When does universal peace prevail? Secession and group formation in rent seeking contests and policy conflicts

This paper analyzes secession and group formation in a general model of contest inspired by Esteban and Ray (1999). This model encompasses as special cases rent seeking contests and policy conflicts, where agents lobby over the choice of a policy in a one-dimensional policy space. We show that in both models the grand coalition is the efficient coalition structure and agents are always better off in the grand coalition than in a symmetric coalition structure. Individual agents (in the rent seeking contest) and extremists (in the policy conflict) only have an incentive to secede when they anticipate that their secession will not be followed by additional secessions. Incentives to secede are lower when agents cooperate inside groups. The grand coalition emerges as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of a sequential game of coalition formation in rent seeking contests.

The density of injective endomorphisms of a free group

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Organisational structure, communication and group ethics

This paper investigates experimentally how organisational decision processes affect the moral motivations of actors inside a firm that must forego profits to reduce harming a third party. In a "vertical" treatment, one insider unilaterally sets the harm-reduction strategy; the other can only accept or quit. In a "horizontal" treatment, the insiders decide by consensus. Our 2-by-2 design also controls for communication effects. In our data, communication makes vertical firms more ethical; voice appears to mitigate "responsibility-alleviation" in that subordinates with voice feel responsible for what their firms do. Vertical firms are then more ethical than the horizontal firms for which our bargaining data reveal a dynamic form of responsibility-alleviation and our chat data indicate a strong "insider-outsider" effect.

On the critical periods of perturbed isochronous centers

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Inter-group conflict and intra-group punishment in an experimental contest game

We study how conflict in a contest game is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our main motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The relevant theoretical prediction in our setting is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and independent of whether punishment is available or not. We find, first, that our results contradict the independence of group-size prediction: conflict expenditures of groups are substantially larger than those of individuals, and both are substantially above equilibrium. Towards the end of the experiment material losses in groups are 257% of the predicted level. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity in the investment behaviour of individual group members. Second, allowing group members to punish each other after individual contributions to the contest effort are revealed leads to even larger conflict expenditures. Now material losses are 869% of the equilibrium level and there is much less heterogeneity in individual group members' investments. These results contrast strongly with those from public goods experiments where punishment enhances efficiency and leads to higher material payoffs.

The Measurement of social polarization in a multi-group context

Polarization indices presented up to now have only focused their attention on the distribution of income/wealth. However, in many circumstances income is not the only relevant dimension that might be the cause of social conflict, so it is very important to have a social polarization index able to cope with alternative dimensions. In this paper we present an axiomatic characterization of one of such indices: it has been obtained as an extension of the (income) polarization measure introduced in Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004) to a wider domain. It turns out that the axiomatic structure introduced in that paper alone is not appropriate to obtain a fully satisfactory characterization of our measure, so additional axioms are proposed. As a byproduct, we present an alternative axiomatization of the aforementioned income polarization measure.

Tree automorphisms and quasi-isometries of Thompson's group F

We prove that automorphisms of the infinite binary rooted tree T2 do not yield quasi-isometries of Thompson's group F, except for the map which reverses orientation on the unit interval, a natural outer automorphism of F. This map, together with the identity map, forms a subgroup of Aut(T2) consisting of 2-adic automorphisms, following standard terminology used in the study of branch groups. However, for more general p, we show that the analgous groups of p-adic tree automorphisms do not give rise to quasiisometries of F(p).

Algebraic properties of isochronous centers of polynomial quadratic-like Hamiltonian systems

Projecte de recerca elaborat a partir d’una estada a la School of Mathematics and Statistics de la University of Plymouth, United Kingdom, entre abril juliol del 2007.Aquesta investigació és encara oberta i la memòria que presento constitueix un informe de la recerca que estem duent a terme actualment. En aquesta nota estudiem els centres isòcrons dels sistemes Hamiltonians analítics, parant especial atenció en el cas polinomial. Ens centrem en els anomenats quadratic-like Hamiltonian systems. Diverses propietats dels centres isòcrons d'aquest tipus de sistemes van ser donades a [A. Cima, F. Mañosas and J. Villadelprat, Isochronicity for several classes of Hamiltonian systems, J. Di®erential Equations 157 (1999) 373{413]. Aquell article estava centrat principalment en el cas en que A; B i C fossin funcions analítiques. El nostre objectiu amb l'estudi que estem duent a terme és investigar el cas en el que aquestes funcions són polinomis. En aquesta nota formulem una conjectura concreta sobre les propietats algebraiques que venen forçades per la isocronia del centre i provem alguns resultats parcials.

Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?

A social choice function is group strategy-proof on a domain if no group of agents can manipulate its final outcome to their own benefit by declaring false preferences on that domain. Group strategy-proofness is a very attractive requirement of incentive compatibility. But in many cases it is hard or impossible to find nontrivial social choice functions satisfying even the weakest condition of individual strategy-proofness. However, there are a number of economically significant domains where interesting rules satisfying individual strategy-proofness can be defined, and for some of them, all these rules turn out to also satisfy the stronger requirement of group strategy-proofness. This is the case, for example, when preferences are single-peaked or single-dipped. In other cases, this equivalence does not hold. We provide sufficient conditions defining domains of preferences guaranteeing that individual and group strategy-proofness are equivalent for all rules defined on the

Dynamics in Thompson's group F

We describe an explicit relationship between strand diagrams and piecewise-linear functions for elements of Thompson’s group F. Using this correspondence, we investigate the dynamics of elements of F, and we show that conjugacy of one-bump functions can be described by a Mather-type invariant.

The loop group and the cobar construction

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Singular integrals on Ahlfors-David regular subsets of the Heisenberg group

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Dead-End Jobs or Career Opportunities? Advancement opportunities in call centers

Employment in call centers has grown significantly throughout the world over the past 15 years. In debates about the quality of these new jobs, there are few studies that specifically address promotion opportunities. Using a survey of over 2400 call centers in 16 countries, this paper documents levels and analyzes factors shaping promotions in call centers, and discusses implications for promotions in the service sector generally. On average, less than 10% of call center agents are promoted in any year--5.7% promoted internally to the call center, and 4% promoted elsewhere in the business. Firms that have more complex labor processes and require agents to have higher levels of firm-specific knowledge tend to also have greater promotion opportunities, which might be expected. There are also unexpected findings, including that increased autonomy in the workplace often provides a ‘substitute' to advancement opportunities, and that unionization is associated with fewer advancement opportunities within call centers, though more advancement opportunities to other parts of the business. Key words: promotions, service industries, call centers.