El model Barcelona II : l'Ajuntament de Barcelona a la societat xarxa de Catalunya (2002-2004)

La recerca va analitzar la interacció entre innovació tecnològica, canvi organitzatiu i transformació dels serveis públics i els processos polítics a l'Ajuntament de Barcelona. Prenent com a hipòtesi de partida l'aparició d'un possible model Barcelona II (que entenem que és paral·lel al model Barcelona, un exemple internacionalment reconegut de combinació de polítiques urbanes), es van estudiar les transformacions internes del consistori barceloní vinculades amb l'ús innovador de les tecnologies de la informació i la comunicació i es van relacionar amb el conjunt de canvis socials i polítics que interaccionaven amb aquest procés.

A general continuous auction model with insiders

We analyse in a unified way how the presence of a trader with privilege information makes the market to be efficient when the release time is known. We establish a general relation between the problem of finding an equilibrium and the problem of enlargement of filtrations. We also consider the case where the time of announcement is random. In such a case the market is not fully efficient and there exists equilibrium if the sensitivity of prices with respect to the global demand is time decreasing according with the distribution of the random time.

Two-sided learning in new keynesian models: dynamics, (lack of) convergence and the value of information

This paper investigates the role of learning by private agents and the central bank (two-sided learning) in a New Keynesian framework in which both sides of the economy have asymmetric and imperfect knowledge about the true data generating process. We assume that all agents employ the data that they observe (which may be distinct for different sets of agents) to form beliefs about unknown aspects of the true model of the economy, use their beliefs to decide on actions, and revise these beliefs through a statistical learning algorithm as new information becomes available. We study the short-run dynamics of our model and derive its policy recommendations, particularly with respect to central bank communications. We demonstrate that two-sided learning can generate substantial increases in volatility and persistence, and alter the behavior of the variables in the model in a signifficant way. Our simulations do not converge to a symmetric rational expectations equilibrium and we highlight one source that invalidates the convergence results of Marcet and Sargent (1989). Finally, we identify a novel aspect of central bank communication in models of learning: communication can be harmful if the central bank's model is substantially mis-specified

Model d'adequació de l'hàbitat del llop a Catalunya

Des de l’any 2000 es té constància de la presencia del llop a Catalunya. Des de llavors, com a mínim 14 llops diferents han entrat i sortit del territori català, encara que cap d’ells s’ha assentat de manera permanent. L’estudi analitza l’entorn català utilitzant GIS, creant un model d’adequació de l’hàbitat tenint en compte les següents variables: la distància a la carretera més propera, la biomassa disponible a la zona, l’altitud i el tipus i tant per cent de recobriment. El model es basa en la informació obtinguda mitjançant la consulta a experts tant del llop com del territori català, així com en una recerca bibliogràfica sobre l’adequació de l’hàbitat del llop. L’enquesta que es dirigí als experts té en compte els valors que cada variable pot prendre dins l’àrea d’estudi, estableix rangs dels valors de cada variable i pregunta als experts com cada rang pot afectar a l’adequació de l’hàbitat pel llop. Els resultats mostren com bona part de la zona Nord de Catalunya té unes condicions adequades perquè el llop pugui arribar a reproduir-s’hi. Es desenvolupa també una anàlisi dels possibles punts de conflicte humà-llop i una superposició dels espais protegits amb les zones més adequades per l’establiment del llop.

Using a Parameterization of a Radiative Transfer Model to Build High-Resolution Maps of Typical Clear-Sky UV Index in Catalonia, Spain

To perform a climatic analysis of the annual UV index (UVI) variations in Catalonia, Spain (northeast of the Iberian Peninsula), a new simple parameterization scheme is presented based on a multilayer radiative transfer model. The parameterization performs fast UVI calculations for a wide range of cloudless and snow-free situations and can be applied anywhere. The following parameters are considered: solar zenith angle, total ozone column, altitude, aerosol optical depth, and single-scattering albedo. A sensitivity analysis is presented to justify this choice with special attention to aerosol information. Comparisons with the base model show good agreement, most of all for the most common cases, giving an absolute error within 0.2 in the UVI for a wide range of cases considered. Two tests are done to show the performance of the parameterization against UVI measurements. One uses data from a high-quality spectroradiometer from Lauder, New Zealand [45.04°S, 169.684°E, 370 m above mean sea level (MSL)], where there is a low presence of aerosols. The other uses data from a Robertson–Berger-type meter from Girona, Spain (41.97°N, 2.82°E, 100 m MSL), where there is more aerosol load and where it has been possible to study the effect of aerosol information on the model versus measurement comparison. The parameterization is applied to a climatic analysis of the annual UVI variation in Catalonia, showing the contributions of solar zenith angle, ozone, and aerosols. High-resolution seasonal maps of typical UV index values in Catalonia are presented

