Private Governance of Financial Markets: the US Regulatory Regime on Hedge Funds

The article investigates the private governance of financial markets by looking at the evolution of the regulatory debate on hedge funds in the US market. It starts from the premise that the privatization of regulation is always the result of a political decision and analyzes how this decision came about and was implemented in the case of hedge funds. The starting point is the failure of two initiatives on hedge funds that US regulators launched between 1999 an 2004, which the analysis explains by elaborating the concept of self-capture. Facing a trade off between the need to tackle publicly demonized issues and the difficulty of monitoring increasingly sophisticated and powerful private markets, regulators purposefully designed initiatives that were not meant to succeed, that is, they “self-captured” their own activity. By formulating initiatives that were inherently flawed, regulators saved their public role and at the same time paved the way for the privatization of hedge fund regulation. This explanation identifies a link between the failure of public initiatives and the success of private ones. It illustrates a specific case of formation of private authority in financial markets that points to a more general practice emerging in the regulation of finance.

Small firms, growth and financial constraints

This paper analyses the impact of different sources of finance on the growth of firms. Using panel data from Spanish manufacturing firms for the period 2000-2006, we investigate the effects of internal and external finances on firm growth. In particular, we examine three dimensions of these financial sources: a) the performance of the firms’ capital structure in accordance with firm size; b) the effects of internal and external financial sources on growth performance; c) the combined effect of equity, external debt and cash flow on firm growth. We find that low-growth firms are sensitive to cash flow and short-term bank debt, while high-growth firms are more sensitive to long-term debt. Furthermore, equity capital seems to reduce barriers to external finance. Our main conclusion is that during the start-up phase, firms are unable to increase their financial leverage and so their capital structure fails to promote correct investment strategies. However, as their equity capital increases, alternative financial mechanisms, in particular long-term debt, become available, which have a positive impact on firm growth.

Modelling Interbank Relations during the International Financial Crisis

This paper examines the effects of the current financial crisis on the correlations of four international banking stocks. We find that in the beginning of the crisis banks generally show a transition to a higher correlation followed by a dramatic decline towards the end of 2008. These findings are consistent with both traditional contagion theory and the more recent network theory of contagion. JEL classifications: C51; G15 Keywords: Financial Crises; Contagion; Interbank Markets.

Are small firms more sensitive to financial variables?

This paper analyses the impact of different sources of finance on the growth of firms. sing panel data from Spanish manufacturing firms for the period 2000-2006, we investigate the effects of internal and external finances on firm growth. In particular, we examine wo dimensions of these financial sources: a) the performance of the firms' capital structure n accordance with firm size; b) the combined effect of equity, external debt and cash low n firm growth. We find that low-growth firms are sensitive to cash low and short-term ank debt, while high-growth firms are more sensitive to long-term debt. Furthermore, ur results show that low-growth firms are more sensitive to short-term financial variables, hile fast growth firms are more sensitive to long-term financial variables. EL codes: L25, R12. eywords: Finance, Firm growth, Quantile regressions, Small firms

Monetary policy rules and financial stress: does financial instability matter for monetary

We examine whether and how main central banks responded to episodes of financial stress over the last three decades. We employ a new methodology for monetary policy rules estimation, which allows for time-varying response coefficients as well as corrects for endogeneity. This flexible framework applied to the U.S., U.K., Australia, Canada and Sweden together with a new financial stress dataset developed by the International Monetary Fund allows not only testing whether the central banks responded to financial stress but also detects the periods and type of stress that were the most worrying for monetary authorities and to quantify the intensity of policy response. Our findings suggest that central banks often change policy

Misallocation of capital in a model of endogenous financial intermediation and insurance

In this paper we analyze productivity and welfare losses from capital misallocation in a general equilibrium model of occupational choice and endogenous financial intermediation. We study the effects of borrowing and lending, insurance, and risk sharing on the optimal allocation of resources. We find that financial markets together with general equilibrium effects have large impact on entrepreneurs' entry and firm-size decisions. Efficiency gains are increasing in the quality of financial markets, particularly in their ability to alleviate a financing constraint by providing insurance against idiosyncratic risk.

Optimal coexistence of long-term and short-term contracts in labor Markets

We consider a market where firms hire workers to run their projects and such projects differ in profitability. At any period, each firm needs two workers to successfully run its project: a junior agent, with no specific skills, and a senior worker, whose effort is not verifiable. Senior workers differ in ability and their competence is revealed after they have worked as juniors in the market. We study the length of the contractual relationships between firms and workers in an environment where the matching between firms and workers is the result of market interaction. We show that, despite in a one-firm-one-worker set-up long-term contracts are the optimal choice for firms, market forces often induce firms to use short-term contracts. Unless the market only consists of firms with very profitable projects, firms operating highly profitable projects offer short-term contracts to ensure the service of high-ability workers and those with less lucrative projects also use short-term contracts to save on the junior workers' wage. Intermediate firms may (or may not) hire workers through long-term contracts.

Growth, selection and appropriate contracts

We study a dynamic model where growth requires both long-term investment and the selection of talented managers. When ability is not ex-ante observable and contracts are incomplete, managerial selection imposes a cost, as managers facing the risk of being replaced tend to choose a sub-optimally low level of long-term investment. This generates a trade-off between selection and investment that has implications for the choice of contractual relationships. Our analysis shows that rigid long-term contracts sacrificing managerial selection may be optimal at early stages of economic development and when access to information is limited. As the economy grows, however, knowledge accumulation increases the return to talent and makes it optimal to adopt flexible contractual relationships, where managerial selection is implemented even at the cost of lower investment. Better institutions, in the form of a richer contracting environment and less severe informational frictions, speed up the transition to short-term relationships.

