When does universal peace prevail? Secession and group formation in rent seeking contests and policy conflicts

This paper analyzes secession and group formation in a general model of contest inspired by Esteban and Ray (1999). This model encompasses as special cases rent seeking contests and policy conflicts, where agents lobby over the choice of a policy in a one-dimensional policy space. We show that in both models the grand coalition is the efficient coalition structure and agents are always better off in the grand coalition than in a symmetric coalition structure. Individual agents (in the rent seeking contest) and extremists (in the policy conflict) only have an incentive to secede when they anticipate that their secession will not be followed by additional secessions. Incentives to secede are lower when agents cooperate inside groups. The grand coalition emerges as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of a sequential game of coalition formation in rent seeking contests.

The density of injective endomorphisms of a free group

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Organisational structure, communication and group ethics

This paper investigates experimentally how organisational decision processes affect the moral motivations of actors inside a firm that must forego profits to reduce harming a third party. In a "vertical" treatment, one insider unilaterally sets the harm-reduction strategy; the other can only accept or quit. In a "horizontal" treatment, the insiders decide by consensus. Our 2-by-2 design also controls for communication effects. In our data, communication makes vertical firms more ethical; voice appears to mitigate "responsibility-alleviation" in that subordinates with voice feel responsible for what their firms do. Vertical firms are then more ethical than the horizontal firms for which our bargaining data reveal a dynamic form of responsibility-alleviation and our chat data indicate a strong "insider-outsider" effect.

Ultrastructural characterisation of the cell wall of Arabidopsis thaliana transgenic plants

The plant cell wall is a strong fibrillar network that gives each cell its stable shape. It is constituted by a network of cellulose microfibrils embedded in a matrix of polysaccharides, such as xyloglucans. To enlarge, cells selectively loosen this network. Moreover, there is a pectin-rich intercellular material, the middle lamella, cementing together the walls of adjacent plant cells. Xyloglucan endotransglucosylase/hydrolases (XTHs) are a group of enzymes involved in the reorganisation of the cellulose-xyloglucan framework by catalysing cleavage and re-ligation of the xyloglucan chains in the plant cell wall, and are considered cell wall loosening agents. In the laboratory, it has been isolated and characterised a XTH gene, ZmXTH1, from an elongation root cDNA library of maize. To address the cellular function of ZmXTH1, transgenic Arabidopsis thaliana plants over-expressing ZmXTH1 (under the control of the CaMV35S promoter) were generated. The aim of the work performed was therefore the characterisation of these transgenic plants at the ultrastructural level, by transmission electron microscopy (TEM).The detailed cellular phenotype of transgenic plants was investigated by comparing ultra-thin transverse sections of basal stem of 5-weeks old plants of wild type (Col 0) and 35S-ZmXTH1 Arabidopsis plants. Transgenic plants show modifications in the cell walls, particularly a thicker middle lamella layer with respect the wild type plants, supporting the idea that the overexpression of ZmXTH1 could imply a pronounced wall-loosening. In sum, the work carried out reinforces the idea that ZmXTH1 is involved in the cell wall loosening process in maize.  

Renormalization and α-limit set for expanding Lorenz maps

We establish a one-to-one correspondence between the renormalizations and proper totally invariant closed sets (i.e., α-limit sets) of expanding Lorenz map, which enable us to distinguish periodic and non-periodic renormalizations. We describe the minimal renormalization by constructing the minimal totally invariant closed set, so that we can define the renormalization operator. Using consecutive renormalizations, we obtain complete topological characteriza- tion of α-limit sets and nonwandering set decomposition. For piecewise linear Lorenz map with slopes ≥ 1, we show that each renormalization is periodic and every proper α-limit set is countable.

Inter-group conflict and intra-group punishment in an experimental contest game

We study how conflict in a contest game is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our main motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The relevant theoretical prediction in our setting is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and independent of whether punishment is available or not. We find, first, that our results contradict the independence of group-size prediction: conflict expenditures of groups are substantially larger than those of individuals, and both are substantially above equilibrium. Towards the end of the experiment material losses in groups are 257% of the predicted level. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity in the investment behaviour of individual group members. Second, allowing group members to punish each other after individual contributions to the contest effort are revealed leads to even larger conflict expenditures. Now material losses are 869% of the equilibrium level and there is much less heterogeneity in individual group members' investments. These results contrast strongly with those from public goods experiments where punishment enhances efficiency and leads to higher material payoffs.

The Measurement of social polarization in a multi-group context

Polarization indices presented up to now have only focused their attention on the distribution of income/wealth. However, in many circumstances income is not the only relevant dimension that might be the cause of social conflict, so it is very important to have a social polarization index able to cope with alternative dimensions. In this paper we present an axiomatic characterization of one of such indices: it has been obtained as an extension of the (income) polarization measure introduced in Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004) to a wider domain. It turns out that the axiomatic structure introduced in that paper alone is not appropriate to obtain a fully satisfactory characterization of our measure, so additional axioms are proposed. As a byproduct, we present an alternative axiomatization of the aforementioned income polarization measure.

Tree automorphisms and quasi-isometries of Thompson's group F

We prove that automorphisms of the infinite binary rooted tree T2 do not yield quasi-isometries of Thompson's group F, except for the map which reverses orientation on the unit interval, a natural outer automorphism of F. This map, together with the identity map, forms a subgroup of Aut(T2) consisting of 2-adic automorphisms, following standard terminology used in the study of branch groups. However, for more general p, we show that the analgous groups of p-adic tree automorphisms do not give rise to quasiisometries of F(p).

Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?

A social choice function is group strategy-proof on a domain if no group of agents can manipulate its final outcome to their own benefit by declaring false preferences on that domain. Group strategy-proofness is a very attractive requirement of incentive compatibility. But in many cases it is hard or impossible to find nontrivial social choice functions satisfying even the weakest condition of individual strategy-proofness. However, there are a number of economically significant domains where interesting rules satisfying individual strategy-proofness can be defined, and for some of them, all these rules turn out to also satisfy the stronger requirement of group strategy-proofness. This is the case, for example, when preferences are single-peaked or single-dipped. In other cases, this equivalence does not hold. We provide sufficient conditions defining domains of preferences guaranteeing that individual and group strategy-proofness are equivalent for all rules defined on the

Analytic approximation of matrix functions in Lp

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Dynamics in Thompson's group F

We describe an explicit relationship between strand diagrams and piecewise-linear functions for elements of Thompson’s group F. Using this correspondence, we investigate the dynamics of elements of F, and we show that conjugacy of one-bump functions can be described by a Mather-type invariant.

On the trace of an endofunctor of a small category

The trace of a square matrix can be defined by a universal property which, appropriately generalized yields the concept of "trace of an endofunctor of a small category". We review the basic definitions of this general concept and give a new construction, the "pretrace category", which allows us to obtain the trace of an endofunctor of a small category as the set of connected components of its pretrace. We show that this pretrace construction determines a finite-product preserving endofunctor of the category of small categories, and we deduce from this that the trace inherits any finite-product algebraic structure that the original category may have. We apply our results to several examples from Representation Theory obtaining a new (indirect) proof of the fact that two finite dimensional linear representations of a finite group are isomorphic if and only if they have the same character.

The loop group and the cobar construction

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