Sources of comparative advantage in polluting industries (with appendix)

We study the determinants of comparative advantage in polluting industries. We combine dataon environmental policy at the country level with data on pollution intensity at the industry levelto show that countries with laxer environmental regulation have a comparative advantage in polluting industries. Further, we address the potential problem of reverse causality. We propose aninstrument for environmental regulation based on meteorological determinants of pollution dispersion identified by the atmospheric pollution literature. We find that the effect of environmentalregulation on the pattern of trade is causal and comparable in magnitude to the effect of physicaland human capital.

Forest fires: Evaluation of government intervention measures

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relation between government measures, volunteer participation, climate variables and forest fires. A number of studies have related forest fires to causes of ignition, to fire history in one area, to the type of vegetation and weathercharacteristics or to community institutions, but there is little research on the relation between fire production and government prevention and extinction measures from a policy evaluation perspective.An observational approach is first applied to select forest fires in the north east of Spain. Taking a selection of fires with a certain size, a multiple regression analysis is conducted to find significant relations between policy instruments under the control of the government and the number of hectares burn in each case, controlling at the same time the effect of weather conditions and other context variables. The paper brings evidence on the effects of simultaneity and the relevance of recurring to army soldiers in specific days with extraordinary high simultaneity. The analysis also brings light on the effectiveness of twopreventive policies and of helicopters for extinction tasks.

Tax reforms and inequality: theoretical and empirical implications

In this paper we examine the effect of tax policy on the relationship between inequality and growth in a two-sector non-scale model. With non-scale models, the longrun equilibrium growth rate is determined by technological parameters and it is independent of macroeconomic policy instruments. However, this fact does not imply that fiscal policy is unimportant for long-run economic performance. It indeed has important effects on the different levels of key economic variables such as per capita stock of capital and output. Hence, although the economy grows at the same rate across steady states, the bases for economic growth may be different.The model has three essential features. First, we explicitly model skill accumulation, second, we introduce government finance into the production function, and we introduce an income tax to mirror the fiscal events of the 1980¿s and 1990¿s in the US. The fact that the non-scale model is associated with higher order dynamics enables it to replicate the distinctly non-linear nature of inequality in the US with relative ease. The results derived in this paper attract attention to the fact that the non-scale growth model does not only fit the US data well for the long-run (Jones, 1995b) but also that it possesses unique abilities in explaining short term fluctuations of the economy. It is shown that during transition the response of the relative simulated wage to changes in the tax code is rather non-monotonic, quite in accordance to the US inequality pattern in the 1980¿s and early 1990¿s.More specifically, we have analyzed in detail the dynamics following the simulation of an isolated tax decrease and an isolated tax increase. So, after a tax decrease the skill premium follows a lower trajectory than the one it would follow without a tax decrease. Hence we are able to reduce inequality for several periods after the fiscal shock. On the contrary, following a tax increase, the evolution of the skill premium remains above the trajectory carried on by the skill premium under a situation with no tax increase. Consequently, a tax increase would imply a higher level of inequality in the economy

Tax reforms and inequality: theoretical and empirical implications

In this paper we examine the effect of tax policy on the relationship between inequality and growth in a two-sector non-scale model. With non-scale models, the longrun equilibrium growth rate is determined by technological parameters and it is independent of macroeconomic policy instruments. However, this fact does not imply that fiscal policy is unimportant for long-run economic performance. It indeed has important effects on the different levels of key economic variables such as per capita stock of capital and output. Hence, although the economy grows at the same rate across steady states, the bases for economic growth may be different.The model has three essential features. First, we explicitly model skill accumulation, second, we introduce government finance into the production function, and we introduce an income tax to mirror the fiscal events of the 1980¿s and 1990¿s in the US. The fact that the non-scale model is associated with higher order dynamics enables it to replicate the distinctly non-linear nature of inequality in the US with relative ease. The results derived in this paper attract attention to the fact that the non-scale growth model does not only fit the US data well for the long-run (Jones, 1995b) but also that it possesses unique abilities in explaining short term fluctuations of the economy. It is shown that during transition the response of the relative simulated wage to changes in the tax code is rather non-monotonic, quite in accordance to the US inequality pattern in the 1980¿s and early 1990¿s.More specifically, we have analyzed in detail the dynamics following the simulation of an isolated tax decrease and an isolated tax increase. So, after a tax decrease the skill premium follows a lower trajectory than the one it would follow without a tax decrease. Hence we are able to reduce inequality for several periods after the fiscal shock. On the contrary, following a tax increase, the evolution of the skill premium remains above the trajectory carried on by the skill premium under a situation with no tax increase. Consequently, a tax increase would imply a higher level of inequality in the economy

El papel de los científicos en la reforma medioambiental de la sociedad

En los últimos años, ha habido un creciente interés por la integración de la ciencia y la toma de decisiones políticas en cuestiones medioambientales. Se considera que los científicos pueden facilitar la resolución de problemas medioambientales complejos a través de una mayor implicación en el proceso político. Sin embargo, las diferencias de valores e intereses entre los científicos y los políticos y otros grupos de interés pueden dificultar esta integración. Este estudio analiza, a partir de entrevistas semiestructuradas a científicos medioambientales, las creencias y las actitudes de los científicos hacia el papel de la ciencia y los científicos en el proceso político medioambiental.

