Equilibrium play and best response to (Stated) beliefs in constant sum games

We report experimental results on one-shot two person 3x3 constant sum games played by non-economists without previous experience in the laboratory. Although strategically our games are very similar to previous experiments in which game theory predictions fail dramatically, 80% of actions taken in our experiment coincided with the prediction of the unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies and 73% of actions were best responses to elicited beliefs. We argue how social preferences, presentation effects and belief elicitation procedures may influence how subjects play in simple but non trivial games and explain the diferences we observe with respect to previous work.

Frames and games

Decision-makers are sometimes influenced by the way in which choice situations are presented to them or "framed" This can be seen as an important challenge to the social sciences, since strong and pervasive framing effects would make it difficult to study human behavior in a synthetic or theoretic manner. We present results from experiments with dilemma games designed to shed light on the effects of several frame variations. We study, among others, the particular public bad frame used by Andreoni (1995) and two more naturalistic frames involving stories. Our results show that none of the frame manipulations have a significant effect on average behavior, but we do find some effects on extreme behavior. We also find that incentives do matter where frames do not matter.

Communication, cultural identities and the Olympic Games: the Barcelona’92 experience

This document includes the results of the research undertaken by the author on the media planning and coverage of the Barcelona'92 and its cultural implications.

La información y documentación deportiva y los grandes eventos deportivos

Ponencia presentada en la Jornadas de Documentación Deportiva organizadas por el Instituto Andaluz del Deporte en 2003, centrada en el papel de la gestión de la información de los acontecimientos deportivos, en particular los Juegos Olímpicos.

Symbol and logo of Barcelona’92 Olympic Games

This text has been published in the book Jocs Olímpics, comunicació i intercanvis culturals: l’experiència dels últims quatre Jocs Olímpics d’estiu, gathering the communications presented in the international Symposium that was celebrated in Barcelona from 3 to 5 april of 1991.

The Olympic Games as a tool for urban renewal: the experience of Barcelona’92 Olympic Village

Paper discussing on the impact of the Games on the urban development of host cities, analysing in particular the Barcelona'92 Olympic Village. This article was published in the book entitled "Olympic Villages: a hundred years of urban planning and shared experiences" compiling the papers given at the 1997 International Symposium on International Chair in Olympism (IOC-UAB).

Socio-economic impact of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games

Paper presented at the 2001 seminar of the International Chair in Olympism (IOC-UAB). The seminar offers a general reflection, from the time of the bid onwards, of the 2000 Games experience in Sydney and Australia.

Keys to interpret the Games: Sydney 2000 Olympics

Document published by the CEO-UAB, corresponding to the results of the research undertaken by the author during the celebration of the Sydney 2000 Games.

Olympic Villages after the Games

Article analysing the use of Olympic villages once the Games are finished. This article was published in the book entitled ‘Olympic Villages: a hundred years of urban planning and shared experiences’ compiling the papers given at the 1997 International Symposium on International Chair in Olympism (IOC-UAB).

Explaining Variation in Organizational Change: The Reform of Human Resource Management in the European Commission and the OECD

In this article we investigate the reforms of human resource management in the European Commission and the OECD by analyzing comparatively to what extent both organizations have adjusted their respective structures towards the ideal type of the so-called New Public Management (NPM). The empirical findings show that reforms towards NPM are more pronounced in the Commission than in the OECD. These findings are surprising for two reasons: First, it seems rather paradoxical that the OECD as central promoter of NPM at the international level lags behind the global trend when it comes to reforming its own structures. Second, this result is in contradiction with theoretical expectations, as they can be derived from theories of institutional isomorphism. To nevertheless account for the surprising results, it is necessary to modify and complement existing theories especially with regard to the scope conditions of their causal mechanisms.

