94 resultados para Price index
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We characterize the divergence between informational and economic efficiency in a rational expectations competitive market with asymmetric information about the costs of production. We find that prices may contain too much or too little information with respect to incentive efficient allocations depending on whether the main role of the price is, respectively, the traditional as index of scarcity or informational. Only when REE degenerate to Cournot equilibria the market solution does not show llocative inefficiency. With multidimensional uncertainty we find that the REE price does not have in general the incentive efficient information mix: It pays to sacrifice allocative efficiency at the REE to improve productive efficiency.
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We explore which types of finiteness properties are possible for intersections of geometrically finite groups of isometries in negatively curved symmetric rank one spaces. Our main tool is a twist construction which takes as input a geometrically finite group containing a normal subgroup of infinite index with given finiteness properties and infinite Abelian quotient, and produces a pair of geometrically finite groups whose intersection is isomorphic to the normal subgroup.
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Using a newly constructed data set, we calculate quality-adjusted price indexes after estimating hedonic price regressions from 1988 to 2004 in the Spanish automobile market. The increasing competition was favoured by the removal of trade restrictions and the special plans for the renewal of the Spanish automobile fleet. We find that the increasing degree of competition during those years led to an overall drop in automobile prices by 20 percent which implied considerable consumer gains thanks to higher market efficiency. Additionally, our results indicate that loyalty relevance and discrepancies in automobile reliability declined during those years. This is captured.
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We give a series of interesting subgroups of finite index in Aut(Fn). One of them has index 42 in Aut(F3) and infinite abelianization. This implies that Aut(F3) does not have Kazhdan’s property (T) (see [3] and [6] for another proofs). We proved also that every subgroup of finite index in Aut(Fn), n &= 3, which contains the subgroup of IA-automorphisms, has a finite abelianization.
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This article provides a fresh methodological and empirical approach for assessing price level convergence and its relation to purchasing power parity (PPP) using annual price data for seventeen US cities. We suggest a new procedure that can handle a wide range of PPP concepts in the presence of multiple structural breaks using all possible pairs of real exchange rates. To deal with cross-sectional dependence, we use both cross-sectional demeaned data and a parametric bootstrap approach. In general, we find more evidence for stationarity when the parity restriction is not imposed, while imposing parity restriction provides leads toward the rejection of the panel stationar- ity. Our results can be embedded on the view of the Balassa-Samuelson approach, but where the slope of the time trend is allowed to change in the long-run. The median half-life point estimate are found to be lower than the consensus view regardless of the parity restriction.
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Abstract Despite the popularity of auction theoretical thinking, it appears that no one has presented an elementary equilibrium analysis of the first-price sealed-bid auction mechanism under complete information. This paper aims to remedy that omission. We show that the existence of pure strategy undominated Nash equilibria requires that the bidding space is not "too divisible" (that is, a continuum). In fact, when bids must form part of a finite grid there always exists a "high price equilibrium". However, there might also be "low price equilibria" and when the bidding space is very restrictive the revenue obtained in these "low price equilibria" might be very low. We discuss the properties of the equilibria and an application of auction theoretical thinking in which "low price equilibria" may be relevant. Keywords: First-price auctions, undominated Nash equilibria. JEL Classification Numbers: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D44 (Auctions).
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This paper contributes to the literature on both embodied technical progress and firm dynamics, by formulating an endogenous growth model where selection and imitation play a fundamental role in helping capital good producers to learn about the productivity of technologies embodied in new plants. By calibrating the model to some key aggregates particularly relevant for the embodied capital literature, among them the growth rate of the relative investment price, the model quantitatively replicates the main facts associated to firm dynamics, such as the entry rate and the tail index of the establishment size distribution. In line with the previous literature, it also predicts a contribution to productivity growth of embodied technical progress and selection of around 60%
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We prove a formula for the multiplicities of the index of an equivariant transversally elliptic operator on a G-manifold. The formula is a sum of integrals over blowups of the strata of the group action and also involves eta invariants of associated elliptic operators. Among the applications, we obtain an index formula for basic Dirac operators on Riemannian foliations, a problem that was open for many years.