The effect of tax enforcement on tax elasticities: Evidence from charitable contributions in France

Optimal tax formulas expressed in "sufficient statistics" are usually calibrated under the assumptionthat the relevant tax elasticities are unaffected by other available policy instruments.In practice though, tax authorities have many more instruments than the mere tax rates andtax elasticities are functions of all these policy instruments. In this paper we provide evidencethat tax elasticities are extremely sensitive to a particular policy instrument: the level of taxenforcement. We exploit a natural experiment that took place in France in 1983, when the taxadministration tightened the requirements to claim charitable deductions. The reform led to asubstantial drop in the amount of contributions reported to the administration, which can becredibly attributed to overreporting of charitable contributions before the reform, rather thanto a real change in giving behaviours. We show that the reform was also associated with asubstantial decline in the absolute value of the elasticity of reported contributions. This findingallows us to partially identify the elasticity of overreporting contributions, which is shown tobe large and inferior to -2 in the lax enforcement regime. We further show using bunching oftaxpayers at kink-points of the tax schedule that the elasticity of taxable income also experienceda significant decline after the reform. Our results suggest that optimizing the tax rate fora given tax elasticity when other policy instruments are not optimized can lead to misleadingconclusions when tax authorities have another instrument that could set the tax elasticity itselfat its optimal level as in Kopczuk and Slemrod [2002].

Political centralization and government accountability

This paper studies fiscal federalism when regions differ in voters' ability to monitor publicofficials. We develop a model of political agency in which rent-seeking politicians providepublic goods to win support from heterogeneously informed voters. In equilibrium, voterinformation increases government accountability but displays decreasing returns. Therefore,political centralization reduces aggregate rent extraction when voter information varies acrossregions. It increases welfare as long as the central government is required to provide publicgoods uniformly across regions. The need for uniformity implies an endogenous trade off between reducing rents through centralization and matching idiosyncratic preferences throughdecentralization. We find that a federal structure with overlapping levels of government canbe optimal only if regional differences in accountability are sufficiently large. The modelpredicts that less informed regions should reap greater benefits when the central governmentsets a uniform policy. Consistent with our theory, we present empirical evidence that lessinformed states enjoyed faster declines in pollution after the 1970 Clean Air Act centralizedenvironmental policy at the federal level.

Unconventional Determinants of Greenhouse Gas Emissions: The Role of Trust

[cat] Les normes socials han estat incloses en la teoria de l’acció col.lectiva per a superar les dificultats per explicar perquè la gestió del béns comuns podria ser més efectiva quan s’autoregula per les mateixes comunitats. El paper rellevant de la confiança en els altres s’ha identificat en diversos contextos d’acció social a nivell local, però només recentment s’ha considerat la idea que també podria ser rellevant en el cas de béns comuns de caire global, seguint l’evidència bàsicament descriptiva recollida per Elinor Ostrom. Però fins ara no hi havia proves quantitatives disponibles d’aquesta idea. Utilitzant un conjunt de dades de 29 països europeus durant el període 1990-2007, donem evidència empírica a favor del paper del nivell de confiança en els altres en el context dels béns públics globals. Concloem que el nivell de confiança en els altres té un impacte reductor de les emissions de gasos d’efecte hivernacle; per exemple, l’extrapolació dels resultats implicaria una reducció d’emissions d’Espanya del 12,5% si el nivell mitjà de confiança en els altres dels espanyols fos tan elevat com els dels suecs.

