A hybrid method for sag source location in power network

The work presented in this paper belongs to the power quality knowledge area and deals with the voltage sags in power transmission and distribution systems. Propagating throughout the power network, voltage sags can cause plenty of problems for domestic and industrial loads that can financially cost a lot. To impose penalties to responsible party and to improve monitoring and mitigation strategies, sags must be located in the power network. With such a worthwhile objective, this paper comes up with a new method for associating a sag waveform with its origin in transmission and distribution networks. It solves this problem through developing hybrid methods which hire multiway principal component analysis (MPCA) as a dimension reduction tool. MPCA reexpresses sag waveforms in a new subspace just in a few scores. We train some well-known classifiers with these scores and exploit them for classification of future sags. The capabilities of the proposed method for dimension reduction and classification are examined using the real data gathered from three substations in Catalonia, Spain. The obtained classification rates certify the goodness and powerfulness of the developed hybrid methods as brand-new tools for sag classification

Debt enforcement and relational contracting

We examine how third-party debt enforcement affects the emergence and performance ofrelational contracts in credit markets. We implement an experiment with finitely repeatedcredit relationships in which borrowers can default. In the weak enforcement treatmentdefaulting borrowers can keep their funds invested. In the strong enforcement treatmentdefaulting borrowers have to liquidate their investment. Under weak enforcement fewerrelationships emerge in which loans are extended and repaid. When such relationships doemerge they exhibit a lower credit volume than under strong enforcement. These findingssuggest that relational contracting in credit markets requires a minimum standard of thirdpartydebt enforcement.

Propostes de polítiques laborals

Us preocupa el problema de l’atur? Us heu preguntat mai per què Espanya té unes taxes d’atur superiors als països de referència en polítiques laborals? Creieu que el mercat laboral espanyol té moltes mancances? Penseu que el model productiu actual, basat en la construcció i el turisme, és sostenible a llarg termini? Aquestes preguntes, juntament amb la gran destrucció d’ocupació arran de la crisi, -durant l’últim trimestre del 2008 a l’economia espanyola li correspon el 70% (1) de la destrucció de llocs de treball a Europa- ens ha portat a reflexionar sobre els determinants i lesconseqüències de l’atur espanyol. Seguint aquesta línia, ens preguntàvem si,mitjançant un seguit de propostes laborals, Espanya podria arribar a reduir les sevestaxes d’atur a llarg termini i equiparar-les a nivells europeus.Si voleu saber més sobre les possibles solucions, en aquest treball exposemun seguit de mesures originals i d’altres basades en idees d’economistes experts queintenten millorar el capital humà de l’economia, el model productiu, els valors imentalitat de la societat, les institucions laborals i la legislació laboral existent , amb laqual cosa es pretén, com a fi últim, augmentar els nivells d’ocupació de l’economia.Algunes d’aquestes són:· Un nou contracte únic i flexibilització laboral· Canvis en la negociació col·lectiva, fiscalitat empresarial i programes formatius· Model original en les prestacions d’atur· Impuls a un nou model productiuAplicant aquestes propostes creiem que és possible reduir la temporalitat almercat laboral espanyol així com també lluitar per aconseguir la plena ocupaciópromocionant el treball estable i de qualitat. Tot i que el problema de l’atur genera moltdebat social entre els diferents agents socials, les propostes han intentat cercar elconsens i, sobretot, la millora econòmica de la societat.

The Sustainable Debts of Philip II: A Reconstruction of Spain's Fiscal Position, 1560-1598

The defaults of Philip II have attained mythical status as the origin of sovereign debt crises. Four times during his reign the king failed to honor his debts and had to renegotiate borrowing contracts. In this paper, we reassess the fiscal position of Habsburg Spain. New archival evidence allows us to derive comprehensive estimates of debt and revenue. These show that primary surpluses were sufficient to make the king's debt sustainable in most scenarios. Spain's debt burden was manageable up to the 1580s, and its fiscal position only deteriorated for good after the defeat of the "Invincible Armada." We also estimate fiscal policy reaction functions, and show that Spain under the Habsburgs was at least as "responsible" as the US in the 20th century or as Britain in the 18th century. Our results suggest that the outcome of uncertain events such as wars may influence on a history of default more than strict adherence to fiscal rules.

Institutions, Public Debt and Foreign Finance

We study the role of domestic financial institutions in sustaining capital flows to the private and public sector of a country whose government can default on its debt. As in recent public debt crises, in our model public defaults weaken banks' balance sheets, disrupting domestic financial markets. This effect leads to a novel complementarity between private capital inflows and public borrowing, where the former sustain the latter by boosting the government's cost of default. Our key message is that, by shaping the direction of private capital flows, financial institutions determine whether financial integration improves or reduces government discipline. We explore the implications of this complementarity for financial liberalization and debt-financed bailouts of banks. We present some evidence consistent with complementarity.

Contractual resolutions of financial distress

In a financial contracting model, we study the optimal debt structure to resolve financial distress. Weshow that a debt structure where two distinct debt classes co-exist - one class fully concentrated andwith control rights upon default, the other dispersed and without control rights - removes the controllingcreditor's liquidation bias when investor protection is strong. These results rationalize the use and theperformance of floating charge financing, debt financing where the controlling creditor takes the entirebusiness as collateral, in countries with strong investor protection. Our theory predicts that the efficiency ofcontractual resolutions of financial distress should increase with investor protection.

