Price competition under cost uncertainty: A laboratory analysis

We study the relation between the number of firms and price-cost margins under price competition with uncertainty about competitors' costs. We present results of an experiment in which two, three and four identical firms repeatedly interact in this environment. In line with the theoretical prediction, market prices decrease with the number of firms, but on average stay above marginal costs. Pricing is less aggressive in duopolies than in triopolies and tetrapolies. However, independently from the number of firms, pricing is more aggressive than in the theoretical equilibrium. Both the absolute and the relative surpluses increase with the number of firms. Total surplus is close to the equilibrium level, since enhanced consumer surplus through lower prices is counteracted by occasional displacements of the most efficient firm in production.

Entry and market selection of firms: a laboratory study

We study competition in experimental markets in which two incumbents face entry by three other firms. Our treatments vary with respect to three factors: sequential vs. block or simultaneous entry, the cost functions of entrants and the amount of time during which incumbents are protected from entry. Before entry incumbents are able to collude in all cases. When all firms' costs are the same entry always leads consumer surplus and profits to their equilibrium levels. When entrants are more efficient than incumbents, entry leads consumer surplus to equilibrium. However, total profits remain below equilibrium, due to the fact that the inefficient incumbents produce too much and efficient entrants produce too little. Market behavior is satisfactory from the consumers' standpoint, but does not yield adequate signals to other potential entrants. These results are not affected by whether entry is simultaneous or sequential. The length of the incumbency phase does have some subtle effects.

Organisational status and efficiency: the case of the spanish SOE "Paradores"

The purpose of this paper is to provide new evidence on the issue of the effect on public enterprises economic performance of the introduction of some given changes in organisational status and management practices, while keeping the enterprises under public control. Our approach is case study type and relies on comparative efficiency literature. We identify relevant changes on the organisational status of a State owned large hotel group along a period of twenty years, next we measure its annual efficiency indicators, and then evaluate to which extent the observed changes in economic performance can be attributable to the corresponding management reforms carried out. As a result we find that the formally more relevant change in organisational status (the enterprise passing to be a Limited Company), which implied a substantial increase in the enterprise autonomy, did not produce a significant improvement in its economic performance; a finding contrary to what we expected according to agency theory. However, a second relevant organisational change –five years later- when both the principal (government) and the agent (firm’s CEO) changed is consistently related to a significant improvement in economic performance. As a research implication we abide for use more precise agency theory statements; and as a practical implication we argue here that potentialities of improvement brought about by a formal-legal change in the status of the enterprise may require also –in order to actually improve firm’s efficiency- some changes in the firm’s key personal positions: supervisor (principal) and CEO (agent), in the sense that a change to a greater-autonomy for the enterprise it seems should come together a parallel new ‘management culture’. Practical implications Management good practises to apply to other public enterprise’s restructuring in order to improve their efficiency. It’s the first study on organizational changes and efficiency for an important Spanish public enterprise.

The Cultural Olympiad of Barcelona in 1992: Good points and bad points. Lessons for the Future

This text was presented at the Symposium “Olympic Arts and Culture Festivals: Recent Experiences and Future Design”, held in Chicago on the 23-24 June 2008. It provides with an analysis of good and bad points of the Cultural Olympiad of Barcelona’92 in order to discover, from that past experience, any lessons for future Cultural Olympiads and Olympic Movement cultural policy in general, as well as to rethink, in a critical way, Catalan cultural policies.

Developing discontinuous Galerkin methods for the resolution of the incompressible Navier-Stokes equations

Informe de investigación elaborado a partir de una estancia en el Laboratorio de Diseño Computacional en Aeroespacial en el Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Estados Unidos, entre noviembre de 2006 y agosto de 2007. La aerodinámica es una rama de la dinámica de fluidos referida al estudio de los movimientos de los líquidos o gases, cuya meta principal es predecir las fuerzas aerodinámicas en un avión o cualquier tipo de vehículo, incluyendo los automóviles. Las ecuaciones de Navier-Stokes representan un estado dinámico del equilibrio de las fuerzas que actúan en cualquier región dada del fluido. Son uno de los sistemas de ecuaciones más útiles porque describen la física de una gran cantidad de fenómenos como corrientes del océano, flujos alrededor de una superficie de sustentación, etc. En el contexto de una tesis doctoral, se está estudiando un flujo viscoso e incompresible, solucionando las ecuaciones de Navier- Stokes incompresibles de una manera eficiente. Durante la estancia en el MIT, se ha utilizado un método de Galerkin discontinuo para solucionar las ecuaciones de Navier-Stokes incompresibles usando, o bien un parámetro de penalti para asegurar la continuidad de los flujos entre elementos, o bien un método de Galerkin discontinuo compacto. Ambos métodos han dado buenos resultados y varios ejemplos numéricos se han simulado para validar el buen comportamiento de los métodos desarrollados. También se han estudiado elementos particulares, los elementos de Raviart y Thomas, que se podrían utilizar en una formulación mixta para obtener un algoritmo eficiente para solucionar problemas numéricos complejos.

Estudi d'un sistema integrat en una empresa tecnològica

El projecte que es presenta és l’estudi de diferents sistemes integrats (ERP) per a la seva implementació en una empresa de desenvolupament de software. Els sistemes integrats són sistemes de gestió de la informació que integren i automatitzen moltes de les pràctiques del negoci d’una empresa per a facilitar-ne l’intercanvi d’informació entre les diferents parts. El projecte ha estat desenvolupat seguint la metodologia METRICA per a la implementació de software, i a partir d’aquesta metodologia s’han estudiat les característiques de l’empresa i posteriorment s’ha fet un anàlisi dels diferents sistemes integrats que podrien ser bones opcions per a implementar-los en l’empresa estudiada. Finalment, s’ha escollit el sistema integrat que més requisits acomplia per a ser instal·lat en l’empresa.

Venezuelan economic laboratory. The Case of the altruistic economy of Felipe Pérez Martí

Felipe Pérez Martí, who was the Venezuelan Minister of Planning and Development in the government of Hugo Chávez, proposes an economic model that he calls the altruistic economy or fourth way, which leads cooperative game theory to its logical extremes postulating a pure communism. Here we sustain that, first, it is impossible in the model of Pérez Martí to marginally allocate non-primary goods to those most in need or who most value them, facing a problem of defective economic calculation, and second, in order to achieve equality, he would have to replace his atomic local planners by a central planner, who would be unable to overcome the problem of imperfect and and incomplete information.