The Law of Impersonal Transactions: Meaning and Difficulties

Most economic interactions happen in a context of sequential exchange in which innocent third parties suffer information asymmetry with respect to previous "originative" contracts. The law reduces transaction costs by protecting these third parties but preserves some element of consent by property right holders to avoid damaging property enforcement-e.g., it is they as principals who authorize agents in originative contracts. Judicial verifiability of these originative contracts is obtained either as an automatic byproduct of transactions or, when these would have remained private, by requiring them to be made public. Protecting third parties produces a sort of legal commodity which is easy to trade impersonally, improving the allocation and specialization of resources. Historical delay in generalizing this legal commoditization paradigm is attributed to path dependency-the law first developed for personal trade-and an unbalance in vested interests, as luddite legal professionals face weak public bureaucracies.

Common law and civil law as pro-market adaptations

We argue that in the development of the Western legal system, cognitive departures are themain determinant of the optimal degree of judicial rule-making. Judicial discretion, seen here as the main distinguishing feature between both legal systems, is introduced in civil law jurisdictions to protect, rather than to limit, freedom of contract against potential judicial backlash. Such protection was unnecessary in common law countries, where free-market relations enjoyed safer judicial ground mainly due to their relatively gradual evolution, their reliance on practitioners as judges, and the earlier development of institutional checks and balances that supported private property rights. In our framework, differences in costs and benefits associated with self-interest and lack of information require a cognitive failure to be active.

Cashing by the hour: Why large law firms prefer hourly fees over contingent fees

Large law firms seem to prefer hourly fees over contingent fees. Thispaper provides a moral hazard explanation for this pattern of behavior.Contingent legal fees align the interests of the attorney with those ofthe client, but not necessarily with those of the partnership. We showthat the choice of hourly fees is a solution to an agency problem withmultiple principals, where the interests of one principal (law firm)collide with the interests of the other principal (client).

It's parties that choose electoral systems (or Duverger's Law upside down)

This article presents, discusses and tests the hypothesis that it is the number of parties what can explain the choice of electoral systems, rather than the other way round. Already existing political parties tend to choose electoral systems that, rather than generate new party systems by themselves, will crystallize, consolidate or reinforce previously existing party configurations. A general model develops the argument and presents the concept of 'behavioral-institutional equilibrium' to account for the relation between electoral systems and party systems. The most comprehensive dataset and test of these notions to date, encompassing 219 elections in 87 countries since the 19th century, are presented. The analysis gives strong support to the hypotheses that political party configurations dominated by a few parties tend to establish majority rule electoral systems, while multiparty systems already existed before the introduction of proportional representation. It also offers the new theoretical proposition that strategic party choice of electoral systems leads to a general trend toward proportional representation over time.

Corporate criminal law and organization incentives: A managerial perspective

Corporate criminal liability puts a serious challenge to the economictheory of enforcement. Are corporate crimes different from other crimes?Are these crimes best deterred by punishing individuals, punishing corporations, or both? What is optimal structure of sanctions? Shouldcorporate liability be criminal or civil? This paper has two majorcontributions to the literature. First, it provides a common analyticalframework to most results presented and largely discussed in the field.In second place, by making use of the framework, we provide new insightsinto how corporations should be punished for the offenses committed bytheir employees.

The economics of organized crime and optimal law enforcement

This paper extends the optimal law enforcement literature to organized crime.We model the criminal organization as a vertical structure where the principal extracts some rents from the agents through extortion. Depending on the principal's information set, threats may or may not be credible. As long as threats are credible, the principal is able to fully extract rents.In that case, the results obtained by applying standard theory of optimal law enforcement are robust: we argue for a tougher policy. However, when threats are not credible, the principal is not able to fully extract rents and there is violence. Moreover, we show that it is not necessarily true that a tougher law enforcement policy should be chosen when in presence of organized crime.

Optimal law enforcement and criminal organization

In this paper, we take an organizational view of organized crime. In particular, we study the organizational consequences of product illegality attending at the following characteristics: (i) contracts are not enforceable in court, (ii) all participants are subject to the risk of being punished, (iii) employees present a major threat to the entrepreneur having the most detailed knowledge concerning participation, (iv) separation between ownership and management is difficult because record-keeping and auditing augments criminal evidence.

Dynamic optimal law enforcement with learning

We incorporate the process of enforcement learning by assuming that the agency's current marginal cost is a decreasing function of its past experience of detecting and convicting. The agency accumulates data and information (on criminals, on opportunities of crime) enhancing the ability to apprehend in the future at a lower marginal cost.We focus on the impact of enforcement learning on optimal stationary compliance rules. In particular, we show that the optimal stationary fine could be less-than-maximal and the optimal stationary probability of detection could be higher-than-otherwise.

