Experiencing simulated outcomes

Whereas much literature has documented difficulties in making probabilistic inferences, it hasalso emphasized the importance of task characteristics in determining judgmental accuracy.Noting that people exhibit remarkable efficiency in encoding frequency information sequentially,we construct tasks that exploit this ability by requiring people to experience the outcomes ofsequentially simulated data. We report two experiments. The first involved seven well-knownprobabilistic inference tasks. Participants differed in statistical sophistication and answered withand without experience obtained through sequentially simulated outcomes in a design thatpermitted both between- and within-subject analyses. The second experiment involvedinterpreting the outcomes of a regression analysis when making inferences for investmentdecisions. In both experiments, even the statistically naïve make accurate probabilistic inferencesafter experiencing sequentially simulated outcomes and many prefer this presentation format. Weconclude by discussing theoretical and practical implications.

Entrepreneurial success and failure: Confidence and fallible judgement

Excess entry or the high failure rate of market-entry decisions is often attributed tooverconfidence exhibited by entreprene urs. We show analytically that whereas excess entryis an inevitable consequence of imperfect assessments of entrepreneurial skill, it does notimply overconfidence. Judgmental fallibility leads to excess entry even when everyone isunderconfident. Self-selection implies greater confidence (but not necessarilyoverconfidence) among those who start new businesses than those who do not and amongsuccessful entrants than failures. Our results question claims that entrepreneurs areoverconfident and emphasize the need to understand the role of judgmental fallibility inproducing economic outcomes.

Take-the-best and other simple strategies: Why and when they work 'well' in binary choice

The effectiveness of decision rules depends on characteristics of bothrules and environments. A theoretical analysis of environments specifiesthe relative predictive accuracies of the lexicographic rule 'take-the-best'(TTB) and other simple strategies for binary choice. We identify threefactors: how the environment weights variables; characteristics of choicesets; and error. For cases involving from three to five binary cues, TTBis effective across many environments. However, hybrids of equal weights(EW) and TTB models are more effective as environments become morecompensatory. In the presence of error, TTB and similar models do not predictmuch better than a naïve model that exploits dominance. We emphasizepsychological implications and the need for more complete theories of theenvironment that include the role of error.

Cumulative dominance and heuristic performance in binary multi-attribute choice

Several studies have reported high performance of simple decision heuristics multi-attribute decision making. In this paper, we focus on situations where attributes are binary and analyze the performance of Deterministic-Elimination-By-Aspects (DEBA) and similar decision heuristics. We consider non-increasing weights and two probabilistic models for the attribute values: one where attribute values are independent Bernoulli randomvariables; the other one where they are binary random variables with inter-attribute positive correlations. Using these models, we show that good performance of DEBA is explained by the presence of cumulative as opposed to simple dominance. We therefore introduce the concepts of cumulative dominance compliance and fully cumulative dominance compliance and show that DEBA satisfies those properties. We derive a lower bound with which cumulative dominance compliant heuristics will choose a best alternative and show that, even with many attributes, this is not small. We also derive an upper bound for the expected loss of fully cumulative compliance heuristics and show that this is moderateeven when the number of attributes is large. Both bounds are independent of the values ofthe weights.

Is confidence in decisions related to feedback? Evidence-and lack of evidence-from random samples of real-world managerial behavior?

Confidence in decision making is an important dimension of managerialbehavior. However, what is the relation between confidence, on the onehand, and the fact of receiving or expecting to receive feedback ondecisions taken, on the other hand? To explore this and related issuesin the context of everyday decision making, use was made of the ESM(Experience Sampling Method) to sample decisions taken by undergraduatesand business executives. For several days, participants received 4 or 5SMS messages daily (on their mobile telephones) at random moments at whichpoint they completed brief questionnaires about their current decisionmaking activities. Issues considered here include differences between thetypes of decisions faced by the two groups, their structure, feedback(received and expected), and confidence in decisions taken as well as inthe validity of feedback. No relation was found between confidence indecisions and whether participants received or expected to receivefeedback on those decisions. In addition, although participants areclearly aware that feedback can provide both confirming and disconfirming evidence, their ability to specify appropriatefeedback is imperfect. Finally, difficulties experienced inusing the ESM are discussed as are possibilities for further researchusing this methodology.

