Communication, cultural identities and the Olympic Games: the Barcelona’92 experience

This document includes the results of the research undertaken by the author on the media planning and coverage of the Barcelona'92 and its cultural implications.

Symbol and logo of Barcelona’92 Olympic Games

This text has been published in the book Jocs Olímpics, comunicació i intercanvis culturals: l’experiència dels últims quatre Jocs Olímpics d’estiu, gathering the communications presented in the international Symposium that was celebrated in Barcelona from 3 to 5 april of 1991.

The Olympic Games as a tool for urban renewal: the experience of Barcelona’92 Olympic Village

Paper discussing on the impact of the Games on the urban development of host cities, analysing in particular the Barcelona'92 Olympic Village. This article was published in the book entitled "Olympic Villages: a hundred years of urban planning and shared experiences" compiling the papers given at the 1997 International Symposium on International Chair in Olympism (IOC-UAB).

Socio-economic impact of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games

Paper presented at the 2001 seminar of the International Chair in Olympism (IOC-UAB). The seminar offers a general reflection, from the time of the bid onwards, of the 2000 Games experience in Sydney and Australia.

Keys to interpret the Games: Sydney 2000 Olympics

Document published by the CEO-UAB, corresponding to the results of the research undertaken by the author during the celebration of the Sydney 2000 Games.

Olympic Villages after the Games

Article analysing the use of Olympic villages once the Games are finished. This article was published in the book entitled ‘Olympic Villages: a hundred years of urban planning and shared experiences’ compiling the papers given at the 1997 International Symposium on International Chair in Olympism (IOC-UAB).

A class of stochastic games with infinitely many interacting agents related to Glauber dynamics on random graphs

We introduce and study a class of infinite-horizon nonzero-sum non-cooperative stochastic games with infinitely many interacting agents using ideas of statistical mechanics. First we show, in the general case of asymmetric interactions, the existence of a strategy that allows any player to eliminate losses after a finite random time. In the special case of symmetric interactions, we also prove that, as time goes to infinity, the game converges to a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, assuming that all agents adopt the same strategy, using arguments related to those leading to perfect simulation algorithms, spatial mixing and ergodicity are proved. In turn, ergodicity allows us to prove “fixation”, i.e. that players will adopt a constant strategy after a finite time. The resulting dynamics is related to zerotemperature Glauber dynamics on random graphs of possibly infinite volume.

Olympic Games as showcase

In the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games, besides the country-versus-country typical showdown in the backdrop of Olympics, and the economic and political impulses for the host city, there was a third factor complicating the celebration: rivalry between the Catalan hosts and the Spanish state. By guiding the development of and eventual Olympic projection of national identity, Catalan and Spanish politicians hoped to create a resounding rallying point around which they could unite disparate individuals. The text is made up of: an introduction, five paragraphs on the different political perspective, conclusions, a commentary on the tallying of score and a note section with bibliographical references.

Dividends and weighted values in games with externalities

We consider cooperative environments with externalities (games in partition function form) and provide a recursive definition of dividends for each coalition and any partition of the players it belongs to. We show that with this definition and equal sharing of these dividends the averaged sum of dividends for each player, over all the coalitions that contain the player, coincides with the corresponding average value of the player. We then construct weighted Shapley values by departing from equal division of dividends and finally, for each such value, provide a bidding mechanism implementing it.

The economy of the Beijing Olympic Games: An analysis of first impacts and prospects

This paper was presented at the International Sport Business Symposium, held by the Capital University of Economics and Business in Beijing, in 2008. The speakers, Ferran Brunet, as a professor at the Autonomous University of Barcelona and Zuo Xinwen, as a member of Beijing Development and Reform Commission, both set out to analyze changes in the economic and social development of the city which were undertaken with the aim to celebrate the 2008 Olympic Games. They discuss aspects as a transformation in the mode of economic growth, resources of the Organizing Committee, investments related to the Games, transport and communications, industries, the balance of urban and rural development, urban construction and management service and operations into a well-off society.

International Institutions as Solutions to Underlying Games of Cooperation

This Working Paper was presented at the international workshop "Game Theory in International Relations at 50", organized and coordinated by Professor Jacint Jordana and Dr. Yannis Karagiannis at the Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals on May 22, 2009. The day-long Workshop was inspired by the desire to honour the ground-breaking work of Professor Thomas Schelling in 1959-1960, and to understand where the discipline International Relations lies today vis-à-vis game theory.

Language knowledge and earnings in Catalonia

In this paper we are aimed to investigate the relationship between Catalan knowledge and individual earnings in Catalonia. Using data from 2006, we find a positive earning return to Catalan proficiency; however, when accounting for self-selection into Catalan knowledge, we find a higher language return (20% of extra earnings), suggesting that individuals who are more prone to know Catalan are also less remunerated than others (negative selection effect). Moreover, we also find important complementarities between language knowledge and completed education, which means that only more educated individuals benefit from Catalan knowledge.

Nash equilibrium strategies in discrete-time finite-horizon dynamic games with risk-and effort-averse players

The objective of this paper is to re-examine the risk-and effort attitude in the context of strategic dynamic interactions stated as a discrete-time finite-horizon Nash game. The analysis is based on the assumption that players are endogenously risk-and effort-averse. Each player is characterized by distinct risk-and effort-aversion types that are unknown to his opponent. The goal of the game is the optimal risk-and effort-sharing between the players. It generally depends on the individual strategies adopted and, implicitly, on the the players' types or characteristics.

Language knowledge and earnings in Catalonia

This paper investigates the economic value of Catalan knowledge for national and foreign first- and second-generation immigrants in Catalonia. Specifically, drawing on data from the “Survey on Living Conditions and Habits of the Catalan Population (2006)”, we want to quantify the expected earnings differential between individuals who are proficient in Catalan and those who are not, taking into account the potential endogeneity between knowledge of Catalan and earnings. The results indicate the existence of a positive return to knowledge of Catalan, with a 7.5% increase in earnings estimated by OLS; however, when we account for the presence of endogeneity, monthly earnings are around 18% higher for individuals who are able to speak and write Catalan. However, we also find that language and education are complementary inputs for generating earnings in Catalonia, given that knowledge of Catalan increases monthly earnings only for more educated individuals.

Mean-payoff games and propositional proofs

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."