Unconventional Determinants of Greenhouse Gas Emissions: The Role of Trust

[cat] Les normes socials han estat incloses en la teoria de l’acció col.lectiva per a superar les dificultats per explicar perquè la gestió del béns comuns podria ser més efectiva quan s’autoregula per les mateixes comunitats. El paper rellevant de la confiança en els altres s’ha identificat en diversos contextos d’acció social a nivell local, però només recentment s’ha considerat la idea que també podria ser rellevant en el cas de béns comuns de caire global, seguint l’evidència bàsicament descriptiva recollida per Elinor Ostrom. Però fins ara no hi havia proves quantitatives disponibles d’aquesta idea. Utilitzant un conjunt de dades de 29 països europeus durant el període 1990-2007, donem evidència empírica a favor del paper del nivell de confiança en els altres en el context dels béns públics globals. Concloem que el nivell de confiança en els altres té un impacte reductor de les emissions de gasos d’efecte hivernacle; per exemple, l’extrapolació dels resultats implicaria una reducció d’emissions d’Espanya del 12,5% si el nivell mitjà de confiança en els altres dels espanyols fos tan elevat com els dels suecs.

Effects of the 80 km/h and variable speed limits on air pollution in the metropolitan area of Barcelona

In 2008 the regional government of Catalonia (Spain) reduced the maximum speed limit on several stretches of congested urban motorway in the Barcelona metropolitan area to 80 km/h, while in 2009 it introduced a variable speed system on other stretches of its metropolitan motorways. We use the differences-in-differences method, which enables a policy impact to be measured under specific conditions, to assess the impact of these policies on emissions of NOx and PM10. Empirical estimation indicate that reducing the speed limit to 80 km h-1 causes a 1.7 to 3.2% increase in NOx and 5.3 to 5.9% in PM10. By contrast, the variable speed policy reduced NOx and PM10 pollution by 7.7 to 17.1% and 14.5 to 17.3%. As such, a variable speed policy appears to be a more effective environmental policy than reducing the speed limit to a maximum of 80 km/h.

Perspectiva del derecho del medio ambiente y de políticas ambientales de la Unión Europea

El artículo expone la actividad de las instituciones en el ámbito de la política europea de medio ambiente. Se analiza también el papel de la Unión Europea en materia de cambio climático y biodiversidad.

Industrial emissions abatement: Untangling the impact of the EU ETS and the economic crisis

In this study we use historical emission data from installations under the European Union Emissions Trading System, -EU ETS- to evaluate the impact of this policy on industrial greenhouse gas emissions during the first two trading phases, 2005-2012. As such the analysis seeks to disentangle two causes of emission abatement: that attributable to the EU ETS and that attributable to the economic crisis that hit the EU in 2008/09. Using a panel data approach the estimated emissions reduction attributable to the EU ETS is about 21 per cent of the total emission abatement during the observation period. These results suggest therefore that the lion’s share of abatement was attributable to the effects of the economic crisis, a finding that has serious implications for future policy adjustments affecting core elements of the EU ETS, including the distribution of EU emission allowances.

World Polarization in carbon emissions, potential conflict and groups: an updated revision

Typically, conflicts in world environmental negotiations are related, amongst other aspects, to the level of polarization of the countries in groups with conflicting interests. Given the predictable relationship between polarization and conflict, it would seem logical to evaluate the degree to which the distribution of countries – for example, in terms of their CO2 emissions per capita – would be structured through groups which in themselves are antagonistic, as well as their evolution over time. This paper takes the concept of polarization to explore this distribution for the period 1992-2010, looking at different analytic approaches related to the concept. Specifically, it makes a comparative evaluation of the results associated with endogenous multi-polarization measures (i.e. EGR and DER indices), exogenous measures (i.e. Z-K or multidimensional index) and strict bipolarization measures (i.e. Wolfson’s measure). Indeed, the interest lies not only in evaluating the global situation of polarization by comparing the different approaches and their temporal patterns, but also in examining the explanatory capacity of the different proxy groups used as a possible reference for designing global environmental policy from a group premise. JEL codes: D39; Q43; Q56. Key words: polarization; carbon emissions; conflict;

Optimal enforcement policy and firms' emissions and compliance with environmental taxes

In a market where firms with different characteristics decide upon both the level of emissions and their reports, we study the optimal audit policy for an enforcement agency whose objective is to minimize the level of emissions. We show that it is optimal to devote the resources primarily to the easiest-to-monitor firms and to those firms that value pollution the less. Moreover, unless the budget for monitoring is very large, there are always firms that do not comply with the environmental objective and others that do comply; but all of them evade the environmental taxes.

Environmental regulation: choice of instruments under imperfect compliance

Compliance is an important issue in environmental regulation. In this paper, we discuss some of the key elements of the problem and analyze a situation where emissions are not random and firms are risk-neutral. We study the firm's decision on emissions and compliance when the environmental regulation is based on standards and the enforcement agency audits the firm with a certain probability. We then compare total emissions when environmental regulation is based on different instruments: standards, taxes, and tradable permits. We show that when compliance is an issue, environmental taxes are superior to the other instruments. We also analyze the (static) efficiency of the solution.