The Three Horsemen of Growth: Plague, War and Urbanization in Early Modern Europe

How did Europe overtake China? We construct a simple Malthusian model with two sectors, and use it to explain how European per capita incomes and urbanization rates could surge ahead of Chinese ones. That living standards could exceed subsistence levels at all in a Malthusian setting should be surprising. Rising fertility and falling mortality ought to have reversed any gains. We show that productivity growth in Europe can only explain a small fraction of rising living standards. Population dynamics - changes of the birth and death schedules - were far more important drivers of the longrun Malthusian equilibrium. The Black Death raised wages substantially, creating important knock-on effects. Because of Engel's Law, demand for urban products increased, raising urban wages and attracting migrants from rural areas. European cities were unhealthy, especially compared to Far Eastern ones. Urbanization pushed up aggregate death rates. This effect was reinforced by more frequent wars (fed by city wealth) and disease spread by trade. Thus, higher wages themselves reduced population pressure. Without technological change, our model can account for the sharp rise in European urbanization as well as permanently higher per capita incomes. We complement our calibration exercise with a detailed analysis of intra-European growth in the early modern period. Using a panel of European states in the period 1300-1700, we show that war frequency can explain a good share of the divergent fortunes within Europe.

On the Structural Difference between the Evolutionary Approach of Young and that of Kandori, Mailath, and Rob

We provide robust examples of symmetric two-player coordination games in normal form that reveal that equilibrium selection by the evolutionary model of Young (1993) is essentially different from equilibrium selection by the evolutionary model of Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993).

Inflation, political instability and stockmarket volatility in interwar Germany

What determined the volatility of asset prices in Germany between thewars? This paper argues that the influence of political factors has beenoverstated. The majority of events increasing political uncertainty hadlittle or no effect on the value of German assets and the volatility ofreturns on them. Instead, it was inflation (and the fear of it) that islargely responsible for most of the variability in asset returns.

Factor prices and productivity growth during the British Industrial Revolution

This paper presents new estimates of total factor productivity growth in Britain for the period1770 1860. We use the dual technique and argue that the estimates we derive from factorprices are of similar quality to quantity-based calculations. Our results provide further evidence,calculated on the basis of an independent set of sources, that productivity growth duringthe British Industrial Revolution was relatively slow. The Crafts Harley view of theIndustrial Revolution is thus reinforced. Our preferred estimates suggest a modest accelerationafter 1800.

Convertibility, currency controls and the cost of capital in Western Europe, 1950-1999

For most of the post-war period, Europe s capital markets remained largely closed to international capital flows. Thispaper explores the costs of this policy. Using an event-study methodology, I examine the extent to which restrictions ofcurrent and capital account convertibility affected stock returns. The delayed introduction of full currency convertibilityincreased the cost of capital. Also, a string of measures designed to reduce capital mobility before the ultimate collapseof the Bretton Woods System had considerable negative effects. These findings offer an explanation for the mountingevidence suggesting that capital account liberalization facilitates growth.

With a bang, not a whimper: Pricking Germany's "stock market bubble" in 1927 and the slide into depression

In May 1927, the German central bank intervenedindirectly to reduce lending to equity investors.The crash that followed ended the only stockmarket boom during Germany s relative stabilization 1924-28. This paper examines thefactors that lead to the intervention as well asits consequences. We argue that genuine concernabout the exuberant level of the stock market,in addition to worries about an inflow offoreign funds, tipped the scales in favour ofintervention. The evidence strongly suggeststhat the German central bank under HjalmarSchacht was wrong to be concerned aboutstockprices-there was no bubble. Also, theReichsbank was mistaken in its belief thata fall in the market would reduce theimportance of short-term foreign borrowing,and help to ease conditions in the money market.The misguided intervention had important realeffects. Investment suffered, helping to tipGermany into depression.

The evolution of conventions under incomplete information

We formulate an evolutionary learning process in the spirit ofYoung (1993a) for games of incomplete information. The process involves trembles. For many games, if the amount of trembling is small, play will be in accordance with the games' (semi-strict) Bayesian equilibria most of the time. This supports the notion of Bayesian equilibrium. Further, often play will most of the time be in accordance with exactly one Bayesian equilibrium. This gives a selection among the Bayesian equilibria. For two specific games of economic interest wecharacterize this selection. The first is an extension to incomplete information of the prototype strategic conflict known as Chicken. The second is an incomplete information bilateral monopoly, which is also an extension to incompleteinformation of Nash's demand game, or a simple version ofthe so-called sealed bid double auction. For both gamesselection by evolutionary learning is in favor of Bayesianequilibria where some types of players fail to coordinate, such that the outcome is inefficient.

Local volatility changes in the black-scholes model

In this paper we address a problem arising in risk management; namely the study of price variations of different contingent claims in the Black-Scholes model due to anticipating future events. The method we propose to use is an extension of the classical Vega index, i.e. the price derivative with respect to the constant volatility, in thesense that we perturb the volatility in different directions. Thisdirectional derivative, which we denote the local Vega index, will serve as the main object in the paper and one of the purposes is to relate it to the classical Vega index. We show that for all contingent claims studied in this paper the local Vega index can be expressed as a weighted average of the perturbation in volatility. In the particular case where the interest rate and the volatility are constant and the perturbation is deterministic, the local Vega index is an average of this perturbation multiplied by the classical Vega index. We also study the well-known goal problem of maximizing the probability of a perfect hedge and show that the speed of convergence is in fact dependent of the local Vega index.

Endogenous business cycles and stabilization policies

The paper reports results on the effects of stylized stabilization policies on endogenously created fluctuations. A simple monetary model with intertemporally optimizing agents is considered. Fluctuations in output may occur due to fluctuations in labor supply which are again caused by volatile expectations which are ``self fulfilling'', i.e. correct given the model. It turns out that stabilization policies that are sufficiently countercyclical in the sense that government spending (on transfers or demand) depends sufficiently strongly negatively on GNP-increases can stabilize the economy at a monetary steadystate for an arbitrarily low degree of distortion of that steady state. Such stabilization has unambiguously good welfare effects and can be achieved without features such as positive lump sum taxation or negative income taxation as part of the stabilization policy.