Optimal law enforcement under asymmetric information

In this paper, we focus on the problem created by asymmetric informationabout the enforcer's (agent's) costs associated to enforcement expenditure. This adverse selection problem affects optimal law enforcement because a low cost enforcer may conceal its information by imitating a high cost enforcer, and must then be given a compensation to be induced to reveal its true costs. The government faces a trade-off between minimizing the enforcer's compensation and maximizing the net surplus of harmful acts. As a consequence, the probability of apprehension and punishment is usually reduced leading to more offenses being committed. We show that asymmetry of information does not affect law enforcement as long as raising public funds is costless. The consideration of costly raising of public funds permits to establish the positive correlation between asymmetry of information between government and enforcers andthe crime rate.

The second law of thermodynamics and the global climate system : A review of the maximum entropy production principle

The long-term mean properties of the global climate system and those of turbulent fluid systems are reviewed from a thermodynamic viewpoint. Two general expressions are derived for a rate of entropy production due to thermal and viscous dissipation (turbulent dissipation) in a fluid system. It is shown with these expressions that maximum entropy production in the Earth s climate system suggested by Paltridge, as well as maximum transport properties of heat or momentum in a turbulent system suggested by Malkus and Busse, correspond to a state in which the rate of entropy production due to the turbulent dissipation is at a maximum. Entropy production due to absorption of solar radiation in the climate system is found to be irrelevant to the maximized properties associated with turbulence. The hypothesis of maximum entropy production also seems to be applicable to the planetary atmospheres of Mars and Titan and perhaps to mantle convection. Lorenz s conjecture on maximum generation of available potential energy is shown to be akin to this hypothesis with a few minor approximations. A possible mechanism by which turbulent fluid systems adjust themselves to the states of maximum entropy production is presented as a selffeedback mechanism for the generation of available potential energy. These results tend to support the hypothesis of maximum entropy production that underlies a wide variety of nonlinear fluid systems, including our planet as well as other planets and stars

Integrated random processes exhibiting long tails, finite moments, and power-law spectra

A dynamical model based on a continuous addition of colored shot noises is presented. The resulting process is colored and non-Gaussian. A general expression for the characteristic function of the process is obtained, which, after a scaling assumption, takes on a form that is the basis of the results derived in the rest of the paper. One of these is an expansion for the cumulants, which are all finite, subject to mild conditions on the functions defining the process. This is in contrast with the Lévy distribution¿which can be obtained from our model in certain limits¿which has no finite moments. The evaluation of the spectral density and the form of the probability density function in the tails of the distribution shows that the model exhibits a power-law spectrum and long tails in a natural way. A careful analysis of the characteristic function shows that it may be separated into a part representing a Lévy process together with another part representing the deviation of our model from the Lévy process. This

Gurt Esparraguera, J. M., Buxeda i Garrigòs M. i Cau Ontiveros, M. A (eds.), LRCW 1 Late Roman Coarte Wares, Cocking Wares and Amphorae in the Mediterranean, Archaeology and Archaeometry BAR 1340

No es exagerado afirmar que, en las últimas décadas, los estudios dedicados a la cultura material de la antigüedad tardía y, en particular, a sus producciones cerámicas, han experimentado un desarrollo acelerado. Este fenómeno se ha traducido en una auténtica explosión de títulos que, con diversa extensión y profundidad, abarcan todas las posibilidades de análisis: desde las monografías de excavación, en las que se describen los repertorios asociados a las formas de vida y trabajo de un asentamiento, hasta las síntesis regionales que abordan cuestiones relacionadas con los mecanismos económicos, culturales y políticos que impulsaron la creación de unos circuitos de intercambio de alcance mediterráneo.

Roman amphora trade across the Straits of Gibraltar: An ancient 'anti-economic practice'?

Summary. Olive oil and fish products from the south of Hispania and North Africa played an important role in the Roman economy. The authors call attention to the asymmetrical distribution of archaeological data available on this subject, in particular the location of amphora kilns, and try to give an explanation, based on the evolution of European archaeology in the twentieth century.

La legislació constantiniana respecte de l'episcopalis audientia.

Dues disposicions de Constantí -el Codex Theodosiallus I, 27, 1 (318) i la COllstitutio Sirmondina I (333)- constitueixen la primera san ció legal del poder jurídic deIs bisbes en afers externs a la religió. Al voltant d' elles creix una nova institució eclesiastica, l' episcopalis audientia, la qual, recollint els preceptes cristians tradicionals, aplica el dret imperial en la resolució de causes de naturales a civil. La controvertida veracitat de les lIeis constantinianes i la varietat d' interpretacions que susciten depassen l' ambit d' allo estrictament jurídic per endinsar-se en la canviant societat romana del segle IV.