Botiga Virtual Esports Pirinencs

L'empresa Esports Pirinencs vol augmentar el seu volum de vendes amb una botiga virtual. Es vol aprofitar la mateixa aplicació per tenir un manteniment dels productes que s'ofereix als clients. Utilitzant una validació d'usuari es podrà accedir amb el rol Client o amb el rol Empleat.

Análisis, Diseño e implementación de un sistema B2E en una administración pública.

Es pretén implementar un sistema B2E (abreviatura de l'expressió business to employee, de l'Empresa a empleat) que permeti a través d'un client lWeb, de forma àgil, ràpida, segura i sezcilla, realitzar els processos de comunicació més habituals entre un organisme públic i els seus professionals específicament en l'àmbit de tramitació administrativa.

Solució global per la gestió de dades d'empleat mitjançant J2ME/J2EE.

Aquest treball final de carrera es basa en l'anàlisi, disseny i implementació d'una solució per comunicar un empleat i la seva empresa per tal de gestionar informació i dades de l'empleat com poden ser: la nòmina, el full d'hores, el full de despeses i la consulta i sol·licitud de vacances.

Casal de cinema

El treball que es presenta a continuació és resultat de les pràctiques de Psicopedagogia realitzades al Museu del Cinema de Girona des del febrer fins al maig de 2012. El treball és, bàsicament, una proposta didàctica per a la realització d'un Casal d'estiu sobre cinema per a la institució anteriorment esmentada

SAP web applications

This project report has been writen by four international students studying at the university of Vitus Bering Denmark. Its purpose is to provide a closer view on the establishment of a new company, producing software applications, in particular SAP applications. We started our work from a problem, that was finding a new way to manage projects and for this reason our focus has been on a particular kind of program, enabling the companies and the workers to control their projects and the hours spent by each employee on each project.

The effects of walking while working on productivity and health: a field experiment

Lack of physical activity can cause health problems and diminish organizational productivity. We conducted a 12-months long field experiment in a financial services company to study the effects of slow-moving treadmills outfitted for office work on employee productivity and health. 43 sedentary volunteers were assigned randomly to two groups to receive treadmill workstations 7 months apart. Employees could opt at will for standard chair-desk arrangement. Biometric measurements were taken quarterly and weekly online performance surveys were administered to study participants and to more than 200 non-participants and their supervisors.In this study we explore three questions concerning the effects of the introduction of treadmills in the workplace. (1) Does it improve overall physical activity? (2) Does it improve health measures? (3) Does it improve performance? The answers are as follows. (1) Yes (net effect of almost half an hour a day). (2) Yes (small gains, one minor decline). (3) No and yes (initial decline followed by increase to recover to initial level within one year) – based on weekly employee self reports.

Self-serving biases: Evidence from a simulated labor relationship

Previous studies have found evidence of a self-serving bias in bargaining and dispute resolution. We use experimental data to test for this effect in a simulated labor relatonship. We finda consistent discrepancy between employer beliefs and employee actions that can only be attributed to self-serving biases. This discrepancy is evident through stated beliefs, revealed satisfaction, and actual actions. We present evidenceand discuss implications.

Attribution and reciprocity in a simulated labor market: An experimental investigation

While papers such as Akerlof and Yellen (1990) and Rabin (1993) argue that psychological considerations such as fairness and reciprocity are important in individual decision-making, there is little explicit empirical evidence of reciprocal altruism in economic environments. This paper tests whether attribution of volition in choosing a wage has a significant effect on subsequent costly effort provision. An experiment was conducted in which subjects are first randomly divided into groups of employers and employees. Wages were selected and employees asked to choose an effort level, where increased effort is costly to the employee, but highly beneficial to the employer. The wage-determination process was common knowledge and wages were chosen either by the employer or by an external process. There is evidence for both distributional concerns and reciprocal altruism. The slope of the effort/wage profile is clearly positive in all cases, but is significantly higher when wages are chosen by the employer, offering support for the hypothesis of reciprocity. There are implications for models of utility and a critique of some current models is presented.

Determinants of organizational form: Transaction costs and institutions in the European trucking industry

We explain why European trucking carriers are much smaller and rely more heavily on owner-operators(as opposed to employee drivers) than their US counterparts. Our analysis begins by ruling outdifferences in technology as the source of those disparities and confirms that standard hypothesesin organizational economics, which have been shown to explain the choice of organizational form inUS industry, also apply in Europe. We then argue that the preference for subcontracting oververtical integration in Europe is the result of European institutions particularly, labor regulationand tax laws that increase the costs of vertical integration.