Decentralization of contracts with interim sidecontracting

This paper gives a new explanation for the phenomena of subcontracting. A model in which a principal contracts two agents who work in a sequence on a project, have soft information and can collude is considered. Side-contracts between agents can be signed at any stage of the game. Due to limited liability and moral hazard agents obtain a rent. The principal’s problem is to find the preferable contracting structure. It is shown that in this setting a decentralized contracting structure can be superior to a centralized structure for the principal. The paper derives the conditions under which this holds. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D23, D82, L14, L22. Keywords: Contract delegation, Collusion, Interim side-contracting, Moral hazard.

Financial constraints and the failure of innovation projects

Theoretical and empirical approaches have stressed the existence of financial constraints in innovative activities of firms. This paper analyses the role of financial obstacles on the likelihood of abandoning an innovation project. Although a large number of innovation projects are abandoned before their completion, the empirical evidence has focused on the determinants of innovation while failed projects have received little attention. Our analysis differentiates between internal and external barriers on the probability of abandoning a project and we examine whether the effects are different depending on the stage of the innovation process. In the empirical analysis carried out for a panel data of potential innovative Spanish firms for the period 2004-2010, we use a bivariate probit model to take into account the simultaneity of financial constraints and the decision to abandon an innovation project. Our results show that financial constraints most affect the probability of abandoning an innovation project during the concept stage and that low-technological manufacturing and non-KIS service sectors are more sensitive to financial constraints.

Financial constraints and the failure of innovation projects

Theoretical and empirical approaches have stressed the existence of financial constraints in innovative activities of firms. This paper analyses the role of financial obstacles on the likelihood of abandoning an innovation project. Although a large number of innovation projects are abandoned before their completion, the empirical evidence has focused on the determinants of innovation while failed projects have received little attention. Our analysis differentiates between internal and external barriers on the probability of abandoning a project and we examine whether the effects are different depending on the stage of the innovation process. In the empirical analysis carried out for a panel data of potential innovative Spanish firms for the period 2004-2010, we use a bivariate probit model to take into account the simultaneity of financial constraints and the decision to abandon an innovation project. Our results show that financial constraints most affect the probability of abandoning an innovation project during the concept stage and that low-technological manufacturing and non-KIS service sectors are more sensitive to financial constraints. Keywords: barriers to innovation, failure of innovation projects, financial constraints JEL Classifications: O31, D21

Contagion or Interdependence in the recent Global Financial Crisis? An application to the stock markets using unconditional cross-market correlations

We consider stock market contagion as a significant increase in cross-market linkages after a shock to one country or group of countries. Under this definition we study if contagion occurred from the U.S. Financial Crisis to the rest of the major stock markets in the world by using the adjusted (unconditional) correlation coefficient approach (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002) which consists of testing if average crossmarket correlations increase significantly during the relevant period of turmoil. We would not reject the null hypothesis of interdependence in favour of contagion if the increase in correlation only suggests a continuation of high linkages in all state of the world. Moreover, if contagion occurs, this would justify the intervention of the IMF and the suddenly portfolio restructuring during the period under study.

How did the Financial Crisis affect the Real Interest Rate Dynamics in Europe?

We investigate the effects of the financial crisis on the stationarity of real interest rates in the Euro Area. We use a new unit root test developed by Peseran et al. (2013) that allows for multiple unobserved factors in a panel set up. Our results suggest that while short-term and long-term real interest rates were stationary before the financial crisis, they became nonstationary during the crisis period likely due to persistent risk that characterized financial markets during that time. JEL codes: E43, C23. Keywords: Real interest rates, Euro Area, financial crisis, panel unit root tests, cross-sectional dependence.

The Generational contract in the family : explaining regime differences in financial transfers from parents to children in Europe

The exchange of social and economic support between the generationsis one of the main pillars of both family life and welfare systems. Thedebate on how to reform the generational contract is still truncated, however, by focusing on its public dimension only, especially on pensions and health care provisions. For a full account, the transfer of resources between adult generations in the family needs to be included as well. In our previous research we have shown that intergenerationalexchange is more likely to take place but less intense in the Nordicwelfare regime than in the Continental and Southern ones. In thepresent paper we analyze the social mechanisms that create and explain this nexus between patterns of intergenerational transfers and welfare regimes. The notion that Southern European family support networksare stronger and more effective than those of Continental and Northern European countries is only partially confirmed. In Southern (and partly in Continental) countries, children are mostly supported by means of co-residence with their parents till their complete economicindependence. However, once they have left the parental home thereare fewer transfers; support tends to be restricted to children who have special needs (such as for the formation of their own family), and depends more on their parents’ resources. In the Nordic countries, in contrast, transfers are less driven by children’s needs and parentalresources.

Financial Development, Financial Fragility, and Growth

This paper studies the apparent contradiction between two strands of the literature on the effects of financial intermediation on economic activity. On the one hand, the empirical growth literature finds a positive effect of financial depth as measured by, for instance, private domestic credit and liquid liabilities (e.g., Levine, Loayza, and Beck 2000). On the other hand, the banking and currency crisis literature finds that monetary aggregates, such as domestic credit, are among the best predictors of crises and their related economic downturns (e.g., Kaminski and Reinhart 1999). The paper accounts for these contrasting effects based on the distinction between the short- and long-run impacts of financial intermediation. Working with a panel of cross-country and time-series observations, the paper estimates an encompassing model of short- and long-run effects using the Pooled Mean Group estimator developed by Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (1999). The conclusion from this analysis is that a positive long-run relationship between financial intermediation and output growth co-exists with a, mostly, negative short-run relationship. The paper further develops an explanation for these contrasting effects by relating them to recent theoretical models, by linking the estimated short-run effects to measures of financial fragility (namely, banking crises and financial volatility), and by jointly analyzing the effects of financial depth and fragility in classic panel growth regressions.