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We examine the impact of real oil price shocks on labor market flows in the U.S. We first use smooth transition regression (STR) models to investigate to what extent oil prices can be considered as a driving force of labor market fluctuations. Then we develop and calibrate a modified version of Pissarides' (2000) model with energy costs, which we simulate in response to shocks mimicking the behavior of the actual oil price shocks. We find that (i) these shocks are an important driving force of job market flows; (ii) the job finding probability is the main transmission mechanism of such shocks; and (iii) they bring a new amplification mechanism for the volatility and should thus be seen as complementary of labor productivity shocks. Overall we conclude that shocks in oil prices cannot be neglected in explaining cyclical labor adjustments in the U.S.
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Every year, the World Economic Forum publishes the World Gender Gap Report mainly based on the results of the Global Gender Gap Index (GGGI) computed by country. This index is made out of four subindexes to capture the magnitude of the gender gap in 4 areas: educational attainment, economic participation and opportunity, political empowerment, and health and survival; its methodology was reformed in 2006. In this paper we adapt the GGGI to construct a Regional Gender Gap Index (RGGI) and we compute it by regions (Comunidades Autónomas) in Spain with 2006 data. The RGGI could be applied to other regions. Results of the RGGI show that not only are there gender gap differences between Spanish regions in Spain, but that there are at the political empowerment and economic participation and opportunity categories that those differences are strongest. Geographic distribution of the gender gap shows that the deepest gaps are, in general, located in the northern regions (Euskadi, with a high score, and Murcia and Extremadura, with low scores, being exceptions); this is mainly due to the poor participation in politics of women in those regions.
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This paper examines statins competition in the Spanish pharmaceutical market, where prices are highly regulated, and simulates a situation in which there is unrestricted price competition. A nested logit demand model is estimated with a panel of monthly data for pharmaceuticals prescribed from 1997 to 2005. The simulation indicates that the regulation of prices is similar in its effects to cooperation among producers, since the regulated prices are close to those that would be observed in a scenario of perfect collusion. Freedom to set prices and a regulatory framework with appropriate incentives would result in a general reduction in prices and may make the current veiled competition in the form of discounts to pharmacists become more visible. The decrease in prices would be partially offset by an increase in consumption but the net effect would be an overall decrease in expenditure. The counterfactual set-up would also lead to important changes in the market shares of both manufacturers and active ingredients, and a reversal of generic drugs. Therefore, pro-competitive regulation would be welfare-enhancing but would imply winners and losers.
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This paper examines competition between generic and brand-name drugs in the regulated Spanish pharmaceutical market. A nested logit demand model is specified for the three most consumed therapeutic subgroups in Spain: statins (anticholesterol), selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (antidepressants) and proton pump inhibitors (antiulcers). The model is estimated with instrumental variables from a panel of monthly prescription data from 1999 to 2005. The dataset distinguishes between three different levels of patients’ copayments within the prescriptions and the results show that the greater the level of insurance that the patient has (and therefore the lower the patient’s copayment), the lower the proportion of generic prescriptions made by physicians. It seems that the low level of copayment has delayed the penetration of generics into the Spanish market. Additionally, the estimation of the demand model suggests that the substitution rules and promotional efforts associated with the reference pricing system have increased generic market share, and that being among the first generic entrants has an additional positive effect.
Resumo:
We prove a formula for the multiplicities of the index of an equivariant transversally elliptic operator on a G-manifold. The formula is a sum of integrals over blowups of the strata of the group action and also involves eta invariants of associated elliptic operators. Among the applications, we obtain an index formula for basic Dirac operators on Riemannian foliations, a problem that was open for many years.
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In this paper we prove a formula for the analytic index of a basic Dirac-type operator on a Riemannian foliation, solving a problem that has been open for many years. We also consider more general indices given by twisting the basic Dirac operator by a representation of the orthogonal group. The formula is a sum of integrals over blowups of the strata of the foliation and also involves eta invariants of associated elliptic operators. As a special case, a Gauss-Bonnet formula for the basic Euler characteristic is obtained using two independent proofs.