New ideas need new space

We develop a setting with weak intellectual property rights, where firms' boundaries, location and knowledge spillovers are endogenous. We have two main results. The first one is that, if communication costs increase with distance, entrepreneurs concerned about information leakage have a benefit from locating away from the industry center: distance is an obstacle to collusive trades between members andnon-members. The second result is that we identify a trade-off for the entrepreneur between owning a facility (controlling all its characteristics) and sharing a facility with a {\it non-member} (an agent not involved in production), therefore losing control over some of its characteristics. We focus on ``location" as the relevant characteristic of the facility, but location can be used as a spatial metaphor for other relevant characteristics of the facility. For theentrepreneur, sharing the facility with non-members implies that the latter, as co-owners, know the location (even if they do not have access to it). Knowledge of the location for the co-owners facilitates collusion with employees, what increases leakage. The model yields a benefit for new plants from spatial dispersion (locating at the periphery of the industry), particularly so for new plants of new firms.We relate this result with recent empirical findings on the dynamics of industry location.

On the valuation and incentive effects of executive cash bonus contracts

Executive compensation packages are often valued in an inconsistent manner: while employee stock options (ESOs) are typically valued ex-ante, cash bonuses are valued ex-post. This renders the existing valuation models of employee compensation packages theoretically unsatisfactory and, potentially, empirically distortive. In this paper, we propose an option-based framework for ex-ante valuation of cash bonus contracts. After obtaining closed-form expressions for ex-ante values of several frequently used types of bonus contracts, we utilize them to explore the e¤ects that the shape of a bonus contract has on the executive s attitude toward risk-taking. We, also, study pay-performance sensitivity of such contracts. We show that the terms of a bonus contract can dramatically impact both risk-taking behavior as well as pay-performance incentives. Several testable predictions are made, and venues of future research outlined.

Effects of employment protection and product market regulations on the Italian labor market

Labor market regulations have often being blamed for high and persistentunemployment in Europe, but evidence on their impact remains mixed. Morerecently, attention has turned to the impact of product market regulationson employment growth. This paper analyzes how labor and product marketregulations interact to affect turnover and employment. We present a matchingmodel which illustrates how barriers to entry in the product market mitigatethe impact of labor market deregulation. We, then, use the Italian SocialSecurity employer-employee panel to study the interaction between barriersto entry and dismissal costs. We exploit the fact that costs for unjustdismissals in Italy increased for firms below 15 employees relative to biggerfirms after 1990. We find that the increase in dismissal costs after 1990decreased accessions and separations in small relative to big firms,especially for women. Moreover, consistent with our model, we find evidencethat the increase in dismissal costs had smaller effects on turnover for womenin sectors faced with strict product market regulations.

When are layoffs acceptable? Evidence from a quasi-experiment

Many authors have discussed a decline in internal labor markets and an apparent shift to a new employment contract, characterized by less commitment between employer and employee and more portable skills. These discussions occur without much evidence on what employment contract employees currently feel is fair. We perfomed quasi-experimental surveys to study when employees in the U.S. andCanada feel that layoffs are fair.Layoffs were perceived as more fair if they were due to lower product demand than if the result of employee suggestions. This result appears to be solely due to norms of reciprocity (companiesshould not punish employees for their efforts), rather than norms of sharing rents, as new technology was also considered a justification for layoffs.Consistent with theories of distributive and procedural equity, layoffs were perceived as more fair if the CEO voluntarily shared the pain. CEO bonuses due to layoffs lowered their reported fairness only slightly.Respondents in Silicon Valley were not more accepting of layoffsthan were those in Canada on average, although the justificationsconsidered valid differed slightly.

Union power, minimum wage legislation endogenous labor supplies and production

The objective of this work is to study the impact of the unions' bargaining power on production and wages. We present a model where a competitive final good is produced through two substitutable intermediate goods, one produced by unskilled labor and the other by skilled labor. Potential workers decide at their cost to become skilled or unskilled and, thus, labor supplies are determined endogenously. We find that the reallocation of the labor supplies due to changes in the unskilled (or skilled) unions¿ bargaining power may have a positive impact on the final goods production. At the same time, total labor earnings increase with the unskilled unions¿ bargaining power if the final goods production increases too. We also show that the minimum wage legislation has efects similar to an increase in the bargaining power of the unskilled unions.

Union power, minimum wage legislation endogenous labor supplies and production

The objective of this work is to study the impact of the unions' bargaining power on production and wages. We present a model where a competitive final good is produced through two substitutable intermediate goods, one produced by unskilled labor and the other by skilled labor. Potential workers decide at their cost to become skilled or unskilled and, thus, labor supplies are determined endogenously. We find that the reallocation of the labor supplies due to changes in the unskilled (or skilled) unions¿ bargaining power may have a positive impact on the final goods production. At the same time, total labor earnings increase with the unskilled unions¿ bargaining power if the final goods production increases too. We also show that the minimum wage legislation has efects similar to an increase in the bargaining power of the unskilled unions.