Excess entry, ambiguity seeking and competence: An experimental investigation

Excess entry refers to the high failure rate of new entrepreneurial ventures. Economic explanations suggest 'hit and run' entrants and risk-seeking behavior. A psychological explanation is that people (entrepreneurs) are overconfident in their abilities (Camerer & Lovallo, 1999). Characterizing entry decisions as ambiguous gambles, we alternatively suggest following Heath and Tversky (1991) that people seek ambiguity when the source of uncertainty is related to their competence. Overconfidence, as such, plays no role. This hypothesis is confirmed in an experimental study that also documents the phenomenon of reference group neglect. Finally, we emphasize the utility that people gain from engaging in activities that contribute to a sense of competence. This is an important force in economic activity that deserves more explicit attention.

Satisfaction in choice as a function of the number of alternatives: When "goods satiate" but "bads escalate"

Whereas people are typically thought to be better off with more choices, studiesshow that they often prefer to choose from small as opposed to large sets of alternatives.We propose that satisfaction from choice is an inverted U-shaped function of thenumber of alternatives. This proposition is derived theoretically by considering thebenefits and costs of different numbers of alternatives and is supported by fourexperimental studies. We also manipulate the perceptual costs of information processingand demonstrate how this affects the resulting satisfaction function. We furtherindicate that satisfaction when choosing from a given set is diminished if people aremade aware of the existence of other choice sets. The role of individual differences insatisfaction from choice is documented by noting effects due to gender and culture. Weconclude by emphasizing the need to have an explicit rationale for knowing how muchchoice is enough.

Ambiguity seeking as a result of the status quo bias

Several factors affect attitudes toward ambiguity. What happens, however, when peopleare asked to exchange an ambiguous alternative in their possession for an unambiguousone? We present three experiments in which individuals preferred to retain the former.This status quo bias emerged both within- and between-subjects, with and withoutincentives, with different outcome distributions, and with endowments determined byboth the experimenter and the participants themselves. Findings emphasize the need toaccount for the frames of reference under which evaluations of probabilistic informationtake place as well as modifications that should be incorporated into descriptive modelsof decision making.

The challenge of representative design in psychology and economics

The demands of representative design, as formulated by Egon Brunswik (1956), set a high methodological standard. Both experimental participants and the situations with which they are faced should be representative of the populations to which researchers claim to generalize results. Failure to observe the latter has led to notable experimental failures in psychology from which economics could learn. It also raises questions about the meaning of testing economic theories in abstract environments. Logically, abstract tests can only be generalized to abstract realities and these may or may not have anything to do with the empirical realities experienced by economic actors.

Deciding analytically or trusting your intuition? The advantadges and disadvantadges of analytic and intuitive thought

Recent research has highlighted the notion that people can make judgmentsand choices by means of two systems that are labeled here tacit(or intuitive) and deliberate (or analytic). Whereas most decisionstypically involve both systems, this chapter examines the conditions underwhich each system is liable to be more effective. This aims to illuminatethe age-old issue of whether and when people should trust intuition or analysis. To do this, a framework is presented to understand how thetacit and deliberate systems work in tandem. Distinctions are also madebetween the types of information typically used by both systems as wellas the characteristics of environments that facilitate or hinder accuratelearning by the tacit system. Next, several experiments that havecontrasted intuitive and analytic modes on the same tasks are reviewed.Together, the theoretical framework and experimental evidence leads tospecifying the trade-off that characterizes their relative effectiveness.Tacit system responses can be subject to biases. In making deliberate systemresponses, however, people might not be aware of the correct rule to dealwith the task they are facing and/or make errors in executing it. Whethertacit or deliberate responses are more valid in particular circumstancesrequires assessing this trade-off. In this, the probability of making errorsin deliberate thought is postulated to be a function of the analytical complexityof the task as perceived by the person. Thus the trade-off is one of bias (inimplicit responses) versus analytical complexity (when tasks are handled indeliberate mode). Finally, it is noted that whereas much attention has beenpaid in the past to helping people make decisions in deliberate mode, effortsshould also be directed toward improving ability to make decisions intacit mode since the effectiveness of decisions clearly depends on both. Thistherefore represents an important frontier for research.