Fiscal insurance and debt management in OECD economies

Assuming the role of debt management is to provide hedging against fiscal shocks we consider three questions: i) what indicators can be used to assess the performance of debt management? ii) how well have historical debt management policies performed? and iii) how is that performance affected by variations in debt issuance? We consider these questions using OECD data on the market value of government debt between 1970 and 2000. Motivated by both the optimal taxation literature and broad considerations of debt stability we propose a range of performance indicators for debt management. We evaluate these using Monte Carlo analysis and find that those based on the relative persistence of debt perform best. Calculating these measures for OECD data provides only limited evidence that debt management has helped insulate policy against unexpected fiscal shocks. We also find that the degree of fiscal insurance achieved is not well connected to cross country variations in debt issuance patterns. Given the limited volatility observed in the yield curve the relatively small dispersion of debt management practices across countries makes little difference to the realised degree of fiscal insurance.

In Search of a theory of debt management

A growing literature integrates theories of debt management into models of optimal fiscal policy. One promising theory argues that the composition of government debt should be chosen so that fluctuations in the market value of debt offset changes in expected future deficits. This complete market approach to debt management is valid even when the government only issues non-contingent bonds. A number of authors conclude from this approach that governments should issue long term debt and invest in short term assets. We argue that the conclusions of this approach are too fragile to serve as a basis for policy recommendations. This is because bonds at different maturities have highly correlated returns, causing the determination of the optimal portfolio to be ill-conditioned. To make this point concrete we examine the implications of this approach to debt management in various models, both analytically and using numerical methods calibrated to the US economy. We find the complete market approach recommends asset positions which are huge multiples of GDP. Introducing persistent shocks or capital accumulation only worsens this problem. Increasing the volatility of interest rates through habits partly reduces the size of these simulations we find no presumption that governments should issue long term debt ? policy recommendations can be easily reversed through small perturbations in the specification of shocks or small variations in the maturity of bonds issued. We further extend the literature by removing the assumption that governments every period costlessly repurchase all outstanding debt. This exacerbates the size of the required positions, worsens their volatility and in some cases produces instability in debt holdings. We conclude that it is very difficult to insulate fiscal policy from shocks by using the complete markets approach to debt management. Given the limited variability of the yield curve using maturities is a poor way to substitute for state contingent debt. The result is the positions recommended by this approach conflict with a number of features that we believe are important in making bond markets incomplete e.g allowing for transaction costs, liquidity effects, etc.. Until these features are all fully incorporated we remain in search of a theory of debt management capable of providing robust policy insights.

Relay-assisted transmission and radio resource management for wireless networks

The following paper presents an overview of the Ph.D Thesis1 presented in [1], which compiles all the research done during the period of time between 2004-2007. In that dissertation the relay-assisted transmission with half-duplex relays is analyzed from different points of view. This study is motivated by the necessity of finding innovative solutions to cope with the requirements of next generation wireless services, and with current radio technology. The use of relayed communications represents a change of paradigm of conventional communications, and requires the definition and evaluation of protocols to be applied to single or multiple-user relay communication. With the two fold goal of enhancing spectral efficiency and homogenize service in cellular communications, system design is investigated at physical (type of transmissions of the relay, decoding mode, ..) and upper layers (resource allocation, dynamic link control).

A class of stochastic games with infinitely many interacting agents related to Glauber dynamics on random graphs

We introduce and study a class of infinite-horizon nonzero-sum non-cooperative stochastic games with infinitely many interacting agents using ideas of statistical mechanics. First we show, in the general case of asymmetric interactions, the existence of a strategy that allows any player to eliminate losses after a finite random time. In the special case of symmetric interactions, we also prove that, as time goes to infinity, the game converges to a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, assuming that all agents adopt the same strategy, using arguments related to those leading to perfect simulation algorithms, spatial mixing and ergodicity are proved. In turn, ergodicity allows us to prove “fixation”, i.e. that players will adopt a constant strategy after a finite time. The resulting dynamics is related to zerotemperature Glauber dynamics on random graphs of possibly infinite volume.