Recursive contracts

We obtain a recursive formulation for a general class of contractingproblems involving incentive constraints. Under these constraints,the corresponding maximization (sup) problems fails to have arecursive solution. Our approach consists of studying the Lagrangian.We show that, under standard assumptions, the solution to theLagrangian is characterized by a recursive saddle point (infsup)functional equation, analogous to Bellman's equation. Our approachapplies to a large class of contractual problems. As examples, westudy the optimal policy in a model with intertemporal participationconstraints (which arise in models of default) and intertemporalcompetitive constraints (which arise in Ramsey equilibria).

Enforcement problems and secondary markets

There is a large and growing literature that studies the effects of weak enforcement institutions on economic performance. This literature has focused almost exclusively on primary markets, in which assets are issued and traded to improve the allocation of investment and consumption. The general conclusion is that weak enforcement institutions impair the workings of these markets, giving rise to various inefficiencies.But weak enforcement institutions also create incentives to develop secondary markets, in which the assets issued in primary markets are retraded. This paper shows that trading in secondary markets counteracts the effects of weak enforcement institutions and, in the absence of further frictions, restores efficiency.

The role of institutions in the contractual process

Human beings increase their productivity by specializingtheir resources and exchanging their products. Theorganization of exchange is costly, however, becausespecialized activities need coordination and incentiveshave to be aligned. This work first describes how theseexchanges are organized in an institutional environment.It then focuses on the dual effect of this environment-as with any other specialized resource, institutions maybe used for expropriation purposes. They enjoyspecialization advantages in safeguarding exchange butthey also make possible new forms of opportunism,causing new costs of exchange. Three perverse tendenciesare identified:In the legal field, there is a surplus ofmandatory rules and, at the same time, a deficit in default rules. Second, courts activity is biased againstthe quasi-judicial role of the parties and the market. Third, Market enforcement is based on reputationalassets that are badly exposed to opportunism.

Debt sustainability in historical perspective: The role of fiscal repression

This article examines the debt history of two contenders for European hegemony: 16th-centurySpain and 18th-century Britain. We analyze their fiscal behavior using measures of overborrowingand fiscal policy functions. Our results suggest that stringency was not key for Britain ssuccess in avoiding default. Instead, fiscal repression allowed the United Kingdom to borrowat below-market rates, thereby outspending its continental rivals.

On the relevance of modeling volatility for pricing purposes

This paper presents a two-factor (Vasicek-CIR) model of the term structure of interest rates and develops its pricing and empirical properties. We assume that default free discount bond prices are determined by the time to maturity and two factors, the long-term interest rate and the spread. Assuming a certain process for both factors, a general bond pricing equation is derived and a closed-form expression for bond prices is obtained. Empirical evidence of the model's performance in comparisson with a double Vasicek model is presented. The main conclusion is that the modeling of the volatility in the long-term rate process can help (in a large amount) to fit the observed data can improve - in a reasonable quantity - the prediction of the future movements in the medium- and long-term interest rates. However, for shorter maturities, it is shown that the pricing errors are, basically, negligible and it is not so clear which is the best model to be used.

How enforcement institutions affect markets

In an experiment we study market outcomes under alternative incentive structures for third-party enforcers. Our transactions resemble an anonymous credit market where lenders can give loans and borrowers can repay them. When borrowers default, judges are free to enforce repayment but are themselves paid differently in each of three treatments. First, paying judges according to lenders votes maximizes surplus and the equality of earnings. In contrast, paying judges according to borrowers votes triggers insufficient enforcement, destroying the market and producing the lowest surplus and the most unequal distribution of earnings. Lastly, judges paid the average earnings of borrowers and lenders achieve results close to those based on lender voting. We employ a steps-of-reasoning argument to interpret the performances of different institutions. When voting and enforcement rights are allocated to different classes of actors, the difficulty of their task changes, and arguably as a consequence they focus on high or low surplus equilibria.

Promoting rule compliance in daily-life: Evidence from a randomized field experiment in the public libraries of Barcelona

We study how to promote compliance with rules in everyday situations. Having access to unique data on the universe of users of all public libraries inBarcelona, we test the effect of sending email messages with dierent contents.We find that users return their items earlier if asked to do so in a simple email.Emails reminding users of the penalties associated with late returns are more effective than emails with only a generic reminder. We find differential treatmenteffects by user types. The characteristics we analyze are previous compliance,gender, age, and nationality.

Trade credit: Suppliers as debt collectors and insurance providers

There are two fundamental puzzles about trade credit: why does it appearto be so expensive,and why do input suppliers engage in the business oflending money? This paper addresses and answers both questions analysingthe interaction between the financial and the industrial aspects of thesupplier-customer relationship. It examines how, in a context of limitedenforceability of contracts, suppliers may have a comparative advantageover banks in lending to their customers because they hold the extrathreat of stopping the supply of intermediate goods. Suppliers may alsoact as lenders of last resort, providing insurance against liquidityshocks that may endanger the survival of their customers. The relativelyhigh implicit interest rates of trade credit result from the existenceof default and insurance premia. The implications of the model areexamined empirically using parametric and nonparametric techniques on apanel of UK firms.

Combating corruption in international business transactions

We analyze the impact of different types of international conventions thatrequire signatory countries to penalize domestic firms that are found tohave bribed foreign public officials. We analyze enforcement of penaltiesunder a convention styled after the OECD's 'Convention on Combating Briberyof Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions', in whichsignatory countries commit to prosecuting firms that have bribed publicofficials of any foreign country. We compare the results with the case inwhich the convention requires signatory countries to commit to prosecutingfirms that have bribed public officials of signatory countries only.We argue that the second type of convention is more likely to ensureenforcement of penalties on firms found to have bribed foreign publicofficials.