What risks do people perceive in everyday life? A perspective gained from the experience sampling method (ESM)

The experiential sampling method (ESM) was used to collect data from 74 parttimestudents who described and assessed the risks involved in their current activitieswhen interrupted at random moments by text messages. The major categories ofperceived risk were short-term in nature and involved loss of time or materials relatedto work and physical damage (e.g., from transportation). Using techniques of multilevelanalysis, we demonstrate effects of gender, emotional state, and types of risk onassessments of risk. Specifically, females do not differ from males in assessing thepotential severity of risks but they see these as more likely to occur. Also, participantsassessed risks to be lower when in more positive self-reported emotional states. Wefurther demonstrate the potential of ESM by showing that risk assessments associatedwith current actions exceed those made retrospectively. We conclude by notingadvantages and disadvantages of ESM for collecting data about risk perceptions.

On ignoring scientific evidence: The bumpy road to enlightenment

It is well accepted that people resist evidence that contradicts their beliefs.Moreover, despite their training, many scientists reject results that are inconsistent withtheir theories. This phenomenon is discussed in relation to the field of judgment anddecision making by describing four case studies. These concern findings that clinical judgment is less predictive than actuarial models; simple methods have proven superiorto more theoretically correct methods in times series forecasting; equal weighting ofvariables is often more accurate than using differential weights; and decisions cansometimes be improved by discarding relevant information. All findings relate to theapparently difficult-to-accept idea that simple models can predict complex phenomenabetter than complex ones. It is true that there is a scientific market place for ideas.However, like its economic counterpart, it is subject to inefficiencies (e.g., thinness,asymmetric information, and speculative bubbles). Unfortunately, the market is only correct in the long-run. The road to enlightenment is bumpy.

On heuristic and linear models of judgment: Mapping the demand for knowledge

Research on judgment and decision making presents a confusing picture of human abilities. For example, much research has emphasized the dysfunctional aspects of judgmental heuristics, and yet, other findings suggest that these can be highly effective. A further line of research has modeled judgment as resulting from as if linear models. This paper illuminates the distinctions in these approaches by providing a common analytical framework based on the central theoretical premise that understanding human performance requires specifying how characteristics of the decision rules people use interact with the demands of the tasks they face. Our work synthesizes the analytical tools of lens model research with novel methodology developed to specify the effectiveness of heuristics in different environments and allows direct comparisons between the different approaches. We illustrate with both theoretical analyses and simulations. We further link our results to the empirical literature by a meta-analysis of lens model studies and estimate both human andheuristic performance in the same tasks. Our results highlight the trade-off betweenlinear models and heuristics. Whereas the former are cognitively demanding, the latterare simple to use. However, they require knowledge and thus maps of when andwhich heuristic to employ.

Ethical differentiation and market behavior: An experimental approach

Does ethical differentiation of products affect market behavior? We examined this issue in triopolistic experimental markets where producers set prices. One producer s costs were higher than the others. In two treatments, the additional costs were attributed tocompliance with ethical guidelines. In the third, no justification was provided. Manyparticipants playing the role of consumers reduced their experimental gains by purchasing the ethically differentiated product at a higher price whether or not they knew the amount of extra cost. Individual differences were important (students of business/economics paid smaller premia than others). Finally, we speculate about the observed demand function for ethics and emphasize the use of experimental methodology to complement empirical studies designed to assess the potential market for ethically differentiated products.

The role of incidental variables of time in mood assessment

Determining what influences mood is important for theories of emotion and research onsubjective well-being. We consider three sets of factors: activities in which people areengaged; individual differences; and incidental variables that capture when mood ismeasured, e.g., time-of-day. These three factors were investigated simultaneously in a studyinvolving 168 part-time students who each responded 30 times in an experience samplingstudy conducted over 10 working days. Respondents assessed mood on a simple bipolarscale from 1 (very negative) to 10 (very positive). Activities had significant effects but,with the possible exception of variability in the expression of mood, no systematicindividual differences were detected. Diurnal effects, similar to those already reported inthe literature, were found as was an overall Friday effect. However, these effects weresmall. Lastly, the weather had little or no influence. We conclude that simple measures ofoverall mood are not greatly affected by incidental variables.