A sequential model for older workers' labor transitions after a health shock

In this work we study older workers'(50-64) labor force transitions after a health/disability shock. We find that the probability of keeping working decreases with both age and severity of the shock. Moreover, we find strong interactions between age and severity in the 50-64 age range and none in the 30-49 age range. Regarding demographics we find that being female and married reduce the probability of keeping work. On the contrary, being main breadwinner, education and skill levels increase it. Interestingly, the effect of some demographics changes its sign when we look at transitions from inactivity to work. This is the case of being married or having a working spouse. Undoubtedly, leisure complementarities should play a role in the latter case. Since the data we use contains a very detailed information on disabilities, we are able to evaluate the marginal effect of each type of disability either in the probability of keeping working or in returning back to work. Some of these results may have strong policy implications.

Asymmetric information and trade policy

Economists understand protectionism as a costly mechanism to redistribute from the average citizen to special-interest groups; yet political platforms that deviate from free trade have surprising popular appeal. I present an explanation based on heterogeneous information across citizens whose voting decision has an intensive margin. For each politician and each sector, the optimal trade-policy choice caters to the preferences of those voters who are more likely to be informed of that proposal. An overall protectionist bias emerges because in every industry producers are better informed than consumers. This asymmetry emerges in equilibrium because co-workers share industry-specific knwoledge, and because producers have greater incentives to engage in costly learning about their sector. My model implies that more widespread information about trade policy for an industry is associated with lower protection. Cross-sectoral evidence on U.S. non-tariff barriers and newspaper coverage is consistent with this prediction.

Determinants of linear judgment: A meta-analysis of lens model studies

The mathematical representation of Brunswik s lens model has been usedextensively to study human judgment and provides a unique opportunity to conduct ameta-analysis of studies that covers roughly five decades. Specifically, we analyzestatistics of the lens model equation (Tucker, 1964) associated with 259 different taskenvironments obtained from 78 papers. In short, we find on average fairly high levelsof judgmental achievement and note that people can achieve similar levels of cognitiveperformance in both noisy and predictable environments. Although overall performancevaries little between laboratory and field studies, both differ in terms of components ofperformance and types of environments (numbers of cues and redundancy). An analysisof learning studies reveals that the most effective form of feedback is information aboutthe task. We also analyze empirically when bootstrapping is more likely to occur. Weconclude by indicating shortcomings of the kinds of studies conducted to date, limitationsin the lens model methodology, and possibilities for future research.

A sequential model for older workers’ labor transitions after a health shock

In this work we study older workers (50 64) labor force transitions after a health/disability shock. We find that the probability of keeping working decreases with both age and severity of the shock. Moreover, we find strong interactions between age and severity in the 50 64 age range and none in the 30 49 age range. Regarding demographics we find that being female and married reduce the probability of keeping work. On the contrary, being main breadwinner, education and skill levels increase it. Interestingly, the effect of some demographics changes its sign when we look at transitions from inactivity to work. This is the case of being married or having a working spouse. Undoubtedly, leisure complementarities should play a role in the latter case. Since the data we use contains a very detailed information on disabilities, we are able to evaluate the marginal effect of each type of disability either in the probability of keeping working or in returning back to work. Some of these results may have strong policy implications.

The value of useless information

There are many situations in which individuals have a choice of whether or notto observe eventual outcomes. In these instances, individuals often prefer to remainignorant. These contexts are outside the scope of analysis of the standard vonNeumann-Morgenstern (vNM) expected utility model, which does not distinguishbetween lotteries for which the agent sees the final outcome and those for which hedoes not. I develop a simple model that admits preferences for making an observationor for remaining in doubt. I then use this model to analyze the connectionbetween preferences of this nature and risk-attitude. This framework accommodatesa wide array of behavioral patterns that violate the vNM model, and thatmay not seem related, prima facie. For instance, it admits self-handicapping, inwhich an agent chooses to impair his own performance. It also accommodatesa status quo bias without having recourse to framing effects, or to an explicitdefinition of reference points. In a political economy context, voters have strictincentives to shield themselves from information. In settings with other-regardingpreferences, this model predicts observed behavior that seems inconsistent witheither altruism or self-interested behavior.

