89 resultados para Market economy
Resumo:
Standard economic analysis holds that labor market rigidities are harmfulfor job creation and typically increase unemployment. But many orthodoxreforms of the labor market have proved difficult to implement because ofpolitical opposition. For these reasons it is important to explain why weobserve such regulations. In this paper I outline a theory of how they may arise and why they fit together. This theory is fully developed in aforthcoming book (Saint-Paul (2000)), to which the reader is referred forfurther details.
Resumo:
Monetary policy is conducted in an environment of uncertainty. This paper sets upa model where the central bank uses real-time data from the bond market togetherwith standard macroeconomic indicators to estimate the current state of theeconomy more efficiently, while taking into account that its own actions influencewhat it observes. The timeliness of bond market data allows for quicker responsesof monetary policy to disturbances compared to the case when the central bankhas to rely solely on collected aggregate data. The information content of theterm structure creates a link between the bond market and the macroeconomythat is novel to the literature. To quantify the importance of the bond market asa source of information, the model is estimated on data for the United Statesand Australia using Bayesian methods. The empirical exercise suggests that thereis some information in the US term structure that helps the Federal Reserve toidentify shocks to the economy on a timely basis. Australian bond prices seemto be less informative than their US counterparts, perhaps because Australia is arelatively small and open economy.
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This paper analyzes the choice between limit and market orders in animperfectly competitive noisy rational expectations economy. There is a uniqueinsider, who takes into account the effect their trading has on prices. If theinsider behaves as a price taker, she will choose market orders if her privateinformation is very precise and she will choose limit orders otherwise. On thecontrary, if the insider recognizes and exploits her ability to affect themarket price, her optimal choice is to place limit orders whatever the precisionof her private information.
Resumo:
We analyze the political support for employment protection legislation.Unlike my previous work on the same topic, this paper pays a lot ofattention to the role of obsolescence in the growth process.In voting in favour of employment protection, incumbent employeestrade off lower living standards (because employment protectionmaintains workers in less productive activities) against longer jobduration. The support for employment protection will then depend onthe value of the latter relative to the cost of the former. Wehighlight two key deeterminants of this trade-off: first, the workers'bargaining power, second, the economy's growth rate-more preciselyits rate of creative destruction.
Resumo:
The two essential features of a decentralized economy taken intoaccount are, first, that individual agents need some informationabout other agents in order to meet potential trading partners,which requires some communication or interaction between theseagents, and second, that in general agents will face tradinguncertainty. We consider trade in a homogeneous commodity. Firmsdecide upon their effective supplies, and may create their ownmarkets by sending information signals communicating theirwillingness to sell. Meeting of potential trading partners isarranged in the form of shopping by consumers. The questions to beconsidered are: How do firms compete in such markets? And what arethe properties of an equilibrium? We establish existenceconditions for a symmetric Nash equilibrium in the firms'strategies, and analyze its characteristics. The developedframework appears to lend itself well to study many typicalphenomena of decentralized economies, such as the emergence ofcentral markets, the role of middlemen, and price-making.
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The financial crisis of 2007-08 has underscored the importance of adverse selection in financialmarkets. This friction has been mostly neglected by macroeconomic models of financialimperfections, however, which have focused almost exclusively on the effects of limited pledgeability.In this paper, we fill this gap by developing a standard growth model with adverseselection. Our main results are that, by fostering unproductive investment, adverse selection:(i) leads to an increase in the economy s equilibrium interest rate, and; (ii) it generates a negativewedge between the marginal return to investment and the equilibrium interest rate. Underfinancial integration, we show how this translates into excessive capital inflows and endogenouscycles. We also extend our model to the more general case in which adverse selection and limitedpledgeability coexist. We conclude that both frictions complement one another and show thatlimited pledgeability exacerbates the effects of adverse selection.
Resumo:
We develop a theory of news coverage in environments of information abundance. News consumersare time-constrained and browse through news items that are available across competingoutlets, choosing which ones to read or skip. Media firms are aware of consumers' preferences andconstraints, and decide on rankings of news items that maximize their profits. We find that, evenwhen readers and outlets are rational and unbiased and when markets are competitive, readersmay read more than they would like to, and the stories they read may be significantly differentfrom the ones they prefer. Next, we derive implications on diverse aspects of new and traditionalmedia. These include a rationale for tabloid news, a theory of optimal advertisement placementin newscasts, and a justification for readers' migration to online media platforms in order to circumventinefficient rankings found in traditional media. We then analyze methods for restoringreader-efficient standards and discuss the political economy implications of the theory.
Resumo:
This paper investigates the importance that market regulation and financial imperfections have on firm growth. We analyse institutions af- fecting labor market as Employment Protection Laws (EP) and Product Market Regulation (PM). We show that together with the beneficial effects of financial development, a firm will get less financing, and thus investless, in a weak financial market (finance effect), the strictness of product and labor market regulations also affect firm growth (labor effect). In particular, we show that the stricter the rules the more detrimental the influence on growth in sectoral value added for a large number of countries. We also show that the labor effect overcomes the positive finance effect.
Resumo:
Does shareholder value orientation lead to shareholder value creation? This article proposes methods to quantify both, shareholder value orientation and shareholder value creation. Through the application of these models it is possible to quantify both dimensions and examine statistically in how far shareholder value orientation explains shareholder value creation. The scoring model developed in this paper allows quantifying the orientation of managers towards the objective to maximize wealth of shareholders. The method evaluates information that comes from the companies and scores the value orientation in a scale from 0 to 10 points. Analytically the variable value orientation is operationalized expressing it as the general attitude of managers toward the objective of value creation, investment policy and behavior, flexibility and further eight value drivers. The value creation model works with market data such as stock prices and dividend payments. Both methods where applied to a sample of 38 blue chip companies: 32 firms belonged to the share index IBEX 35 on July 1st, 1999, one company represents the “new economy” listed in the Spanish New Market as per July 1st, 2001, and 5 European multinational groups formed part of the EuroStoxx 50 index also on July 1st, 2001. The research period comprised the financial years 1998, 1999, and 2000. A regression analysis showed that between 15.9% and 23.4% of shareholder value creation can be explained by shareholder value orientation.
Resumo:
The circumstances that were the driving forces behind Europe's economic growth beginning in the 19th century are diverse, and not easily prioritized. Until the 1970's, specifically, in Economy and Economic History, attention was focused on different institutional and technological variables, and various regularities were proposed. Nevertheless, new studies also underlined that the evolution of economic activity could not be understood considering only the new production possibilities offered by market economies. As a result, today it is also accepted that those processes can not be explained without considering two additional circumstances: the energy flows that sustained them, and the changes undergone in their transformation In this context, a question arises that takes on special importance. Which was the influence of the biological change in the economic growth?. A part of the flows of energy must be made into food, and this transformation can only happen with the participation.
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This paper analyzes the role of traders' priors (proper versus improper) on the implications of market transparency by comparing a pre-trade transparent market with an opaque market in a set-up based on Madhavan (1996). We show that prices may be more informative in the opaque market, regardless of how priors are modelled. In contrast, the comparison of market liquidity and volatility in the two market structures are affected by prior specification. Key words: Market microstructure, Transparency, Prior information
Resumo:
This paper concerns the effects of territorial factors on the processes involved in the creation of manufacturing firms in Spanish cities. Most contributions have focused on regional factors rather than urban ones. Here we assume that it is possible to identify certain urban factors that attract new firms. We use data for the entry of firms in Spanish manufacturing industries between 1994 and 2002. This paper contributes to the existing literature on market entry. Key words: cities, regions, firm entry and Spanish economy. JEL: R0, R12, L60