm to be awarded the realization of the project and to produce a quality level lower than the announced. We compute the equilibrium level of corruption and we study the impact on corruption of the competitiveness of the environment, and in particular of: i) an increase in the number of potential suppliers of the good or service to be procured, ii) competitive (rather than collusive) behavior of procurement agents, and iii) an increase of competition in the market for procurement agents. We identify the effects that influence the equilibrium level of corruption and show that, contrary to conventional wisdom, corruption may well be increasing in competition.

Decision making in uncertain and changing environments

We consider an agent who has to repeatedly make choices in an uncertainand changing environment, who has full information of the past, who discountsfuture payoffs, but who has no prior. We provide a learning algorithm thatperforms almost as well as the best of a given finite number of experts orbenchmark strategies and does so at any point in time, provided the agentis sufficiently patient. The key is to find the appropriate degree of forgettingdistant past. Standard learning algorithms that treat recent and distant pastequally do not have the sequential epsilon optimality property.

Heterogeneity-promoting optimal procurement

When procurement takes place in the presence of horizontally differentiated contractors, the design of the object being procured affects the resulting degree of competition. This paper highlights the interaction between theoptimal procurement mechanism and the design choice. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the sponsor's design choice, instead of homogenizingthe market to generate competition, promotes heterogeneity.

Induced aggregation operators in decision making with the Dempster-Shafer belief structure

We study the induced aggregation operators. The analysis begins with a revision of some basic concepts such as the induced ordered weighted averaging (IOWA) operator and the induced ordered weighted geometric (IOWG) operator. We then analyze the problem of decision making with Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence. We suggest the use of induced aggregation operators in decision making with Dempster-Shafer theory. We focus on the aggregation step and examine some of its main properties, including the distinction between descending and ascending orders and different families of induced operators. Finally, we present an illustrative example in which the results obtained using different types of aggregation operators can be seen.

The induced 2-tuple linguistic generalized OWA operator and its application in linguistic decision making

[spa] Se presenta el operador de media ponderada ordenada generalizada lingüística de 2 tuplas inducida (2-TILGOWA). Es un nuevo operador de agregación que extiende los anteriores modelos a través de utilizar medias generalizadas, variables de ordenación inducidas e información lingüística representada mediante el modelo de las 2 tuplas lingüísticas. Su principal ventaja se encuentra en la posibilidad de incluir a un gran número de operadores de agregación lingüísticos como casos particulares. Por eso, el análisis puede ser visto desde diferentes perspectivas de forma que se obtiene una visión más completa del problema considerado y seleccionar la alternativa que parece estar en mayor concordancia con nuestros intereses o creencias. A continuación se desarrolla una generalización mayor a través de utilizar medias cuasi-aritméticas, obteniéndose el operador Quasi-2-TILOWA. El trabajo finaliza analizando la aplicabilidad del nuevo modelo en un problema de toma de decisiones sobre gestión de la producción.

The generalized index of maximum and minimum level and its application in decision making

[spa] El índice del máximo y el mínimo nivel es una técnica muy útil, especialmente para toma de decisiones, que usa la distancia de Hamming y el coeficiente de adecuación en el mismo problema. En este trabajo, se propone una generalización a través de utilizar medias generalizadas y cuasi aritméticas. A estos operadores de agregación, se les denominará el índice del máximo y el mínimo nivel medio ponderado ordenado generalizado (GOWAIMAM) y cuasi aritmético (Quasi-OWAIMAM). Estos nuevos operadores generalizan una amplia gama de casos particulares como el índice del máximo y el mínimo nivel generalizado (GIMAM), el OWAIMAM, y otros. También se desarrolla una aplicación en la toma de decisiones sobre selección de productos.

Induced aggregation operators in decision making with the Dempster-Shafer belief structure

We study the induced aggregation operators. The analysis begins with a revision of some basic concepts such as the induced ordered weighted averaging (IOWA) operator and the induced ordered weighted geometric (IOWG) operator. We then analyze the problem of decision making with Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence. We suggest the use of induced aggregation operators in decision making with Dempster-Shafer theory. We focus on the aggregation step and examine some of its main properties, including the distinction between descending and ascending orders and different families of induced operators. Finally, we present an illustrative example in which the results obtained using different types of aggregation operators can be seen.

The induced 2-tuple linguistic generalized OWA operator and its application in linguistic decision making

[spa] Se presenta el operador de media ponderada ordenada generalizada lingüística de 2 tuplas inducida (2-TILGOWA). Es un nuevo operador de agregación que extiende los anteriores modelos a través de utilizar medias generalizadas, variables de ordenación inducidas e información lingüística representada mediante el modelo de las 2 tuplas lingüísticas. Su principal ventaja se encuentra en la posibilidad de incluir a un gran número de operadores de agregación lingüísticos como casos particulares. Por eso, el análisis puede ser visto desde diferentes perspectivas de forma que se obtiene una visión más completa del problema considerado y seleccionar la alternativa que parece estar en mayor concordancia con nuestros intereses o creencias. A continuación se desarrolla una generalización mayor a través de utilizar medias cuasi-aritméticas, obteniéndose el operador Quasi-2-TILOWA. El trabajo finaliza analizando la aplicabilidad del nuevo modelo en un problema de toma de decisiones sobre gestión de la producción.

The generalized index of maximum and minimum level and its application in decision making

[spa] El índice del máximo y el mínimo nivel es una técnica muy útil, especialmente para toma de decisiones, que usa la distancia de Hamming y el coeficiente de adecuación en el mismo problema. En este trabajo, se propone una generalización a través de utilizar medias generalizadas y cuasi aritméticas. A estos operadores de agregación, se les denominará el índice del máximo y el mínimo nivel medio ponderado ordenado generalizado (GOWAIMAM) y cuasi aritmético (Quasi-OWAIMAM). Estos nuevos operadores generalizan una amplia gama de casos particulares como el índice del máximo y el mínimo nivel generalizado (GIMAM), el OWAIMAM, y otros. También se desarrolla una aplicación en la toma de decisiones sobre selección de productos.