Two-sided learning in New Keynesian models: Dynamics, (lack of) convergence and the value of information

This paper investigates the role of learning by private agents and the central bank(two-sided learning) in a New Keynesian framework in which both sides of the economyhave asymmetric and imperfect knowledge about the true data generating process. Weassume that all agents employ the data that they observe (which may be distinct fordifferent sets of agents) to form beliefs about unknown aspects of the true model ofthe economy, use their beliefs to decide on actions, and revise these beliefs througha statistical learning algorithm as new information becomes available. We study theshort-run dynamics of our model and derive its policy recommendations, particularlywith respect to central bank communications. We demonstrate that two-sided learningcan generate substantial increases in volatility and persistence, and alter the behaviorof the variables in the model in a significant way. Our simulations do not convergeto a symmetric rational expectations equilibrium and we highlight one source thatinvalidates the convergence results of Marcet and Sargent (1989). Finally, we identifya novel aspect of central bank communication in models of learning: communicationcan be harmful if the central bank's model is substantially mis-specified.

Heterogeneous information and trade policy

Protectionism enjoys surprising popular support, in spite of deadweight losses. At thesame time, trade barriers appear to decline with public information about protection.This paper develops an electoral model with heterogeneously informed voters whichexplains both facts and predicts the pattern of trade policy across industries. In themodel, each agent endogenously acquires more information about his sector of employment. As a result, voters support protectionism, because they learn more about thetrade barriers that help them as producers than those that hurt them as consumers.In equilibrium, asymmetric information induces a universal protectionist bias. Thestructure of protection is Pareto inefficient, in contrast to existing models. The modelpredicts a Dracula effect: trade policy for a sector is less protectionist when there ismore public information about it. Using a measure of newspaper coverage across industries, I find that cross-sector evidence from the United States bears out my theoreticalpredictions.

Discrete devaluations and multiple equilibria in a first generation model of currency crises

The first generation models of currency crises have often been criticized because they predict that, in the absence of very large triggering shocks, currency attacks should be predictable and lead to small devaluations. This paper shows that these features of first generation models are not robust to the inclusion of private information. In particular, this paper analyzes a generalization of the Krugman-Flood-Garber (KFG) model, which relaxes the assumption that all consumers are perfectly informed about the level of fundamentals. In this environment, the KFG equilibrium of zero devaluation is only one of many possible equilibria. In all the other equilibria, the lack of perfect information delays the attack on the currency past the point at which the shadow exchange rate equals the peg, giving rise to unpredictable and discrete devaluations.

Information revelation and market incompleteness

\documentstyle[portada,11pt]{article}This paper shows that the presence of private information in aneconomy can be a source of market incompleteness even when it is feasibleto issue a set of securities that completely eliminates the informationalasymmetries in equilibrium. We analyze a simple security design model in which avolume maximizing futures exchange chooses not only the characteristics ofeach individual contract but also the number of contracts. Agents have rationalexpectations and differ in information, endowments and, possibly, attitudestoward risk. The emergence of complete or incomplete markets in equilibriumdepends on whether the {\it adverse selection effect} is stronger or weakerthan the {\it Hirshleifer effect}, as new securitiesare issued and prices reveal more information. When the Hirshleifer effectdominates, the exchange chooses an incomplete set of financial contracts, andthe equilibrium price is partially revealing.

Turnout, political preferences and information: Experimental evidence from Perú

Electoral institutions that encourage citizens to vote are widely used around the world. Yet littleis known about the effects of such institutions on voter participation and the composition of the electorate.In this paper, I combine a field experiment with a change in Peruvian voting laws to identify theeffect of monetary (dis-)incentives on voting. Using the random variation in the fine for abstention andan objective measure of turnout at the individual level, I estimate the elasticity of voting with respectto cost to be -0.21. Consistent with the theoretical model presented, the reduction in turnout inducedby the reduction in the fine is driven by voters who (i) are in the center of the political spectrum, (ii)are less interested in politics, and (iii) hold less political information. However, voters who respondto changes in the cost of abstention do not have different preferences for policies than those who voteregardless of the cost. Further, involvement in politics, as measured by the decision to acquire politicalinformation, seems to be independent of the level of the fine. Additional results indicate that thereduction in the fine does not affect the incidence of vote buying, but increases the price paid for avote.